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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the evolution of civilian control of the military in the early 
American republic.  It looks in particular at the earliest days of the United States Navy, and 
how the executive branch maintained oversight of American military power at sea.  Prior to 
the War of 1812, the Navy Department’s authority over its officer corps was ill defined, and 
many naval officers displayed ambivalence about their civilian superiors, offering verbal 
acknowledgement of their subordination to civil authority, but often acting in ways contrary 
to orders.  The Constitution and congressional naval legislation provided little help, as both 
endorsed the idea of civilian control of the military but never clearly spelled out the exact 
boundaries of the relationship between government officials and military officers.  Naval 
officers sought to carve out a sphere of autonomy for themselves, without completely 
undermining the ideal of subordination to the civilian government.  Successive presidents 
and secretaries of the navy each established their own unique working relationship with their 
captains, and all of them engaged in repeated quarrels with recalcitrant officers over issues of 
personal honor, money, and duty assignments.  My dissertation explores the evolution of 
republican government in the United States, as successive presidential administrations sought 
to maximize the usefulness of military without at the same time undermining their ability to 
control it. 
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In each ship, there is one man who, in the hour of emergency or peril at sea, can turn to no other 
man. There is one who alone is ultimately responsible…He is the Commanding Officer. He is the 
ship. 
Joseph Conrad1 
 
The sea is no wet nurse for democracy.  Authority and privilege are her twin foster-children.  
Instant and unquestioning obedience is the rule of the sea; and your typical sea captain 
would make it the rule of land if he could. 
Samuel Eliot Morison2 
 
 
I owed my life to the service of my country.  But I knew of no duty imposing on me the 
obligation to sacrifice my reputation.  
Commodore Thomas Truxtun3 
 
 
The Secretary of the Navy, like the other secretaries, is the regular organ of the president for 
the business belonging to his department; and…his official acts derive their authority from, 
or, in other words, carry with them, the authority of the Executive of the U.S…He is to be 
understood to speak and act with the Executive sanction, or, in other words, the Executive is 
presumed to speak and act through him. 
 
James Madison4 
 
                                                 
1 Quoted in James Stavridis and William Mack, Command at Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 
4. 
 
2 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 
Company, 1921), 24 
 
3 Thomas Truxtun “Reply of Commodore Thomas Truxtun to an Attack made on him by the National 
Intelligencer in June 1806,” Thomas Truxtun Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Manuscript 
Collection, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 
 
4 James Madison to Benjamin Crowinshield, June 12, 1815 in Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, 
Fourth president of the United States, volume II, 4 volumes (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1865): 603-
606. 
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Introduction 
 June 1, 1813.  The War of 1812 had been raging for over a year, and had thus far 
brought nothing but embarrassment and frustration at sea for the British.  Captain Philip 
Broke of the Royal Navy burned for a chance to bring his ship, the HMS Shannon, into 
combat with one of the upstart Americans’ vaunted frigates, and his desperation came 
through in a letter to Captain James Lawrence of the U.S. vessel Chesapeake.  Broke’s 
pleasant tone and high praise for the American captain’s honor belied the bloody purpose of 
the missive.  “I request you will do me the favor to meet…ship to ship, to try the fortunes of 
our respective flags,” wrote Broke, adding a detailed explanation of the forces he had at his 
disposal and promising to order the other ships under his command to stay out of the battle, 
insuring equal odds.  If Lawrence preferred, Broke expressed his willingness to sail away 
from his squadron under a flag of truce, and engage the Chesapeake beyond all hope of 
reinforcements.  He even disclosed valuable intelligence, revealing to Lawrence that he 
lacked water and provisions for his crew, and would be exiting the scene very shortly.1 
 An American prisoner carried the letter ashore in Boston for Lawrence, only to find 
he had already sailed; Lawrence would not live to read his British counterpart’s challenge.  
Had he, the American captain probably would not have seen anything strange in Broke’s 
request.  This was a war between men of honor, and no captain of either navy could fail to 
seek out a chance to meet a ship of equal size in noble combat.  As it happened, Lawrence 
                                                 
1 Captain Philip Broke to Captain James Lawrence, June 5, 1813, William Dudley and Michael Crawford, eds., 
The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History (Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the 
Navy, 1985- ), 3 volumes, II: 126-128). Hereafter referred to as NW.  
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did not need to see Broke’s appeal.  When he learned that the Shannon was nearby, and 
sailing in isolation (Broke had sent away the remainder of his squadron to make himself a 
more tempting target for the American frigate), Lawrence immediately sought to bring it into 
action.1  
 Broke gleefully complied.  Among the Royal Navy’s most experienced officers and a 
man obsessed with drilling his crew, Broke proved more than ready for battle.  His men 
decimated the Chesapeake with their disciplined fire.  The first broadside destroyed 
Lawrence’s sails, making it impossible to steer the vessel, and Broke easily maneuvered to 
blast away at the hapless enemy two more times.  Meanwhile, snipers on board the Shannon 
cut down most of the American officers, including Lawrence himself.  Mortally wounded in 
the hip, Lawrence shouted to his men the legendary last words “Don’t give up the ship,” as 
he was carried below.  It was a hopeless order.  Second Lieutenant George Budd and Acting 
Third Lieutenant William Cox were now the senior officers on board, but Cox carried 
Lawrence below and was caught up in the swarm of retreating men while Budd was already 
engrossed in events belowdecks, oblivious to the desperate straits of his crew.  When Broke 
led a boarding party onto the Chesapeake, the inexperienced and leaderless Yankee sailors 
yielded easily, and the British lowered the American flag. 
 Lawrence lingered for four days following the battle, though largely insensible 
because of the pain.  He finally died on June 5, just as the Chesapeake sailed into Halifax, 
Nova Scotia.  The British showed the utmost regard for their gallant enemy, wrapping his 
                                                 
1 The account of the battle and its aftermath is primarily taken from Broke, “An account of the Chesapeake-
Shannon Action,” June 6, 1813; Lieutenant George Budd to Secretary of the Navy William Jones, June 13, 
1813, NW, II: 129-134; George Daughan, 1812: The Navy’s War (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 187-195; 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 volumes (New York: Dodo Press, 
1905), 119-136; Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812 (London: 
Faber & Faber, 2012), 159-191; and Kevin McCranie, Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies in the War 
of 1812 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012),  147-156.   
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body in the Chesapeake’s flag and burying him with full military honors.   The United States 
likewise showered praise on the fallen captain.  Although Lawrence was clearly and 
decisively beaten and his ship passed to the enemy’s control, his death insured that no 
censure would be attached to his name for decades.2  He became a martyr for his nation.  
Although the Chesapeake now belonged to the enemy and his body lay buried, the American 
public exalted Lawrence as a national hero, a man who had lived up to the standards of his 
era and profession by dying with honor. 
 He also blatantly defied orders.  Amid celebration of Lawrence as the heroic ideal of 
the young navy, most Americans chose to forget that Lawrence would have survived if he 
had obeyed the directives of his civilian superiors.3  The new secretary of the navy, William 
Jones, had been quite explicit that he was initiating a new strategy upon assuming office in 
1813, one that called for avoiding the British and preserving America’s precious few frigates, 
not seeking the glory of capturing ships that the Royal Navy could easily replace.4  In 
addition to the clearly-stated general orders of the new secretary, Lawrence also had very 
specific orders to disrupt the enemy’s communication and destroy it commerce; no room was 
left to him for adventurism against an equally-sized and more experienced Royal Navy 
vessel.   
 But a stronger imperative than obedience to orders drove Lawrence.  His keen sense 
of honor and quest for glory forbade him from fleeing in the face of the enemy, regardless of 
his civilian superior’s wishes.  It was impossible, of course, to hold the dead captain to 
                                                 
2 Alfred Thayer Mahan was among the first to criticize Lawrence for violating orders and seeking battle with a 
significantly more experienced captain and crew.  Mahan, War of 1812, 118-134. 
3 Daughan, 1812, 195; Mahan, War of 1812, 118-119. 
4 Jones Circular to Officers, February 22, 1813, NW, II: 48 
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account for allowing himself to be drawn into an engagement, but even if he had survived it 
is doubtful there would have been any serious repercussions.  Lawrence was a product of an 
officer corps that prized aggressiveness, unassailable physical courage, and even reckless 
daring.  And the civilian leadership of that navy had not opposed such attitudes prior to the 
War of 1812; it often applauded them.  When William Jones took over the Navy Department 
in 1813 and tried to rein in these traits, he clashed with the policies of his predecessors and 
the prevailing culture of the officer corps.  
Civil-Military Relations in the Early U.S. Navy 
 Jones was not the only secretary, however, to struggle to define his relationship with 
the navy’s officer corps.  The first five secretaries of the navy and their officers suffered from 
an ambiguous relationship.  In the early republic, everyone – government officials, military 
officers, and citizens – accepted the idea that the military must remain subordinate to the 
civilian government.  However, exactly what that subordination should look like was often 
contested.  Naval officers verbally acknowledged their duty to obey the government, and 
there was never the slightest threat of a naval coup or a rogue captain abandoning his 
country.  Nevertheless, officers also felt that certain matters were their prerogative, and 
guarded their turf zealously. The Constitution and congressional naval legislation provided 
little help; while both affirmed the ideal of civilian control of the military, neither clearly 
spelled out the exact boundaries of responsibility of military officers.  Moreover, the small 
size of the Navy Department and the vast distances separating captains from civilian 
superiors meant that naval officers often had to assume a measure of autonomy.  Successive 
secretaries of the navy – Benjamin Stoddert, Robert Smith, Paul Hamilton, William Jones, 
and Benjamin Crowninshield – each established his own unique working relationship with 
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his captains, even as each faced repeated quarrels with recalcitrant officers over issues of 
personal honor, money, and duty assignments.  
This recalcitrance should not have come as a surprise, however, to the secretaries. 
American naval officers certainly understood their generations’ ideas about authority, 
hierarchy, and deference, but they also saw themselves as very high on the social ladder.  In 
1835, while stationed in Constantinople, Commodore David Porter noted the parallels 
between the Turkish sultan, who ruled his people with absolute authority, and the power of 
the captain of a naval vessel.  “A man of war is a petty kingdom, governed by a petty 
despot,” he observed.  In ways, the captain maintained even more unchecked power than the 
Sultan, for being “the most absolute sovereign on earth,” Mahmoud could “afford to be kind 
and courteous to those around him.”  The ruler of a man of war must, to maintain the 
unquestioned obedience of his subjects, lord over his subordinates on board with near 
tyrannical authority to maintain their constant compliance.5  For many officers, releasing that 
power, once the ship was in port, proved problematic. 
   The power of a captain over his seamen was indeed immense, and officers saw 
themselves as inhabiting a different world than those who took orders from them.  To stoop 
to receiving orders instead of giving them could be frustrating.  David Porter, the same man 
who compared himself to a Turkish sultan, groused at one point that South Carolinian 
Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton needed to remember that his officers were of an entirely 
different class and station than the plantation slaves he could command at his pleasure.  “It is 
supposed,” Porter said of Hamilton, “that he has been too long in the habit of driving slaves 
                                                 
5 David Porter, Constantinople and its Environs in a Series of Letters, Exhibiting the Actual State of the 
Manners, Customs and Habits of the Turks, Armenians, Jews and Greeks as Modified by the Policy of Sultan 
Mahmoud by an American Long Resident at Constantinople. 2 volumes (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1835): 10-11. 
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to know how to regard the honorable feelings of gentlemen.”6  While willing to acknowledge 
the vague principle of civilian authority, officers also valued their own independence and 
dignity, and resented it when they perceived civilian oversight as too restrictive.     
It was not so much the reality of orders that troubled officers, however, as the nature 
of them.  Naval officers saw certain areas as their own concerns, and expected civilian 
officials to defer to their judgment.  Usually, the secretary of the navy was willing to comply. 
As Porter’s quote about “petty despots” indicates, the captain of a ship enjoyed the Navy 
Department’s full backing in his treatment of junior officers and especially the men under his 
command.  We may argue whether or not Porter exaggerated in comparing his role to that of 
a dictator.  Christopher McKee contends that there was an unspoken relationship between 
officers and men aboard ship that constrained the captains’ authority.7  Even McKee, 
however, ascribes this constraint of an officer’s power to the men themselves, who might 
mutiny if their captain exceeded mutually-acceptable limits.  As for the secretary of the navy, 
he occasionally agreed to transfer a junior officer unhappy with his commander, though even 
that was rare, but he virtually never intervened on behalf of ordinary seamen, even when they 
appealed to him.8 
                                                 
6 Quoted in David Long, Nothing Too Daring: A Biography of Commodore David Porter, 1783-1843 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1970), 58. 
7 Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 
1794-1815 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 258-259. 
8 Matthew Raffety, The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013), also argues that tensions sprang up on board American merchant vessels 
from seamen who believed their officers were too authoritarian, though he has less to say about naval service.  
While he contends that American courts sometimes intervened on behalf of merchant seamen, most of his 
analysis dates from the Jacksonian era, when democratic ideals were on the rise and increasing tensions 
between classes.  This project cuts off before that time, and is mainly focused on an earlier ethic, one more 
attuned to hierarchy and obedience.   
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Senior officers showed varying degrees of concern for the well-being of their seamen, 
but most took the responsibility for their subordinate officers very seriously.  In an era prior 
to any kind of naval academy, they understood that it was their duty to train up the next 
generation of naval officers, and they devoted significant attention to this role.  The first five 
secretaries of the navy were generally happy to let them.  Stoddert looked to his officers to 
choose the best of their subordinates for promotion, and while later secretaries took a much 
more active role in choosing candidates for commissions and promotions, they still gave 
significant latitude to senior officers in dealing with their subordinates.  Robert Smith, for 
example, established a formal examination for promotion to lieutenant, rather than simply 
rubber-stamping captains’ recommendations.  Yet it was the captains who conducted the 
examinations, and managing promotion remained primarily the duty of the officer corps 
itself.  Smith and Hamilton also proved generous with leave for young officers to sail on 
merchant voyages and learn their profession, but whenever a “young gentleman” was on 
board a naval vessel, he was indisputably under the authority of his captain.9  It fell to 
captains to cull the ranks of undesirable officers, and they enjoyed substantial discretion 
when they felt a young man was worthy of a second chance.  In short, whatever the vagaries 
of the relationship between civilian authority and senior officers, the fact of a chain-of-
                                                 
9 In the 1820s, this situation started to change somewhat.  While during the years this dissertation covers 
promotion was fairly rapid and opportunities to distinguish oneself readily available, with the conclusion of the 
War of 1812 promotion stagnated, and many officers remained stuck in a lieutenancy for many years.  Tensions 
between junior and senior officers naturally emerged, and both groups occasionally appealed to the secretary of 
the navy or the president for support, though civilian leaders still generally sided with the ranking officer.  See: 
Linda Maloney, The Captain from Connecticut: The Life and Naval Times of Isaac Hull (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1986), 449-468, esp. 457; Claude Berube and John Rodgaard, A Call to the Sea: Captain 
Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), 126-132; David Curtis Skaggs, 
Thomas Macdonough: Master of Command in the Early U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2003), 174-185.     
8 
 
command in control of more junior officers remained unambiguous in the early days of the 
Navy Department, and junior officers interacted with the secretary through their superiors. 
Eventually, the officer corps and navy department forged an unofficial division of 
labor that maximized the navy’s ability to enhance American prestige, allowed the officer 
corps a sphere of autonomy, yet remained firmly committed to the principle of civilian 
control.  Officers understood that any display of timidity or excessive caution in the face of 
another nation meant an immediate end to that officer’s career.  The officer corps assumed 
near-total responsibility for the oversight of junior officers and seamen as well as the day-to-
day management of the navy.  Yet questions of where to deploy naval force and how sea 
power should be used were firmly vested in the secretary of the navy, acting at the behest of 
president. 
Historiography of the Early U.S. Navy 
 The period covered by this dissertation is among the most-written about eras of 
American naval history.  It is a story that appeals to Americans’ patriotic fervor and love of 
drama.  According to the popular narrative, the tiny American navy, beset by domestic foes 
and dwarfed by the mighty Royal Navy, overcame the odds and ultimately proved its worth 
in a series of stunning victories during the War of 1812.  There is a measure of truth to this 
story, but in its nationalistic and sensational aspects it ignores a more complex reality.  
Fortunately, historians have produced a bevy of nuanced, carefully-researched studies of the 
early days of the United States Navy.  Even among the wealth of excellent historical studies, 
however, there remains a gap in the literature.  The relationship between the civilian and 
military leadership of the early navy is understudied, and by analyzing it we can come to a 
deeper understanding of the administrative history of the early republic, the development of 
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the executive branch, American cultural attitudes towards armed forces and violence, and the 
role of international factors in America’s evolution as a republic. 
 Accounts of the earliest days of the American navy came almost immediately.  
Following the successes of the War of 1812, writers found an eager market for works on the 
birth of the American navy and the exploits of its officers.  Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, 
himself a naval officer who had served under Stephen Decatur, penned biographies of some 
of the most famous heroes, including Decatur as well as Oliver Hazard Perry.10  James 
Fenimore Cooper, the famed novelist, was also a naval enthusiast, and he published A 
History of the Navy of the United States and Lives of American Naval Officers.11  America’s 
celebration of the War of 1812 did not only inspire Americans, however.  William James, a 
British naval officer, became disgusted with what he perceived (not unreasonably) as 
American distortions of the recent conflict.  He began what he hoped would be an impartial 
history of the war in 1817.  He vehemently argued that the war had been an indisputable 
British triumph.  The American ships that had won victories were all significantly larger than 
their British counterparts and, he argued, mostly manned by British deserters anyway.  
Furthermore, James argues, they failed to weaken the massive British Navy in any 
appreciable sense.12 
                                                 
10 Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, Life of Stephen Decatur: A Commodore in the Navy of the United States 
(Boston: Little and Brown, 1846); The Life of Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry (New York: Harper, 1840). 
11 James Fenimore Cooper, A History of the Navy of the United States of America (Philadelphia: Lee and 
Blanchard, 1839); Cooper, Lives of Distinguished American Naval Officers (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 
1846). 
12 William James, Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812: A full and correct account of the naval war between 
Great Britain and the United States of America, 1812-1815 (London: Conway Maritime, 2004, originally 
published 1817). 
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 These earliest histories of the navy enjoyed one tremendous advantage over 
subsequent historians: the ability to interview participants in the events they described.  As a 
result, we have access to many occurrences that would otherwise have gone unrecorded.  
Unfortunately, these authors seldom cited their interviews, and indeed used citation lightly.  
Thus, while we may know of episodes that would otherwise be lost to history, we also have 
to take the authors’ word that they come from reliable sources.  Moreover, the emphasis in 
early histories was overwhelmingly on the officers themselves.  Civilian administrators 
receive scant credit or even attention for their role in these events. 
 By the dawn of the twentieth century, a new generation of naval scholars with a 
somewhat more modern standard of scholarship rose to the fore.  Most famously, Theodore 
Roosevelt wrote The Naval War of 1812 to counter James.  While acknowledging that earlier 
American claims were somewhat inflated, Roosevelt still refutes James’ claim that the U.S. 
Navy was crushed, arguing that Americans can indeed recall the war with pride.13  Written in 
roughly the same period, Gardner Allen’s excellent studies of the American Revolution, the 
Quasi War with France, and the Barbary Wars are also characterized by thorough research, 
but exclusively interested in the exploits of officers in battle.14   
 The beginning of the twentieth century also saw the birth of administrative history of 
the navy.  Charles Oscar Paullin’s voluminous output covered the management of the early 
navy, and touched on civil-military relations on occasion.  His emphasis was consistently on 
who directed the navy in peacetime as well as war, and he was careful to cover matters of 
                                                 
13 Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 (New York: The Modern Library, 1999, originally published 
1881). 
14 Gardner Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution, 2 volumes, (New York: Houghton-Mifflin 
Company, 1913); Allen, Our Naval War with France (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1909); and Allen, Our 
Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1905). 
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procurement, supply, and finances as well as leadership.  As a result, secretaries of the navy 
played a prominent role in his narratives.15   
 Paullin remains widely read among naval historians, but he was the anomaly.  As the 
century progressed, officers and battles remained the primary interest of scholars.  
Biographies, in particular, made up the bulk of the writing on the subject.  William Bell 
Clark wrote a plethora of biographies, usually focused on the American Revolution.16  
Dudley Knox likewise penned a narrative account of American naval history that primarily 
focuses on officers as American heroes.17 
 Still, at midcentury, signs of the so-called “New Military History” were certainly 
present.  Harold and Margaret Sprout’s work on the creation of the American navy is 
explicitly focused on the wider American public’s perception of their country’s maritime 
forces.18  Marshal Smelser also delved into the navy’s place in American society, exploring 
the Congressional debates on founding a maritime force, and how such a force would mesh 
with republican ideology.19 
                                                 
15 Most of Paullin’s articles have been compiled into a single volume: Paullin’s History of Naval 
Administration, 1775-1911: A Collection of Articles from the US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis: US 
Naval Institute, 1968).  Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy and Its 
Achievements (New York: Haskell House Ltd, 1971), originally published 1906.   
16 William Bell Clark, Gallant John Barry, 1745-1803: The Story of a Naval Hero of Two Wars (New York, 
The Macmillan Company, 1938); Captain Dauntless: The Story of Nicolas Biddle and the Continental Navy 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1949);  Lambert Wickes: Sea Raider and Diplomat; the Story of a 
Naval Captain of the Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1932); George Washington’s Navy: 
Being an Account of His Excellency’s Fleet in New England Waters (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1960); and Ben Franklin’s Privateers: A Naval Epic of the American Revolution (Baton 
Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1956). 
17 Dudley Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1936).  
18 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1939). 
19 Marshal Smelser, The Congress Founds the Navy, 1787-1798. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1959). 
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 Currently, there are three distinct but interrelated strands of American naval history.  
There remains a massive market for traditional narratives of the creation and course of the 
American navy, but we also have a much wider variety of works on administrative history 
and social history.  Narrative accounts, of course, often incorporate elements of social and 
administrative history alongside major political and military events, but they tend to be more 
focused on the stuff of narrative history: major battles, political maneuvering, and key 
leaders.    
Such accounts of the early navy abound, whether focused on individual conflicts and 
events or the overarching narrative.  The War of 1812, in particular, has been the subject of 
considerable attention during its bicentennial, and a wealth of new scholarship has emerged 
studying the war at sea and on the Great Lakes.20  Many of these works also provide a 
valuable perspective by integrating the events of the war at sea into the wider conflict.  Other 
recent works cover a broader time span, showing the War of 1812 as the climax of the United 
States Navy’s development, much the way it was perceived by the participants.21   
                                                 
20 The recent scholarship on the War of 1812 to coincide with its bicentennial is voluminous.  Some exceptional 
works not already cited here include: Donald Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial 
Edition (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2012), originally published 1989; Alan Taylor, The Civil War 
of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2010); 
and John Elting, Amateurs to Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812 (Da Capo Press, 1995), originally 
published 1991.  For the war on the Great Lakes, see: David Curtis Skaggs and Gerard Atloff, A Signal Victory: 
The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812-1213 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997); and Eliot Cohen, 
Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles along the Great Warpath that made the American Way of 
War (New York: The Free Press, 2011),  267-304.  Other conflicts from this period have received far less 
attention.  For the Quasi War: Michael Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with 
France, 1798-1801 (1987. Reprinted with a new introduction by the author. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2000).  For the Barbary Wars, in addition to Lambert: Michael  Kitzen, Tripoli and the United States at War: A 
History of American Relations with the Barbary States, 1785-1805 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993); Frederick 
Leiner, The End of the Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
21 William Fowler, Jack Tars and Commodores: The American navy, 1783-1815 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 
Company, 1984); Ian Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2006). 
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 Social and cultural historians have also turned their gaze towards the navy, but their 
emphasis has been almost exclusively focused on the ordinary seamen who manned the 
ships; the officers receive less attention and civilian administrators almost none at all.22  Two 
exceptions, James Valle’s Rocks and Shoals and Matthew Raffety’s The Republic Afloat, 
address the relationship between officers and their men, though Raffety is almost exclusively 
interested in merchant shipping.23  A more comprehensive portrait of the officer corps can be 
found in Christopher Mckee’s magisterial, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession.  Based 
on a tremendous wealth of careful research, McKee’s study shows how officers perceived 
themselves, their subordinates, and their profession.  There is little that McKee does not 
touch on, tracing the origins of the officer corps under the Washington and Adams 
Administrations, and also showing the progress from midshipman to (hopefully) captain that 
succeeding generations of naval officers followed.  He also recognizes the importance of 
secretaries of the navy, and gives descriptions of each one that come to office prior to 1815 
and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses.24   
 Administrative history of the American navy, as noted above, dates back to Charles 
Oscar Paullin, and he remains among the foremost authors on the subject.  Paolo  Coletta’s 
edited volume American Secretaries of the Navy is a superb resource for understanding who 
the secretaries were, offering short biographical sketches of each one through World War 
                                                 
22 For the experiences of Jack Tar in the early republic, see Paul Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront: American 
Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); and Peter 
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden 
History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). 
23 James Valle, Rocks and Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861 (Annapolis, MD: naval 
Institute Press, 1980); Raffety, The Republic Afloat, 95-98, 123-124. Both works will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 2. 
24 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession. 
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II.25  Edward Eckert’s The Navy Department in the War of 1812 is a valuable resource, but at 
a scant 77 pages, it is hardly comprehensive.26  Michael Palmer’s Stoddert’s War is an 
administrative history only in a very limited sense, as his primary concern is with the first 
secretary of the navy’s strategic thinking.  Still, Palmer integrates the story of the oversight 
of the navy and its management by civilians with that of the battles and sea admirably, to 
paint a more complete picture of this understudied conflict.27  
 This study aims to bring together these three strands, showing how the military 
culture of the early American naval officer corps was directly shaped by civilian 
administrators and in turn restricted those administrators’ ability to impose their will on the 
officer corps.  It traces the implicit and explicit negotiations over power in the early navy, 
negotiations that were rooted in ideas about authority, personal freedom, deference, and 
honor.  The administrative history of the creation and development of the United States Navy 
cannot be understood apart from social and cultural ideas of the time.  
Chapter Outline 
 The dissertation begins with the creation of the United States Navy in 1794.  To fully 
understand the relationship between naval officers and their civilian superiors at this time, 
however, it is vital to first explore two key concepts that shaped virtually every aspect of this 
relationship.  The first is American understandings of civil-military relations.  Chapter one 
explores the current social science and historical literature on civil-military relations and 
applies these concepts to the early American republic. 
                                                 
25 Paolo Coletta, American Secretaries of the Navy, Volume I, 1775-1913 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1980). 
26 Edward Eckert, The Navy Department in the War of 1812 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
1971). 
27 Palmer, Stoddert’s War. 
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 Chapter two focuses on honor.  American naval officers drew on two traditions for 
their understanding of honor.  European armies, and especially the British, had carefully-
delineated expectations of honorable behavior from their officers, and their American 
counterparts thoroughly internalized these standards.  Meanwhile, society as a whole in the 
early republic still expected men of honor to hold to certain standards, including unassailable 
personal integrity and refusal to brook the slightest insult, and American naval officers were 
committed to these principles as well.  This chapter also notes how the infant republic sought 
national honor, and how the standards of the time applied to the nation, and its navy, as a 
whole as well as to individuals.      
Chapter three begins the narrative discussion of the early U.S. Navy.  It addresses the 
dissolution of the Continental Navy after the American Revolution and the arguments for and 
against creating a new force in the early republic.  Its primary interest, however, is in how 
Benjamin Stoddert, the first secretary of the navy, established the Navy Department, set the 
tone for his officer corps, and made a lasting impact on the military culture of the force.  
Stoddert was thoroughly committed to his era’s understanding of honor, and drilled that 
sense into the officer corps of the new navy, removing those who failed to measure up.  His 
tenure had a lasting impact on the culture of the U.S. Navy. 
 Chapters four and five deal with the Jeffersonian Republicans in power.  Although 
widely perceived as “anti-navy,” which many in his party certainly were, Thomas Jefferson 
actually used naval force fairly effectively in the war with Tripoli.  Chapter four details how 
Stoddert’s culture of honor had several negative repercussions, including rampant dueling 
among junior officers, and also analyzes the American war with Tripoli in light of the civil-
military relationship in the navy at that time.   
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Chapter five focuses on Jefferson and his successor, James Madison, in their domestic 
naval policy.  It includes the maligned gunboat program and embargo of 1807, both of which 
were particularly distasteful to naval officers.  Nevertheless, those same officers dutifully 
worked to advance both to the best of their abilities, demonstrating that while civil-military 
relations might grow strained, officers’ commitment to the principle remained strong.  
Meanwhile, the officer corps sought to purge its own shame over the humiliating 
Chesapeake-Leopard episode, in which one of their own, James Barron, yielded to a Royal 
Navy vessel of equal size without a fight.  The embarrassment of this episode burned for 
years, and officers sought to regain the honor of their profession after Barron, they believed, 
had tarnished it. 
 The War of 1812 is the subject of the sixth chapter.  Begun during the administration 
of Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, the first six months of the war saw stunning 
American victories at sea alongside severe bureaucratic incompetence at home.  The latter 
eventually became too much for Madison, and he sacked Hamilton after securing reelection.  
To replace him, the president turned to William Jones, a Philadelphia merchant.  Jones 
immediately set about attempting a culture change in the navy, urging officers to flee 
needless combat and concern themselves less with the nation’s honor and more with 
commercial warfare.  His changes yielded some fruit militarily, but failed to make a major 
dent in officers’ attitudes beyond his short tenure. 
 Finally, chapter seven considers the aftermath of the war.  A dramatic change in the 
national outlook wrought by the war led to a greatly expanded emphasis on the 
professionalization of America’s military forces, and the navy benefited from this.  This 
chapter examines the expansion of the navy in the aftermath of the war, and also the areas in 
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whcih naval officers’ ambitions remained disappointed.  Central to these changes was the 
new administrative apparatus set up for the now-larger navy.  The Board of Navy 
Commissioners was intended as a way to reduce the secretary’s workload, but instead it 
created an opportunity for high-ranking naval officers to press for more power, and a 
harmonious working relationship only emerged after the president ruled, decisively, in favor 
of the secretary.  Even then, with the idea of civilian supremacy affirmed, the exact 
boundaries of civilian control remained murky, and the relationship between the secretary 
and the Board continued to be a fluid one well into the 1820s. 
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The Essential Principles of our Government: Civilian Control of the Military 
 
The supremacy of the civil over the military authority… [is one 
of] the essential principles of our government.  
Thomas Jefferson1 
 
The Army (considering the irritable state it is in, its sufferings 
and composition) is a dangerous instrument to play with… 
Upon the whole, disband the Army, as soon as possible; but 
consult the wishes of it, which really are moderate, in the 
mode, and perfectly compatible with the honor, dignity, and 
justice which is due from the country to it. 
George Washington2 
 
In the autumn of 1777, with Philadelphia captured and British troops rapidly closing 
in on two almost completed ships, General George Washington calculated that it would be 
better to sink the vessels than allow them to be put to the enemy’s use.  Thus, he gave orders 
to destroy the Effingham and the Washington.  The Commander-in-Chief sent word to the 
local Navy Board, one of two bodies created by the Continental Congress to oversee 
administrative matters of the rebellious colonies’ maritime forces.  The Board immediately 
forwarded the commander’s wishes to John Barry, the captain charged with overseeing the 
ships’ construction.3  On the night before the ships were scuttled, Barry and one Board 
member, Francis Hopkinson, engaged in a shouting match that did little credit to either man 
                                                 
1 Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1801, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition, 
ed. Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008. 
2 George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 4, 1783, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton Digital Edition, 
ed. Harold C. Syrett. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2011. 
3 Tim McGrath, John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail (Yardley, PA: Westholme Press, 2010), 126-
137. See also: Joseph Gurn, Commodore John Barry: Father of the American navy (Cranbury, NJ: The 
Scholar’s Bookshelf, 2005, originally published 1933), 54-70 provide the best secondary accounts of this 
episode, though both are noticeably slanted in Barry’s favor. 
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and eventually led to a court martial.  Barry appealed to Hopkinson to allow work to continue 
on the ships, assuring him that his defenses were adequate and that there was no chance of 
them falling into the enemy’s hands.  Hopkinson informed Barry of his refusal in a manner 
the heroic and proud captain found humiliating, denigrating his knowledge of maritime 
matters and issuing the directive in a condescending tone.  Flying into a rage, Barry informed 
his rival that he “knew more about a ship than General Washington and the Navy Board 
together,” and threatened to refuse to sink the ships.   Hopkinson exploded with anger, 
shouting “you shall obey our orders,” and forcibly evicted Barry from his office.1 
 While it would be easy to interpret Barry and Hopkinson’s spat as a personality clash 
between two proud men, the deeper reality is that this episode emerged out of a murky civil-
military relationship that haunted the Continental Navy throughout the Revolution.2  
Although created by the Continental Congress to act on its behalf, the local Navy Board that 
Hopkinson oversaw was unsure of its relationship to General Washington.  Indeed, in the 
course of his argument with Hopkinson, Barry even claimed that, as his original orders came 
from the Marine Committee of the Continental Congress, he could not sink the vessels until 
authorized to do so by that body.3  While Barry himself ultimately did not put enough stock 
in this argument to defy Hopkinson, and finally did sink the ships as ordered, it is telling that 
no one seemed to know where final authority rested throughout the ordeal. 
                                                 
1 McGrath, John Barry, 129-130. 
2 For the Continental Navy, see: William Fowler, Rebels Under Sail: The American navy during the Revolution. 
(New York: Scribner, 1976); Nathan Miller, Sea of Glory: The Continental Navy Fights for Independence, 
1775-1783.  (New York: David McKay Company Inc, 1974); and James Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The 
American Revolution Afloat (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 2007). 
3 John Barry to the Continental Congress, January 10, 1778, in Clark, Naval Documents, XI: 85-88. 
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 A clearer civil-military relationship emerged under the Constitution, which 
emphatically invested command over the armed forces in the president.4  A healthy 
relationship between the government and America’s tiny standing army and navy did not 
immediately follow.  However reassuring the idea of civilian control of the military might 
sound – and it is rightly regarded as one of the bedrocks of republican government – the truth 
is that it is a concept that is very much open to interpretation, debate, and even manipulation.  
Americans today, both scholars and servicepersons, still struggle to define the proper division 
of responsibility between the military and the civilian government.  This chapter explores the 
literature on civil-military relations, particularly when it comes to questions of the military’s 
ability to manage its own internal affairs and what role military officers’ expertise and advice 
should play in civilian decision-making.  Understanding the early American navy through 
this lens will enable us to make sense of the often contentious relationship between the office 
of the secretary of the navy and the officer corps.  Far from inhabiting a different world than 
military officers of the twenty-first century, naval officers of the early republic clashed over 
almost identical issues to those explored by present-day political scientists, and a stronger 
conceptual understanding of civil-military relations literature highlights the rationale behind 
many of the issues that plagued relations between the first American naval officers and the 
early U.S. government. 
   
 
                                                 
4 Richard H. Kohn, “The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers,” Richard H. Kohn, ed., 
The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989 (New York: New York 
University Press, 1991), 61-94. 
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Like the leaders of the early republic, scholars today struggle to define the precise 
meaning of civilian control.  Christopher Gibson offers what is probably the most concise 
definition, labeling civilian control as “the exercise of the will of the country’s elected 
leadership over the armed forces.”5 Richard Kohn agrees, defining civilian control as a 
situation in which “all great decisions relating to war and peace, to raising and organizing 
armies and navies, to governing them internally, and to their use and support, [rests] in the 
hands of the representatives of the people, or those appointed by them to administer military 
affairs.”6  Similarly, Kohn elsewhere defines true civilian supremacy as when civilians not 
only issue orders, but when they “frame the alternatives and define the discussion, as well as 
make the final choice.”7  While these definitions might seem all-encompassing and absolute, 
there is in fact a considerable literature in the disciplines of political science and sociology on 
the proper nature and extent of civilian-control of the military, and this debate can be of great 
help in informing our understanding of the earliest interactions between the new United 
States’ government and military forces.   
The social science literature largely ignores the early republic.  Samuel Huntington, in 
one of the first works to delve into civil-military relations, The Soldier and the State, argued 
that a professional officer corps did not exist in the United States prior to the Civil War, and 
he has little to say about all that came before that.8  Although Huntington has been critiqued 
                                                 
5 Christopher Gibson, “National Security and Civilian Control of the Military: A Madisonian Approach,” 
Suzanne Neilsen and Don Snyder, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New 
Era, (Baltimore: Johns-Hopkins University Press, 2009), 248. 
6 Richard H. Kohn, “Civil-Military Relations: Civilian Control of the Military,” John Whiteclay Chambers, ed., 
The Oxford Companion to American Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 122. 
7 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8.4 (1997), 140-153. 
8 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 193-221. 
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by historians on that point, it remains true that most practitioners of political science, public 
policy, and sociology are far more interested in recent history as the material for their 
arguments and theories.9  A major intervention of this project is to apply the concepts from 
this literature to the United States in the decades immediately following the American 
Revolution.  Although standing military forces in the early republic were comparatively tiny, 
and their destructive capacity dramatically less than it is at present, current social science 
literature on civil-military relations can still make the role of the military in the early 
American republic more understandable. 
 Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State remains one of the most influential 
works available on civil-military relations, and essential reading for any scholar of American 
attitudes towards its armed forces.10  Huntington argues in favor of what he calls “objective 
civilian control,” wherein the officer corps is allowed autonomy to manage their forces and 
wage war as they see fit, while being removed from political questions.  This is superior to 
subjective civilian control, in which the civilian government oversees all aspects of the 
                                                 
9 For example, Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United 
States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), and Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: 
American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) both 
address the post-Cold War U.S. military.  The impact of September 11, 2001 on civil-military relations is also 
an area of concern, as seen in Feaver and Gelpi as well as Thomas Mackubin, U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 
9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).  Much of the 
political science literature on civil-military relations is also concerned with emerging democracies and the 
developing world, such as: Larry Diamond and Mark Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: (A 
Journal of Democracy Book) (Baltimore, MD: Johns-Hopkins University Press, 1996); Dale Herspring, Civil-
Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four Nation Study (Baltimore, MD: Johns-Hopkins University 
Press, 2013); Dhirendra Vajpeyi and Glenn Segall, eds., Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries 
(Washington DC: Lexington Books, 2013). 
10 Huntington’s sugnificance remains true despite the fact that much of his argument has been discredited or 
challenged.  Peter Feaver and Erika Seeler note that Huntington’s influence extends beyond the nature of his 
argument to the simple fact that he was the first to apply social science methods to questions of civil-military 
relations.  His ideas “remain influential, not because subsequent scholars have accepted Huntington’s argument 
in toto – most have not – but because it is almost impossible to think or write about civil-military relations 
without engaging Huntington.”  Peter Feaver and Erika Seeler, “Before and After Huntington: The 
Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies,” Nielsen and Snider, American Civil-Military Relations, 
72-73. 
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military.  The military, Huntington contends, is altogether different from civilian society, 
espousing conservative values and a pessimistic outlook generally not shared by those 
outside the armed forces.  Subjective control tries to make the military conform to civilian 
culture and values, leaving that society at a disadvantage when warfare arises.  Society needs 
the values of the military, and needs the military to be able to function in its mission 
unimpeded by the civilian population’s liberal values.  Objective civilian control allows the 
military to flourish within its own realm, while keeping it “a tool of the state.”11 
 Peter Feaver challenges Huntington’s interpretation, however, seeing the relationship 
between civil and military as less rigid than Huntington’s objective model, and the 
government’s role in overseeing the military as far more expansive.  Feaver argues that 
military officers and their civilian superiors form a principal-agent relationship.  The 
principal – the civilian government – delegates to an agent – the military – to perform a 
variety of tasks related to maintaining national security.  Feaver’s framework creates 
significant complications for Huntington’s strict civil-military bifurcation.  The civilian 
government, Feaver argues, will necessarily influence military matters, and the military 
leadership will of course have preferences on policy issues; true objective control cannot 
exist in the real world.  Furthermore, rather than a strict division between obedience to orders 
and insubordination, Feaver sees a spectrum of subordination and considers military leaders’ 
response to civilian superiors in terms of “working” and shirking.”  Shirking, in this case, 
does not refer to cowardice in battle, but merely to an officer allowing his preferences to 
trump those of the civilian government.  “Working, in the broadest sense of the word, means 
doing something to the principal’s satisfaction,” Feaver argues, while “shirking means not 
                                                 
11 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83.   
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doing it to the principal’s satisfaction.”  The ideal of working is when the agent “does what it 
is has contracted with the principal to do, how the principal has asked it to, with due 
diligence and skill, and in such a way as to reinforce the principal’s superior role in making 
decisions and in drawing lines of delegation.”  Anything less than this is, in some form, 
considered shirking.12   
 “Shirking” has a wide spectrum, the most extreme form being a military coup, 
something that has rarely, if ever, been a realistic threat in American history.  There are three 
major forms of shirking, according to Feaver, that do occur in the United States.  Officers can 
1) influence policy by providing misleading information on the costs of a potential use of 
military force, 2) they can appeal to the public at large through “unauthorized leaks,” or 
direct contact with influential civilians, or 3) they can delay policy implementation through 
“foot-dragging” and other bureaucratic delays.13   
 Feaver also addresses the attitudes military officers develop towards their civilian 
government.  One issue that is regularly a source of tension is how the government goes 
about monitoring the military.  Officers want to maximize their ability to perform their 
assigned tasks without oversight, while civilians desire to monitor the behavior of their 
military agents to insure that their orders are being carried out in the manner they desire.  
Militaries prefer the least intrusive monitoring mechanisms possible.14  Of course, one reason 
militaries prefer weak monitoring is that it maximizes their ability to shirk.  Feaver notes that 
                                                 
12 Feaver, Armed Servants, 1-15, 60-68. 
13 Feaver, Armed Servants, 68.  See also: Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in 
the United States Today,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 55.3 (Summer 2002), 15-16. 
14 Feaver, Armed Servants, 75-77. 
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one key component in an officer or officers’ decision to shirk is their belief about the 
likelihood of punishment.15   
 Eliot Cohen likewise believes that pure objective control is impossible.  He argues 
that the most effective wartime civilian leaders routinely consider issues of a military nature 
and make decisions that would be considered the purview of generals (or admirals) under 
Huntington’s objective control.16  Cohen identifies Huntington’s model as “the normal theory 
of civil-military relations,” but then acknowledges that “the bounds of civilian and military 
authority seem far blurrier than either [civilian or military leaders] might like, or than 
scholars might expect.”17  In a major revisionist argument, Cohen contends that reliance on 
the normal theory was a major contributing factor to the disaster in Vietnam and it stunted 
the fullness of victory in the first Gulf War of 1991.18  Cohen uses Abraham Lincoln, 
Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion as examples of successful 
wartime civilian leaders because they questioned and critiqued their military leaders and held 
them accountable for their ability to mold strategic and tactical decisions to meet political 
ends. 
 Although Huntington’s ideal of objective control has come under fire from scholars, 
it remains a frequently cited and studied work.  Indeed, an entire volume was published fifty 
years after The Soldier and the State to respond to Huntington’s thesis.  Virtually all the 
                                                 
15 Feaver, Armed Servants, 56, 68, 87-95. 
16 Eliot Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of 
Force,” Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 429-458; and Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002). 
17 Cohen, “Unequal Dialogue,” 432. 
18 Cohen, Supreme Command, 175-202. 
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scholars consulted for Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider’s edited volume American Civil-
Military Relations acknowledge that Huntington’s ideal of objective control has been 
unrealistic in the United States and most countries, historically as well as in the present.  
Still, they also recognize its value as a theoretical concept.  Risa Brooks, for example, argues 
that there are certain benefits to the military following and weighing in on political debates.  
Military leaders can help politicians make more informed decisions about how to use military 
force, discourage ill-advised tampering with military doctrine and organization by civilians, 
and insure that the military continues to develop and evolve in an effective manner in 
peacetime.  Nonetheless, she concludes that the threat posed to democracy by military 
leaders stepping too far over some indistinct line into political matters far outweighs the 
potential benefits, and ultimately argues for maintaining some form of objective control, 
despite its downsides.19 
 Christopher Gibson challenges Brooks (and, of course, Huntington) by calling for a 
more nuanced understanding of civilian control, what he calls a “Madisonian Approach.”20 
Gibson repudiates objective control as “fundamentally flawed…because it presumed that the 
military and political spheres could be distinguished in a comprehensive and meaningful 
way.”  He calls for harkening back to the Founding Fathers and their views of controlling the 
military.  Specifically, he argues that “elected leaders should always have the final say and 
nothing is beyond their purview…members of the military must remain nonpartisan in their 
public life, and…civilian control of the military is shared between the president, who serves 
                                                 
19 Risa Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies,” Nielsen and Snider, American Civil-Military 
Relations, 213-238. 
20 Christopher Gibson, “Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military: A Madisonian 
Approach,” Nielsen and Snider, American Civil-Military Relations, 239-263.   
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as commander in chief, and the Congress, whose vast authority over military is outlined in 
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution.”21  Specifically, Gibson calls for drastically reducing 
the power of the Secretary of Defense by making him, or her, a part of the military agent and 
not an extension of the president.  As we shall see in chapter 7, this is a decidedly un-
Madisonian concept, since Madison himself argued that cabinet officers are in fact 
extensions of the chief executive. 
 Others argue over the limits of civilian authority.  James Burk rejects the idea that 
military officers are called to obey any and all lawful orders.  To claim that they should is to 
argue that “professional soldiers should suspend all thought and give no time to deliberation 
about whatever they are commanded to do.”22  While Burk recognizes the centrality of 
military obedience to civilian orders for democracy to function, he argues that members of 
the military must be granted discretion in how they carry out their missions, and held 
accountable for their use of that discretion. 
 Granting discretion to members of the military, of course, comes with an element of 
risk, just as it requires a risk on the military’s part to take a vow of apolitical loyalty to the 
government.  Both sides are dependent on the other to faithfully live up to their side of the 
bargain.  The crucial component of healthy civil-military relations, argues Richard Kohn, is 
trust between political leaders and military officers.  He calls for military leaders to build 
trust with the government by eschewing any kind of partisan behavior, even after retirement, 
and by strictly and faithfully obeying all orders.23  Meanwhile, civilians can gain the trust of 
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28 
 
the military first by assuming its loyalty and understanding its culture and mentality, and also 
by accepting responsibility for their policy decisions instead of “hiding behind the military to 
cover their own mistakes.”24  There is no question in Kohn’s mind, however, that regardless 
of the health of the relationship, the military must always remain subordinate to elected 
officials, and must not bring the prestige of their position, public support, or even perceived 
expertise to bear to control or manipulate policy decisions.25   
Kohn notes with alarm a growing trend in the post-Cold War United States for the 
military to try to shape American policy.  Military officers have gone so far as to appeal 
directly to the American public to try to coerce the government, making themselves more of 
an interest group than a bipartisan tool of the state.  Indeed, the military no longer can be 
considered especially bipartisan, given the overwhelmingly conservative Republican leanings 
of the officer corps. Kohn also notes a growing openness, at least theoretically, to officers 
resigning rather than follow distasteful orders, something he categorically rejects.  “Proper 
professional behavior cannot include simply walking away from a policy, an operation, or a 
war an officer believes is wrong or will fail…there is in fact no tradition of resignation in the 
American military.”  Elsewhere, he is equally blunt: “[resignation] even the very hint of it – 
much less the threat or act – is a direct assault on civilian authority.”26 
Russell Weigley agrees that civil-military relations in the United States are strained, 
but he dates the problem much earlier.  While Weigley agrees with Kohn and Gibson that 
civilian control means that the government has final authority, he rejects the idea that this 
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authority should be used without caution or restraint.  “The most desirable civil-military 
relations,” he argues “are those in which there is a nearly altogether candid exchange of ideas 
between the soldier and the statesman, along with a consequent founding of policy and 
strategy upon a real meeting of the minds.”  In other words, while the president does have 
final authority, a close working relationship and unfettered communication between civilian 
and military leaders can make this unequal relationship and mutually-supportive one instead 
of one of hostility.  Such good working relations, Weigley argues, have seldom been the case 
since the Civil War.  He blames Major General Emory Upton, a Civil War veteran and later 
faculty member at West Point, who argued for something very much along the lines of 
objective control.  “Upton came to perceive civilian control of the military as the root cause 
of the military deficiencies of the United States,” Weigley argues, and therefore Upton 
advocated that “the president ought to regard his role as commander in chief of the armed 
forces as simply ceremonial, and…leave military command completely to the professionals.”  
Although Upton’s “poisoning” of American civil-military relations never led to a coup or 
blatant public insubordination – with the lone exception of Douglas MacArthur – it did 
destroy the trust between the American government and its military, making collegial, 
thoughtful interaction almost impossible.27   
Nonetheless, commitment to the ideal of subordination to the government remains a 
bedrock of military ideology.  A staunch commitment to civilian supremacy, whatever that 
might mean in practice, dates back well prior to the American Revolution.  American 
colonists inherited an English Whig tradition that saw standing armies as tools of for 
quashing dissent and depriving the people of their liberties.  Americans were quite familiar 
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with Oliver Cromwell’s tenure in England as military dictator, and believed only constant 
vigilance in defense of liberty could prevent something similar.  Indeed, among the key 
causes of the Revolution was King George’s decision to quarter troops in the New World in 
1774, and to usurp the civilian government of Massachusetts.  Of course, winning the war 
with Britain ultimately required the creation of a somewhat professional army, but 
Americans clamored for it to be disbanded almost immediately after the war ended.28 
When the founders gathered to craft the Constitution in 1787, they recognized both 
the need for some type of armed forces for national defense and also the great threat such 
forces would represent.  They were therefore committed to a government that would allow 
for a national army, but also firmly and unquestionably make it a tool in the hands of the 
government.  “On the basis of history and political theory, Americans considered standing 
armies to be instruments of despotism as well as defense,” Kohn argues, and thus “civilian 
control of the military was already firmly established as an axiom of government,” by the 
time of the Constitutional Convention.29  Whatever the dangers a regular army might pose, 
however, the need for one was an inescapable fact of the new nation’s political situation.  
The Framers recognized a plethora of internal and external threats to the infant republic, and 
the Constitution assumed a standing army in peacetime firmly under the control of the 
president and Congress.30 
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Richard Kohn’s Eagle and Sword discusses the federal government’s use of military 
power in the early republic.31  He considers why a new nation with such an intense dislike of 
standing armies still produced one so quickly after the war for independence.  He argues that 
for a cadre of staunch Federalists, many of whom were veterans of the Revolutionary War, it 
was patently obvious that the militia was incapable of providing ongoing security for the new 
nation.  These men managed to craft the Constitution in such a way that a permanent military 
establishment was likely to come into existence in the new nation.32  Although the 
Federalists managed to create a “national military establishment” in the years after 1789, 
their expansion and then use of the standing army in the late 1790s seemed to confirm the 
worst fears of its opponents, and this contributed to Jefferson’s election in 1800.  
Reginald Stuart’s Civil-Military Relations during the War of 1812 explores the 
relationship between military commanders and civilians during the country’s second war 
with Great Britain.33  Stuart’s work overlaps with Kohn’s, as his analysis begins in the 1780s 
just after the Revolutionary War.  Stuart concludes that, for all the problems America 
suffered during the war from poor militia forces and inadequate leadership, civilian 
supremacy and respect for Constitutional rights remained intact at the close of the conflict.   
Huntington’s assertion that no professional officer corps existed until after the Civil 
War has come under sharp criticism from historians, notably William Skelton.34  Skelton 
                                                 
31 Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in 
America, 1783-1802 (New York: The Free Press, 1975). 
32 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 76-81. 
33 Reginald C. Stuart, Civil-Military Relations during the War of 1812 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security 
International, 2009). 
34 William Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1992), xiv.  Other works which do not challenge Huntington’s thesis directly, but 
nevertheless completely undermine it by their characterization of American military officers prior to the Civil 
32 
 
traces the emergence of a professional officer corps in the Army from the aftermath of the 
humiliating performance in the War of 1812.  Far from a post-Civil War phenomenon, 
Skelton argues that by the time the South seceded, a professional army was already very 
much in place.  He grounds this argument in the fact that the Army possessed “a regular 
system of recruitment and professional education, a well-defined area of responsibility, a 
considerable degree of continuity in its membership, and permanent institutions to maintain 
internal cohesion and military expertise.”35  Officers self-consciously developed these traits, 
and were careful (with some exceptions) to cultivate political neutrality until the outbreak of 
the Civil War forced them to choose sides.  Samuel Watson likewise argues that the army 
had already begun the process of professionalizing by the War of 1812, and that this process 
was essentially complete well before the outbreak of the Civil War.36  He traces the United 
States Army on the frontiers during the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Eras, arguing that it was 
at first a highly insubordinate and difficult to manage body, particularly when the fiery 
Andrew Jackson was among its senior officers.  Over time, however, officers developed a 
sense of professionalism and ingrained within their culture a strict subordination to civilian 
control. 
Whatever successes Army officers might have had in advancing their profession, they 
were still met with ambivalence by Americans in general.  Marcus Cunliffe’s still classic 
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study, Soldiers and Civilians, demonstrates that Americans continued to hold contrasting 
ideas about professional soldiers all the way up to the Civil War.37  Because most Americans 
looked with distain and fear on permanent standing armies, they preferred to rely on citizen-
soldiers of the militia for defense.38   He also notes that professional soldiers coming out of 
West Point were never as completely removed from politics as they liked to pretend.39 In the 
end, he finds that American Army officers prior to and during the Civil War never fully 
escaped their civilian identity, but that a professional officer corps was nonetheless essential 
for the United States to survive.40   
Kohn, Stuart, Skelton, Watson, and Cunliffe all provide vital insights into the nature 
of civil-military relations in the early American republic.  All are primarily interested in the 
role of land forces, however; the navy plays a minor role, if at all, in each of these works.  
Skelton gives the navy only a single paragraph, while Watson ignores it entirely.41 The other 
works here are similarly concerned with the Army as an institution.  This dissertation builds 
on their work by applying the standards of professionalism and subordination to civil 
authority to the emerging United States Navy.     
The Constitution and congressional legislation relating to the navy was vague on what 
civilian control would look like in practice.  By the early 1820s, however, a rough division of 
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responsibilities had been negotiated.  This division bore some similarities to objective 
control; naval officers oversaw those matters they were most qualified to supervise, such as 
ship construction, maintenance, and training junior officers, while the civilian government 
decided when and how to use the navy as an instrument of foreign relations.  In other ways, 
however, the civilian government acted in ways that contradicted the normal theory of civil-
military relations.  Presidents and secretaries alike meddled in a host of details as to how the 
navy fought America’s enemies.  Furthermore, while the officer corps enjoyed considerable 
discretion in selecting, training, and promoting junior officers, this was never entirely outside 
the secretary’s control either, regardless of administration.   
In Feaver’s terms, the U.S. Navy was clearly an agent of the civilian government in 
the early republic.  But the government contracted with the navy to do far more than just 
protect American shipping or capture enemy vessels.  The government expected the navy to 
enhance American prestige, particularly in the eyes of Great Britain.  The newly-independent 
nation was perceived as weak by Europe’s powers, and the navy’s duty was not only to 
protect the country from direct attack by other nations, but also to earn it a place alongside 
these nations as an equal.  Achieving sucha  stature demanded something more than simply a 
technical or tactical competence, or so the officers of the U.S. Navy believed.  The civil-
military relationship between the Navy Department and the U.S. Navy in the early republic 
only makes sense when viewed through conceptions of honor and reputation that pervaded 
American and European society.  Widely shared notions of honor in the early modern world 
ultimately shaped, and hindered, civilian control of the military in the early years of the 
United States. 
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“A Treasure Irrecoverable Once Lost:” Honor and the Early American Republic 
 
Many authors have wrote (sic) on [honor], but I find 
none that have compared it to the eye, which can’t 
suffer the least mote in it, without being blemished.  
Honor may be called a precious stone, which the least 
speck makes less valuable! It is a treasure 
irrecoverable once unfortunately lost! 
Major Robert Donkin1 
 
The honor of a nation is its life. Deliberately to 
abandon it is to commit an act of political suicide … 
The nation which can prefer disgrace to danger is 
prepared for a master and deserves one. 
Alexander Hamilton2 
 
Duels inherently involved an element of risk – that was, after all, the whole point – 
but few duels were as suicidal as the series faced by Richard Somers on board the frigate 
United States.  The affair began when Stephen Decatur and Somers were both stationed in 
the Mediterranean under Captain John Barry.3  Decatur’s sharp sense of humor was well 
known to his companion, and Somers apparently thought nothing of it when Decatur told him 
he looked like a fool during one bantering conversation.  Somers laughed it off, and resumed 
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his business, probably planning to return the jab at an opportune moment.  Somers’ fellow 
midshipmen, however, were not amused.  In their minds, Somers had displayed fatal 
cowardice by walking away from a direct insult to his character.  The following day, they 
informed him that they would not dine at any table he occupied.  The situation simmered 
aboard the tight confines of a man of war, Somers’s insistence that his friend had meant 
nothing by the comment falling on deaf ears.  According to his fellow officers, only by 
meeting Decatur on the field of honor could Somers salvage his reputation; otherwise he 
would be forever regarded as something far worse than a fool: a coward.  Faced with such 
unforgiving disdain, Somers did indeed issue a challenge: to six of his tormentors.  The 
young man agreed to trade shots with each of them in succession, thereby proving his 
worthiness to serve or falling dead from a brother officer’s bullet. 
 Decatur, by all accounts, urged his friend not to go through with what appeared to be 
a suicidal duel, but Somers refused, and insisted that Decatur act as his second.  On the 
appointed day, the parties met, and Somers lined up against his first opponent.  He inflicted a 
slight wound, but received a bullet in his right arm, forcing him to shoot at the second man 
with his left.  Unsurprisingly, he missed entirely, while taking a second shot in his hip.  
Weakened from the loss of blood, he had to sit on the ground, with his arm propped up by 
Decatur, and fire off a third shot, amazingly managing to hit the other man, though not 
seriously.  By this point, there could be little question that whatever faults Somers might 
have, he was no coward, and the affair was called off, with each of the six men he challenged 
alternating at nursing his wounds. 
Somers’ decision to duel six men at once was extreme, even by the standards of the 
time, but his willingness to die for his reputation was not.  This was an era in which personal 
37 
 
reputation, and the quest to maintain it, dominated every aspect of a man’s life.  Somers 
knew the risk he was taking, and there is no reason to doubt he considered it worthwhile even 
if he perished; a man’s life was a reasonable price for his honorable standing.  As Somers’ 
case indicates, this emphasis on honor could prove problematic in depriving the navy of 
valuable subordinates in a theater of war.  But it had other, more insidious aspects as well.  A 
fixation on honor could subvert the chain-of-command, or at the very least could strain 
officers’ relationship with the government.   In an age when honor was paramount, any 
officer who felt his orders might taint his reputation was more than willing to contemplate 
insubordination (or shirk, to use Feaver’s terminology).  Understanding civil-military 
relations in the early republic requires understanding the early modern world’s conception of 
honor, and the tremendous power this ideal held over Americans in the first decades of 
independence. 
 
 For all its significance, the term “honor” is remarkably difficult to define, and this 
was certainly the case in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as well.1  In his 
landmark 1755 dictionary, Samuel Johnson listed no less than thirteen possible definitions of 
the term, encompassing social standing, personal integrity, rank and dignity, and reputation.2  
For military officers, the essential tenets of honor were a bit more specific, but even Captain 
George Smith’s 1779 Universal Military Dictionary conceded that it was “a vague 
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expression, which custom has given different meanings.”3  Smith emphasized the importance 
of virtue in honor, and reminded his readers that the esteem granted a man who performed 
honorable deeds was “a real good, which should be dear to us.”  He did not, interestingly, tie 
honor to courage in battle, though that was certainly seen as an essential component of 
meriting honor.  Whatever the definition, it was widely understood that honor was highly 
fragile.  Major Robert Donkin of the British Army mused that many authors “have wrote on 
[honor], but I find none that have compared it to the eye, which can’t suffer the least mote in 
it, without being blemished.  Honor may be called a precious stone, which the least speck 
makes less valuable! It is a treasure irrecoverable once unfortunately lost!”4     
Julian Pitt-Rivers defines honor as “the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in 
the eyes of his society.  It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but also it is 
the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.”  
He finds honor to be intimately bound up with social status, but it is more than just that.  
Someone of low status lacks honor, but mere social standing does not automatically confer 
honor; it must be earned through conduct.  Pitt-Rivers argued that honor “provides a nexus 
between the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration 
to personify them.”  Nor is honor exclusively individual.  It is something which is possessed 
by a group or society, but only so long as all members conform to its ideals.  Allowing one 
member to violate the norms of honor without sanction shames the entire group.5  
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Anthropologist Frank Henderson Stewart, although heavily influenced by Pitt-Rivers’ 
work, contends that his definition is incomplete.  In fact, he argues that “the Western notion 
of honor has never been analyzed in a satisfactory fashion,” and strives to come up with a 
comprehensive definition of what Westerners mean when they refer to their “honor.”  He 
identifies two interrelated components.  Internal honor refers to one’s own sense of integrity 
and uprightness.  The old definition of character, what you are when no one is looking, might 
encapsulate this idea of honor nicely.  But the other form of honor, Stewart’s external honor, 
is impossible when no one is looking.  It refers to perceptions, social standing, and 
reputation.6   Crucial to this form of honor is the concept of the “honor group,” which is 
essentially “a set of people who follow the same code of honor and who recognize each other 
as doing so.”  Thus, what Stewart dubs “the title to right of honor” would be “the right to be 
treated as a full and equal member of the honor group.”7  Stewart characterizes “honor as a 
right, roughly speaking, to be treated as having a certain worth.” Both inner and outer honor 
fit into this categorization.  The claim to honor can easily be lost, however; it is contingent on 
others recognizing the bearer’s right.8  Moreover, Stewart distinguishes between what he 
calls “horizontal honor” and “vertical honor.”   Horizontal honor is the right to be recognized 
as an equal.  Vertical honor is “the right to a special respect enjoyed by those who are 
superior.”  The most familiar form of this is “rank honor…the honor enjoyed by all members 
of a superior rank in relation to their inferiors.”9     
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Military Honor 
Military officers, at least since the early modern era, have pursued their own unique 
sense of honor, which overlaps with that of their society but contains requirements unique to 
their profession.  For early American naval officers, ideas about what constituted honor were 
an extension of two very similar strains of thought in the early modern world.  One was the 
ideas about honor and hierarchy drawn from the militaries of Europe, especially Great 
Britain.  The other was civilian ideas about honor that were, at the time, universally accepted 
across the United States.10  While the two differed in some ways, both forms had, at their 
core, the idea that being a man of honor depended as much on perception as on actual 
conduct; external honor was preeminent, and the honor group zealously enforced the 
standards of the officer corps, even, at times, at the expense of civil law and military 
regulations.  Merely believing oneself to be honorable was useless; true honor was something 
conferred by one’s peers and acknowledged by one’s inferiors.     
Sociologist Morris Janowitz explored uniquely military ideas about honor in his 
classic The Professional Soldier.11 As in the larger society, honor in the military is based on a 
code of behavior, and being well regarded by one’s peers – fellow officers – is among the 
foremost goals of a military professional.  Janowitz traces the American military’s ideas 
about honor to the Revolutionary Era, when Washington and others consciously copied 
European, and especially British, standards for the new nation’s armed forces.  Officers were 
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expected to be gentlemen, loyal to their superiors, members of “a cohesive brotherhood 
which claimed the right to extensive self-regulation,” and finally warriors who fought for 
glory or fame.  The last is crucial; Janowitz argues that the best military officers will fight 
more for the noble end of honor or glory on the battlefield than for any specific political 
objective.12 
Janowitz addresses the precedents from early modern Europe that forged American 
ideals of military honor, but his work is primarily concerned with the twentieth century 
armed forces.  Fully appreciating the values and attitudes of early American naval officers 
requires a more specific analysis of the world of European military officers in the years 
surrounding the American Revolution.  Mark Odintz’s unpublished dissertation “The British 
Officer Corps, 1754-1783,” provides a detailed analysis of honor in the British army in the 
era of the American Revolution, while Armstrong Starkey’s War in the Age of 
Enlightenment, David Bell’s The First Total War, and Christopher Duffy’s The Military 
Experience in the Age of Reason all consider martial honor across Europe during the early 
modern era.13  Starkey notes the moral component of honor, arguing that it “represented the 
soldier’s ethic of duty, bravery, and self-sacrifice” that drove military officers.  But there was 
a social component as well.  In an age when the restriction of officers’ commissions to well-
born gentlemen was breaking down, the code of honor instilled an aristocratic ethos across 
the officer corps.  “The eighteenth century code of honor…represented a corporate culture 
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that assimilated men of nonaristocratic background,” Starkey argues, concluding that the 
“officer corps provided social mobility for many of its members who accepted the culture of 
honor as an emblem of their new status.”14  A commitment to honor unified the officer corps 
and distinguished it from the rabble of enlisted men, and therefore each officer had to earn 
and constantly maintain a good reputation.  When one’s honor was even remotely called into 
question, it had to be defended even, quite literally, to the point of death.  Hence the 
widespread practice of dueling in European armies.  Loss of standing in the eyes of one’s 
peers would almost certainly mean the end of an officer’s career.15     
As Mark Odintz notes, however, duels often had ulterior motives besides just 
defending one’s reputation.  They were more frequent in stations far from combat where 
boredom was rampant, and often a handful of bullies issued the majority of the challenges.  
Some young, inexperienced officers might even fight duels not so much because they felt 
their honor was in question, but in an effort to build a name for themselves or establish a 
reputation.  Nevertheless, Odintz and Starkey agree that refusing to participate in a duel, once 
challenged, irreparably ruined an officer’s career.  Odintz contends that some British officers 
viewed the practice as detrimental to the army, but it was too essential to the honor code and 
burned too deeply into military norms to be immediately curtailed.  Unless one of the 
participants died, which was surprisingly uncommon, the likelihood of a court-martial 
following a duel was virtually non-existent.  In fact, an officer might even face a court-
martial for conduct unbecoming an officer if he refused to participate in a duel once 
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challenged.16  Ideas about honor were an integral part of the chain-of-command.  Common 
soldiers obeyed their officers not only because they faced draconian punishment if they failed 
to do so – though that was certainly true – but also because their officers acted in such a 
manner as to merit obedience.17    
David Bell cautions us against exaggerating the meritocratic nature of the officer 
corps in Europe during this period.  Especially on the continent, the upper ranks remained 
very much the province of the well-born, even after the purchase of commissions was 
abolished in the 1770s.  He also challenges the idea of patriotic honor, arguing that officers 
were not unconcerned with their country, but also fought for far more personal motives and 
identified strongly with their fellow-officers on enemy armies.  Bell wholeheartedly agrees 
with Starkey, Odintz, and Duffy that honor was the primary driving force of the officer corps 
in Europe in the century leading up to the French Revolution.18 
Christopher Duffy’s The Military Experience in the Age of Reason falls somewhere 
between Starkey and Bell on the question of aristocracy versus meritocracy in European 
officer corps.  While the military was seen as the appropriate realm of the high-born – indeed 
the only appropriate realm, a nobleman disgraced as an officer often had no other occupation 
open to him – tentative steps took place in the mid to late eighteenth century to open the 
military to competent members of the middle class.  Such officers, however, often faced 
constant hostility from their peers.  France opened up access to commissions somewhat in the 
1750s, but by the Revolution such meritocratic officers had largely been driven from the 
                                                 
16 Odintz, “British Officer Corps,” 375-391, 494-517. 
17 Odintz, “British Officer Corps,” 375-379. 
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ranks.  Still, “in no country was there a totally effective prohibition against a commoner 
obtaining commissioned rank.”19  Duffy sees patriotism as a real but weak force in the early 
modern era, with officers loosely loyal to king and country but honor was a much more 
significant value.  Betraying your sovereign in wartime was utterly disgraceful, not so much 
because the traitor failed his country, but because he dishonored himself by breaking a sacred 
trust pledged to that country.  Once the war was over, “it was not considered unpatriotic if 
you went on your travels at the end of the conflict and found yourself a new home.”20  Kevin 
McCranie, however, argues that this had begun to change by the nineteenth century.  During 
the War of 1812, naval officers for both Britain and the United States explicitly stated that 
they were fighting for not only their own honor but for the honor of their nations.21   
Such a carefree attitude was nowhere to be found when it came to honor.  The 
slightest hint of disgrace, even for circumstances totally beyond an officer’s control, meant 
that he would be immediately shunned.  “Honor demanded to be constantly tested and 
reasserted, and it was a commodity which could so easily be lost,” Duffy writes, that it bred 
“curious feelings of insecurity.”22  As with Starkey, Odintz, and Bell, Duffy devotes 
considerable attention to the duel as an outgrown of the culture of honor, but that custom was 
hardly the only expression officers gave themselves over to.  An honorable officer had no 
fear of death; bravery that would seem idiotic to twenty-first century viewers was the bare 
minimum standard at the end of the eighteenth.  Officers ostentatiously put themselves in 
                                                 
19 Duffy, Military Experience, 35-45, quote on page 43. 
20 Duffy, Military Experience, 74. 
21 Kevin McCranie, “Dueling with Warships to Satisfy Honor: The Use of Naval Challenges in the War of 
1812,” The International Journal of Maritime History 25 vol. 61 (2013), 61-84. 
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harm’s way in battle, carefully signifying their position through dress and conduct even in 
the heat of battle.  To make oneself and enemy target and show contempt for his bullets was 
the duty of every officer worthy of the name.  
While American naval officers (like their army counterparts) inherited the martial 
traditions of all of Europe to some extent, their foremost guide was unquestionably Britain, 
and especially their former mother country’s navy.  British naval officers possessed finely-
developed notions of honor, and their specific standards of honorable conduct were 
particularly important for the early U.S. Navy.  Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
every professionally-minded American naval officer sought to consciously emulate his 
British counterparts to the greatest extent possible, particularly in personal behavior.23  The 
Royal Navy also recognized the importance of noble deportment and social standing among 
its officers.  In response to rampant insubordination and ill-discipline among young officers, 
the Admiralty regularized ranks and introduced uniforms in the early eighteenth century to 
promote espirit de corps.  By the time of the American Revolution, the Royal Navy had 
made great strides in insuring that its officers, who usually but by no means always came 
from the upper-crust of society, could be perceived as true gentlemen.24  
For honor in the early American navy, the literature is somewhat thin.  Two 
exceptions are James Valle’s Rocks and Shoals, and Matthew Raffety’s  The Republic Afloat, 
both of which explore the crucial role of honor in the officer corps.  Valle is decidedly 
unsympathetic to the young officers that launched the U.S. Navy, blasting their “exaggerated 
                                                 
23 Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 210-215.  
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sense of personal honor which led to pointless quarrels,” and claiming that they were a “crop 
of overwhelmingly proud and egotistical young commodores… incapable of sacrificing 
private considerations for the good of the service.”25  In Raffety’s analysis, however, this 
perspective overlooks the crucial role of honor in shipboard life.  As in the British Army, it 
was a sense of honor and trappings of authority that maintained order (or failed to) aboard 
ship. “Atop the ship’s chain of command, the captain was expected to represent the pinnacle 
of honor,” Raffety argues.  “Officers’ authority had several sources, including craft 
convention and the law.  In a less concrete but perhaps more essential way, however, officers 
legitimated their authority by illustrating through their behavior, dress, and speech that they 
were the sort of men who deserved to command.” Therefore, a diminishment of an officer’s 
personal standing before the crew would perilously undermine the ship’s hierarchy.  So 
essential was the officers’ standing in the eyes of the crew that naval and merchant officers 
alike feared legislation designed to bolster their authority.   Their honor established their 
fitness to command sailors, and legal intrusion, even if intended to expand a captain’s power, 
undermined his authority before the men.26  Although Raffety devotes the bulk of his 
attention to civilian captains, he does argue that all these trends were not only also true, but 
were taken to extremes, among naval officers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 James Valle, Rocks and Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861 (Annapolis, MD: naval 
Institute Press, 1980), 24, 88. 
26 Matthew Raffety, The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013), 95-98, 123-124. 
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Honor in the Civilian Realm 
American naval officers drew for their honor culture from their own civilian society 
as well as from their European military counterparts.  This was an era when the 
democratizing spirit of the Revolution had only begun to take root, and all Americans in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with pretensions to status craved both honor 
and reputation.  Douglas Adair identifies two key ideas that drove the founding generation.  
One was fame, the desire to be celebrated by one’s fellow men.  It was a yearning to be a 
“great man,” that is, “one who stands out, who towers above his fellows in some spectacular 
way.”  The desire for fame included not only one’s fellow countrymen, though they were 
certainly part of it, but also future generations.  At its heart, the “desire for fame is the desire 
for immortality.”  “Honor,” on the other hand, is slightly different.  One could do great deeds 
and still be regarded as a morally-deficient human being.  Early Americans longed for fame, 
but not at the cost of their standing in society.  Adair defines honor as similar to a 
conscience; it governs behavior by weighing on the mind what others would think of this or 
that action.  He does not, however, see it as the same for everyone.  There was a social 
component to honor, a belief that honor could only be held by free men who occupied a 
position of significance in society.27 
Writing about honor in the South, Bertram Wyatt-Brown offers a similar definition.  
Honor, he contends, was bound up in a socially stratified society with “clearly understood 
hierarchies of leaders and subordinates,” though he argues that people at all levels of this 
hierarchy pursued a sense of honor.  At its essence, honor was “essentially the cluster of 
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ethical rules … by which judgments of behavior are ratified by community consensus,” and it 
called for “the rejection of the lowly, the alien, and the shamed.”28  This rejection was 
essential, for any individual or community that tolerated dishonorable behavior was thereby 
tainted.  Simply feeling a sense of personal distaste was inadequate; honorable people had to 
publicly and emphatically shame those who violated the norms of honor. 
  Although his emphasis is on the Old South, Wyatt-Brown takes pains to note that this 
sense of honor was universal in America during the colonial era and early republic.  It was 
only in the 1820s and ‘30s that values in the North began to shift.  A key reason that all of the 
original thirteen colonies held to similar ideas about honor was that they derived from the 
same source.  Ideas about honorable behavior came to the New World from the Old, and their 
origins stretch into the distant past beyond the historian’s gaze.  This “primal honor,” as 
Wyatt-Brown dubs it, was to some extent supplanted by Judeo-Christian ideas, but it was 
never fully expunged from the Southern mind, and its influence throughout America was 
readily apparent during the Revolution and early republic.  He identifies five characteristics 
of primal honor:  
(1) honor as immortalizing valor, particularly in the character of revenge against 
familial and community enemies; (2) opinion of others as an indispensable part of 
personal identity and gauge of self-worth; (3) physical appearance and ferocity of 
will as signs of inner merit; (4) defense of male integrity and mingled fear and 
love of woman; and finally, (5) reliance upon oath-taking as a bond in lieu of 
family obligations and allegiances.29 
 
The first two characteristics clearly overlap with Adair’s definition of fame and Starkey and 
Odintz’s emphasis on the external nature of honor, while all, but especially the third, feed 
into Stewart’s idea of an honor group.  Equally important is the fragility of honor, an idea 
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attested in Starkey, Odintz, and Stewart as well as Pitt-Rivers, Janowitz, and Gilbert.  For 
early Americans, maintaining honor was among their most vitally important tasks. 
Joanne Freeman illuminates this point well in her study of early republican politics, 
Affairs of Honor.30  An attack on honor was an urgent and frightening issue, demanding 
immediate attention.  “When honor was at stake, all else fell by the wayside” in the early 
republic.  For politicians, the ability to win and hold office hinged on their reputation before 
the American public.  In some ways it inverted the notions of honor within the military 
hierarchy.  Now it was those being led who critiqued, and possibly withdrew, the honorable 
standing of their leaders.  Yet in other ways, it was simply a less volatile form of the 
military’s system.  In the navy, seamen who lost respect for their officers might mutiny in a 
variety of ways large and small.31  American voters simply kicked the disgraced politician 
from office.  As such, politicians often went to the same lengths to preserve their honor as 
military officers.  The frequency of dueling in the military was exceptional, both in Britain 
and the United States.  But the acceptance of the practice, however grudgingly, was not.  
Alexander Hamilton, an opponent of the practice, still consented to participate in his fatal 
duel with Aaron Burr in order to maintain his ability to participate in politics.32  
How then, did all this shape the early American navy?  Desiring as they did to 
emulate their British peers, American naval officers readily carried over the ideas about 
honor from the British Army and especially the Royal Navy.  Christopher McKee cites 
Adair’s discussion of the pursuit of fame in the early republic, and ranks it among the chief 
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influences of the early navy.  “Unless this search for fame…is recognized as a primary 
element in the ethical air breathed by naval officers,” McKee contends that ‘a true 
understanding of that corps is as impossible as if one lacked basic data of ranks and 
numbers.”33    
As in both the civilian and military realms, honor within the early U.S. naval officer 
corps was enforced by the community, Stewart’s “honor group.”  It was vital to shame 
officers who violated the norms of honor by displaying cowardice in the face of the enemy, 
accepting insults, acting or speaking dishonestly, or violating an oath.  Although they felt a 
measure of solidarity with one another as members of a common profession, protecting that 
profession meant that officers usually had no qualms about criticizing one of their own to the 
secretary of the navy or offering their endorsement to the secretary when he removed a 
disgraced officer from the corps.  When it came to balancing their own honor and reputation 
against the good of the service, most officers felt a strong ambivalence.  They genuinely 
wanted to advance the nation’s interest, and their patriotism was part of their honorable 
standing.  But when following orders or putting the good of the nation ahead of one’s self 
might damage an officer’s reputation, such an officer faced a deeply troubling choice, and 
none were above seeking their own honor first, even at the cost of defying orders. 
National Honor 
Such attitudes did not mean that the good of the nation was insignificant.  On the 
contrary, American naval officers, like their counterparts on land and in Europe, understood 
that disgrace for their country was just as shameful as person disgrace.  The rules about 
honor accepted for individuals in Europe and the United States in the early modern world 
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applied to nations as well.34  Early modern European officers carried the reputation of their 
class, and their monarch, onto the field of battle with them.  For Americans, they carried the 
idea of republicanism and the nation itself.  That nation, however, did not have the luxury of 
being assumed to have honorable standing. 
The United States, in the years after independence, lacked national honor.  It was 
perceived as unable to defend itself against aggression, willing to tolerate insults, and of a 
lower station than Britain or France.  Although politically independent of the British Empire, 
American leaders still felt themselves shamed, still not fully able to regard themselves as 
honorable, as long as their former mother country believed it could transgress their rights 
with impunity.35  America’s leaders wanted more than to be politically distinct from Great 
Britain. They wanted to be recognized as a member of Britain and France’s honor group.  
Presidents and their cabinets from both parties sought to lay claim to their title of right to “be 
treated as having a certain worth,” to receive from Britain and France recognition as 
possessing horizontal honor.36 This meant, among other things, refusing to passively accept 
insults from another nation, just as a man of honor could not accept an insult from a peer.   
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Alexander Hamilton made this point explicit in a newspaper editorial during a war scare with 
France, arguing that   
the most pernicious of conquests, which a state can experience, is a conquest over 
that elevated sense of its own rights which inspires a due sensibility to insult and 
injury, over that virtuous pride of character which prefers any peril or sacrifice to 
a final submission to oppression, and which regards national ignominy as the 
greatest of national calamities.  
 
In short, no nation could expect anything but contempt and exploitation as long as it refused 
to defend its status and worth.  “The honor of a nation is its life,” he concluded, and to 
“abandon it is to commit an act of political suicide.”37  His fierce political rival, Thomas 
Jefferson, agreed.  “Weakness provokes insult and injury,” he wrote to John Jay, “while a 
condition to punish it often prevents it.”38 
 The pursuit of national pride fed attitudes about honor among military officers in the 
early modern era, but it could also strengthen military forces in battle.  The need to vindicate 
the honor of their nation drove officers, soldiers, and sailors alike, while pride in the 
superiority of their country’s institutions or society gave them confidence in battle.  Even 
disgusted continental observers, who regarded Englishmen as insolent, tasteless, and overly 
proud, had to acknowledge that these attitudes gave English warriors a unique courage in 
battle.39   
 
 
                                                 
37 Alexander Hamilton, “The Warning No. III,” February 21, 1797, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton Digital 
Edition, ed. Harold C. Syrett. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2011. 
38 Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, August 23, 1785, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition, ed. Barbara 
B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008. 
39 Duffy, Military Experience, 31-32. 
53 
 
This dissertation argues that the conflation of personal and national honor began in 
the United States well before the War of 1812.  Almost from the moment of its creation, the 
U.S. Navy implanted in its officers a sense that their country’s reputation hinged on their 
behavior.  Although they differed over the size, and expense, of the navy, Federalists and 
Jeffersonian-Republicans alike saw it as the key to putting America in “a condition to 
punish” attacks on its honor.  Naval captains thus carried the dual burden of personal and 
national honor, and their civilian bosses were cognizant of this fact and shaped their 
expectations accordingly.  The first five secretaries of the navy had no patience for officers 
who displayed timidity, sloth, or cowardice, yet tolerated blatant insubordination from 
captains who evinced zeal for the honor of their country and its navy.  Promoting such 
attitudes was not without cost, however.  These same officers often put their own honor and 
reputation ahead of the good of the service, and their infighting, even to the point of fatal 
duels, proved a constant source of frustration to the Navy Department in the early years of 
the nineteenth century. 
It seemed an inescapable frustration, however.  The code of honor was too 
entrenched, and too crucial to building an effective navy.  No one articulated this better than 
Benjamin Stoddert, who became the first secretary of the navy in 1797.  Staunchly 
committed to a navy that would bring credit to his young country, he wholeheartedly 
embraced his society’s ideals of honor, and governed the first naval officer corps 
accordingly, laying the foundations of a naval culture that would long outlive his tenure as 
secretary. 
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“To Rid Our Navy of Such Men:” Benjamin Stoddert and the Creation of the United 
States Navy 
 
Our Navy at this time when its character is to form, ought to be 
commanded by men who, not satisfied with escaping censure, 
will be unhappy if they do not receive and merit praise – By 
men who have talents and activity, as well as spirit, to assist a 
judicious arrangement for the employment of the force under 
their command, or to cure the defects of a bad one – I hope and 
I believe that there are several such men in the service. 
Benjamin Stoddert1 
 
A man may be a very good seaman, and be qualified to 
command a merchant vessel, but at the same time very unfit to 
command in the Navy.  If I am not misinformed there are 
several of that description in the Navy. 
Richard Dale2 
 
A new century dawned inauspiciously for the American navy.  On the first day of 
1800, eleven barges manned by “negroes and mullattos and armed with muskets, sabers and 
boarding pikes” surrounded the United States Navy schooner Experiment and its merchant 
convoy of four ships in the Caribbean “with the intention to board each of the vessels.”3  In 
fierce action lasting over five hours, the Experiment repelled three boarding attempts, but lost 
two of the ships it was convoying, including the schooner Mary, whose captain was slain by 
the attackers.  Lieutenant William Maley, senior officer of the Experiment attributed the loss 
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of those ships to the totally becalmed waters, which prevented them from escaping, and 
boasted that not a single man from his own vessel perished in the fighting, with only 
Lieutenant Porter slightly wounded.  He swore that he had done everything in his power to 
prevent the loss of the vessels under his protection, but to no avail.1 
Maley’s report is a model of brevity, unsurprising given that he certainly preferred the 
secretary of navy know as few details of the battle as possible.  He omitted, among other 
things, the fact that he spent the entire battle in the hold of his ship.  When he realized the 
Experiment and its convoy were surrounded, Maley judged the situation hopeless and 
directed his crew to acquiesce without firing a shot.  Lieutenant Porter, the same David 
Porter who would become a towering figure in the American naval history, refused to 
comply with such a disgraceful order and promptly assumed command.  Maley either tamely 
submitted to this and withdrew to the hold of the ship or the other officers sided with Porter 
and compelled him to do so.  Either way, half of the convoy survived the attack thanks to 
Porter’s act of blatant insubordination.2 
The episode highlights the two greatest internal threats to America’s then embryonic 
navy: incompetent and insubordinate officers.  Either had the potential to cripple America’s 
maritime force, and President John Adams and first Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert 
had to cope with any number of such men throughout the undeclared war with France, which 
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published 1909), 139-147. 
56 
 
lasted from 1797 through 1801.  But when confronted by the incompetence of Maley and the 
insubordination of Porter, Stoddert did not hesitate; Porter emerged without the slightest 
censure while Maley found himself before a court martial to account for his conduct.3  In 
building the officer corps for the infant navy, Stoddert’s primary concern was that men of 
action, men who would take daring risks and zealously seek to advance the nation’s 
reputation abroad, should govern American ships.  While he encouraged discipline aboard 
ship and grew annoyed when officers failed to follow his orders, Stoddert worried far more 
about idleness and excessive caution than compliance when evaluating captains.  Writing to 
John Barry, Stoddert commented that a “spirit of enterprise and adventure, cannot be too 
much encouraged in our officers under your command, nor can too many opportunities be 
afforded the enterprising to distinguish themselves.”  Although such actions carried great 
risks for the country’s undeniably few vessels, Stoddert’s primary concern was not to avoid 
losing ships.  “We have nothing to dread,” he went on to inform Barry, “but inactivity.”4  
Stoddert’s inclinations led him to what might be termed a “hands-off” approach in his 
oversight of captains.  Beyond providing broadly outlined orders, Stoddert allowed them 
considerable discretion in all matters of naval governance.  He routinely consulted them on 
his decisions, and he tolerated behavior that came perilously close to insubordination, 
especially from officers whom he considered zealous and active.  This mindset, and the 
attitudes it created among the officer corps, caused him difficulty late in his tenure, but 
slothful, careless, and overly cautious captains produced a far greater measure of grief, and if 
Stoddert came to regret his excessive delegation by the close of the war, he also did an 
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admirable job culling the ranks of captains whose timidity failed to bring credit to their 
country.  Stoddert’s administration, and the officer corps that rose to prominence under him, 
played a defining role in the naval history of the United States.  The Constitution and 
subsequent Congressional naval legislation were often deliberately vague as to how the 
American navy would function, and what the precise duties and prerogatives would be for 
civilian administrators and military officers.  Stoddert’s term as secretary was crucial for the 
precedents it set as much as for the actual decisions he made, though those too could be 
momentous.  While naval administration evolved a great deal after Stoddert, it was he who 
determined the kind of character America preferred in it naval officers, and all subsequent 
captains through the War of 1812, for good or ill, came from a mold that Stoddert 
established: aggressive, courageous, sensitive to any insult to their own or their country’s 
honor, and often difficult to control. 
His achievements deserve further study, but if he enjoys the status of America’s first 
secretary of the navy, Stoddert cannot claim major naval campaigns against Barbary pirates 
or the vaunted Royal Navy that his successors can.  His administration coincided with the all 
but forgotten undeclared war between the United States and its Revolutionary ally, France.5  
His accomplishments gave the so-called Half War significance, however.  While the Quasi-
War is seldom studied, it played a crucial role in the internal development of the American 
navy.  The Washington and Adams Administrations essentially created the United States 
Navy from nothing during this period; the Continental Navy of the American Revolution 
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provided little in the way of positive examples or talented officers for its successors to build 
on. 
“If the Continental Navy had never existed, it is hard to see how the outcome of the 
Revolution would have been any different,” writes historian William Fowler.6  John Adams, 
the man with perhaps the greatest claim to the title “Father of the American navy,” would 
have agreed, commenting during the war that “recollecting the whole history of the rise and 
progress of our navy (during the Revolution), it is very difficult to avoid tears.”7  Other than 
a few dramatic successes by John Paul Jones, John Barry, and a handful of others, the 
Continental Navy was, at best, an annoyance to the British, and the only naval engagement 
with a significant impact on the outcome of the war, the Battle of the Chesapeake, was 
wholly the work of the French Navy.  Once the war ended, the newly created nation 
possessed only two vessels that the enemy had not captured or sunk, and these were quickly 
sold.  Faced with staggering war debts and led by a Congress unable to raise revenue, it was 
out of the question for the United States to attempt to rebuild its fleets, and for the next 
thirteen years American merchant vessels sailed entirely at their own risk.8 
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 Unemployed, most of the officers of the Continental Navy returned to life as 
merchant captains.  John Paul Jones, the most celebrated and influential naval hero of the 
Revolution, drifted across the Atlantic to Russia, hoping to use a commission in the Czarina’s 
navy to gain the glory he never quite found in his own country.9 Far more typical were the 
experiences of John Barry and privateer Thomas Truxtun.  Both used their skills as seamen in 
lucrative commercial voyages to Canton, China, where they mingled with numerous other 
patriots from the recent war with Britain, and often dined convivially with their former 
adversaries.  Although very rewarding financially, the Canton trade – or any voyages by 
American merchant vessels – posed hazards; merchant captains drilled their crews to defend 
the ship if pirates attacked, particularly if they sailed anywhere near the Mediterranean, 
where the Barbary corsairs seized United States’ merchant ships with impunity.  Such an 
ever-present threat could not fail to remind these men that the country they had helped create 
no longer possessed the ability to protect its commerce at sea.10    
The only hope of the country creating a new navy rested with the Constitution drawn 
up in Philadelphia in 1787. By and large, naval veterans of the Revolution enthusiastically 
supported the charter. Joshua Barney gave speeches campaigning on behalf of pro-
Constitution delegates in his home state, firmly convinced that repealing the Articles of 
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Hopkins University Press, 1956), 60-99. 
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Confederation offered the best hope for his country, but certainly also aware that it 
represented the best chance for the creation of a federal navy, and therefore of a commission 
for himself.11  While many veterans of the Revolution at sea favored the new charter, few 
went so far to see it approved as John Barry.  Watching from the gallery at the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention, Barry was disgusted when Antifederalist delegates, aware that they 
lacked the votes to prevent ratification, left the convention before a vote could take place, 
thereby denying a quorum.  Barry, likely with the collusion of Speaker Thomas Mifflin, led a 
gang of sailors to the inn where a few of the truant assemblymen dined peacefully, 
prematurely celebrating the success of their plan to subvert the Constitution.  The Convention 
only lacked two delegates for a quorum, and Barry’s gang unceremoniously seized James 
McCalmont and Jacob Miley, two ringleaders of the Antifederalists, and dragged them – 
quite literally kicking and screaming – back to the state house.  Relatively unhurt, the two 
recalcitrant delegates found themselves blocked inside and forced to watch as their 
colleagues ratified the Constitution.12   
If the Revolutionary War hero expected gratitude for his extra-legal activities, he was 
soon disappointed.  To Barry’s chagrin, McCalmont brought charges against him, which 
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, and even Barry’s good friend Charles Biddle felt 
obliged to support, despite their great relief at Barry’s actions.  The matter quickly passed, 
however.  Relieved that the Constitution did indeed become the law of the land, none of its 
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Pennsylvania, 1745-1821 (Philadelphia: E. Claxon and Company, 1883), 217-220. 
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supporters could stomach the thought of an actual reprimand for Barry, despite the highly 
dubious legality of his actions, and the charges were subsequently dropped.13  
 The Constitution that Barry so strongly supported laid the foundation for a future 
United States Navy, while explicitly insuring civilian control of any such force once it was 
created.  The delegates vested the president with power as “Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States,” while restricting the power to “provide and maintain a 
Navy,” and “to make rules for the government of land and naval forces” to Congress.14  In 
The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay argued strongly in favor 
of a naval force, citing Congress’s ability to create one as a key reason for supporting the 
new government.15  The Constitution also took steps to insure that any navy would be the 
sole prerogative of the central government.  By prohibiting states from granting letters of 
marque or maintaining ships in a time of peace, the new charter insured that the constant 
squabbling between the Continental Navy and the various state navies that mired the 
Revolution would not be repeated in future wars.16  Although they found some measure of 
compromise unavoidable regarding the militia, the delegates thoroughly restricted the states’ 
power over armed forces and made the central government paramount.17  This, of course, 
                                                 
13 McGrath, John Barry, 358-364.  
14 Article II, Section 2, Constitution of the United States of America; Article I, Section 8, Constitution.   
15 Publius, The Federalist: No. 11, George Carey and James McClellan, eds. The Federalist: The Gideon 
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formed a crucial part of the Antifederalists’ objection to the Constitution, since they feared 
the diminution of state power it promised. Among features they protested was the ability of 
Congress to create and administer a navy, with Southerners especially fearing that this would 
grant inordinate power to New England states, where shipping dominated the economy. 18 
   Furthermore, argued opponents of the Constitution, creating a navy also meant 
creating a naval officer corps.  Military leaders, whether they command forces on land or sea, 
have “a different interest from and opposed to the civil power,” argued one Antifederalist 
delegate.19  While naval forces’ role at sea physically separated them from the government 
and population, thereby making them less of a threat to liberty, opponents of the Constitution 
still feared the creation of an officer corps whose values would be antithetical to ideals of the 
Revolution.  Finally, the key reason Antifederalists opposed a naval force was the massive 
expense of building and maintaining so many ships.  Governmental funds would be wasted, 
they argued, when the Atlantic Ocean acted as a perfectly good barrier against invasion.20    
 The Federalists ultimately triumphed, and the Constitution became the basis for a new 
American government.  A navy did not automatically follow, however.  Opposition still ran 
strong, and the fragile financial condition of the new government precluded the immediate 
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construction of a fleet.  For many leaders of the new nation, however, an American display of 
force at sea was only a matter of time.  Any reader of The Federalist could hardly doubt that 
Hamilton intended for the United States to eventually become a naval power.21  Washington 
shared his Treasury Secretary’s sentiments, as did first Secretary of War Henry Knox.  Even 
Thomas Jefferson, who later drastically reduced the American navy as president, believed a 
small force necessary and advocated to for its creation.22 
 Jefferson’s party, led by James Madison in the House of Representatives, later 
worked to prevent the creation of a navy, but at the time the sage of Monticello ardently 
supported giving the nation such a force to combat rampant piracy in the Mediterranean.  The 
Barbary corsairs consisted of four semi-independent regencies of the Ottoman Empire on the 
Mediterranean coast of North Africa.  Their economies hinged on seizing the ships of infidel 
nations and enslaving their crews.  Massive ransoms and annual tribute from maritime 
nations generated revenue for rulers.23  In 1793, the capture of American merchants by 
Barbary corsairs finally forced Congress to take decisive action.  On March 27, 1794, it 
passed the Act to provide a Naval Armament, allowing for the construction of six frigates.  
The legislation authorized the building of a mere half-dozen ships, to begin immediately.  
                                                 
21 For Hamilton’s life and political views, see Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: The Penguin 
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Despite the fact that Americans citizens were enslaved within the Barbary regencies at the 
time, stiff opposition to any kind of navy ran through much of Congress, and the Act passed 
only narrowly.  Moreover, it ended ominously for naval advocates, promising that “if a peace 
shall take place between the United States and the Regency of Algiers,” construction of the 
frigates must cease immediately.24 
 The creation of the United States Navy prompted a flurry of letters from applicants 
seeking officers’ commissions.  Selecting the first officers to lead the nation’s incipient 
maritime force fell to president Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox.  Given his 
sterling Revolutionary War record, John Barry was an obvious choice for the most senior 
officer in the new navy, and Washington and Knox sought his advice on appointments for the 
other five frigates.  By doing so, they set a precedent that the future Navy Department would 
routinely follow.  Civilian officials charged with selecting naval officers looked to those 
same officers to nominate their peers.  In this case, the three men seem to have enjoyed a 
cordial working relationship.  Barry praised Washington for ignoring “powerful interests” 
backing some candidates and choosing the first officer corps based on each man’s merit.25 
The first six captains chosen were, in order of seniority, John Barry, Samuel 
Nicholson, Silas Talbot, Joshua Barney, Richard Dale and Thomas Truxtun.26  Seniority was 
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based on each man’s standing in the Continental Navy at the close of the Revolution.27 
Truxtun, who would go on to tower over the others in the historical record, carried the 
distinction of being the only one who had not served on that force.  He had captained a 
privateer during the war, a position looked upon with contempt by his peers within the 
Continental Navy, though probably not as much contempt as Truxtun had felt for the 
Continental Congress’ anemic maritime force.  Truxtun also appears to have enjoyed the 
least political patronage, with no record of his receiving the endorsement of a prominent 
figure as part of his application to the service.  Nonetheless, it would be Truxtun who would 
do more than all the others to establish the navy’s reputation and prepare it for the future.28   
Internal bickering in the navy began before the first keel was laid.  Although the first 
six captains were nominal equals, their order on the initial list determined seniority in the 
event of a dispute.  More importantly, it reflected on the honor of the men chosen, at least in 
their own minds.  As soon as he learned that he ranked behind Talbot, Barney resigned and 
subsequently joined the French Navy.29  He believed, with some justification, that Talbot’s 
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standing was the result of his position as a congressman from New York, not his 
Revolutionary War record.  Talbot possessed a fine war record, but Barney nonetheless felt 
insulted by his place on the list and refused his commission.  The navy called in James Sever 
to replace him, but it was off to an inauspicious start.30  Difficulties with recalcitrant captains 
soon became the least of its problems, however, when word arrived that the Algerine 
government had agreed to terms of peace. 
Almost as soon as Congress approved the captains, the navy nearly disappeared.  A 
successful treaty with the Regency of Algiers removed the immediate need for a naval force, 
and according to the Act, construction on the ships should have ceased immediately and the 
officers returned to civilian life.  North Africa was no longer the only source of danger to 
American shipping, however.  Relations had soured between the United States and it ally in 
the Revolutionary War, France.  The Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed by the two 
countries during the war for independence stipulated that each would come to the other’s aid 
in the event of a war.  In 1793, France had occasion to claim this clause, when Great Britain 
declared war to reverse the work of the French Revolution.  Washington recognized that 
involving the United States in the conflict would be the height of folly, given the country’s 
weakness and financial struggles.  His declaration of neutrality infuriated the French, as did 
the Jay Treaty with England, which many in France, and the United States, for that matter, 
saw as an economic alliance with Britain.  The French Revolutionary government began 
authorizing privateers to seize American ships, which they could do with impunity thanks to 
inability of the American government to protect its merchant fleets.31   
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With the cries against French depredations becoming incessant, a compromise 
allowed work to continue on three of the frigates.32  The War Department chose the vessels 
under construction in Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore – those closest to completion – 
and scrapped the other three.33  John Barry, Samuel Nicholson, and Thomas Truxtun, the 
officers assigned to oversee construction of these vessels, retained their jobs.  Their 
counterparts were not so lucky.  The three remained on the roll as captains, but with no ships 
to command or duties to perform.  Having already had to squeeze three ships from a tight-
fisted Congress largely opposed to any naval establishment, the Washington Administration 
found no justification for keeping these men on the pay roll without suitable employment for 
them.  Richard Dale, Silas Talbot and James Sever were released from the American navy in 
all but name.34 
Dale chose the merchant marine over being stranded on land with a useless title of 
captain.35  He saw little value in being referred to as a naval officer with no time at sea, nor 
pay.  Talbot accepted the post of Agent for Impressed Seamen, and set out on a frustrating 
and largely fruitless sojourn to the West Indies, where the British routinely seized American 
sailors for their own navy.  While Talbot did manage to secure releases for a few victims of 
the British press who were obviously American citizens, he suffered continual frustration 
working with haughty and otherwise occupied British officials.  Following that, he too spent 
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time in the merchant service.36  Their decision is certainly understandable; at the time, 
neither man had any way of knowing when or if the government would ever require his 
services.  Their time away from active duty in the military would, however, have serious 
implications in the future, and, in Talbot’s case, nearly bring the navy to a halt at the moment 
of America’s greatest success against France. 
 While Washington managed to convince Congress of the need to complete the naval 
force already begun, a separate government department devoted to naval affairs was out of 
the question, and oversight remained under the War Department.  As long as Henry Knox 
remained Secretary of War, this arrangement worked well, for Knox was a capable and 
careful administrator.37  His duties were also limited to overseeing the construction of a mere 
six, and later only three, frigates.  There was no functional navy to man or to plan strategy or 
operations for.  And so far as the construction of the frigates was concerned, Knox delegated 
most of the responsibility to the officers themselves.  Barry, Truxtun, and Sever were 
appointed superintendents of their respective ships and charged with constructing, equipping, 
and manning the ships they were to command, though they maintained regular 
communication with the War Department.38 
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 With Knox’s retirement from public life in January of 1795, the civilian oversight of 
the new navy grew considerably weaker.  Timothy Pickering served briefly as secretary of 
war, but his tenure was uneventful as far as naval matters were concerned. Finally, 
Washington’s old friend James McHenry assumed the duties of secretary of war on January 
27, 1796.39  The choice proved unfortunate.  McHenry lacked Knox’s prestige and 
Pickering’s administrative abilities.  His most remarkable trait was what one historian dubs 
an “easygoing” manner that was ill-suited for the myriad responsibilities and powerful egos a 
man in his position faced.40 Alexander Hamilton initially considered him “well-disposed, but 
unqualified,” and later became convinced that “McHenry is wholly insufficient for his place, 
with the additional misfortune of not having himself the least suspicion of the fact!”  In time, 
Hamilton became the de facto Secretary of War, operating the War Department himself as 
the head of the Army, a situation not wholly dissatisfying to a man of Hamilton’s ambition.41  
Despite McHenry’s less than sterling record and qualifications, when John Adams assumed 
the presidency in 1797, he felt it best for the sake of national unity to retain Washington’s 
cabinet, and McHenry remained at his post.42   
 Meanwhile, the federal government’s lethargy in building up a fleet to defend 
American commerce rankled Northern merchants.  Increasing French depredations frustrated 
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citizens of the nation’s vital shipping centers: Baltimore, Boston, and coastal New England.  
That frustration mingled with patriotic fury when the XYZ Affair became public.  American 
emissaries to France were approached immediately upon arrival by agents, codenamed X, Y, 
and Z, who informed them that substantial bribes would be required before any negotiations 
could begin.  When Adams made these overtures public, war fever swept the nation.43  
Fueled by anger at French haughtiness and possibly to encourage greater action by their 
government, private citizens began taking up subscriptions to build warships which would 
then be put to the federal government’s use.44  Such generosity, while certainly helpful for a 
country seeking to build a navy from scratch in wartime, posed a threat to the ideal of civilian 
control.  Washington, Knox, and Hamilton had tried desperately to rid themselves of the 
militia system specifically because localized forces diminished central control, and the 
potential that the towns, and especially the subscribers, who provided these ships would also 
want to dictate their use must have given pause to the new president, particularly since he 
had no Navy Department and an already overworked and unreliable secretary of war at the 
time.45  Fortunately, the subscribers proved willing to let their government use the ships as it 
wished, though they did exert some influence over the captains assigned to “their” vessels.46  
For example, the citizens of Philadelphia seem to have been instrumental in Stephen Decatur 
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Sr. being assigned to the ship built by their subscriptions, also named Philadelphia.  Decatur 
proved a fine choice, but the precedent was problematic nonetheless.47 
 The subscription warships formed only a part of naval expansion.  With the nation 
clamoring for war, Adams finally enjoyed widespread public support and the political capital 
to build up the navy.  The federal government set about purchasing merchant vessels for 
conversion into warships.48  The task of overseeing all this, along with the final stages of 
construction on the three frigates, proved too much for the Secretary of War.  McHenry’s 
obvious inability and the growing size and responsibility of the navy made it imperative that 
Congress create a Navy Department, and it finally did so in 1798.  Once again, however, 
Congress left the exact prerogatives and powers of the head of the department vague.  It was 
careful to note that the secretary’s principal duty was to execute orders given him by the 
president, and otherwise transferred any powers over naval matters once held by the 
Secretary of War to him.  It was assumed, though never explicitly stated, that naval officers 
would be subject to the orders of the secretary of the navy, but the Act offered no guidance 
on the exact boundaries of the captains’ authority, or on any practical matters relating to the 
oversight of the officer corps.  These matters were left for the first Secretary to work out on 
his own, and the boundaries of civilian control fluctuated with each new secretary of the 
navy.49  
 Adams faced a daunting task finding someone to accept the post of civilian head of 
the navy.   The federal government had little to offer talented men, and any capable secretary 
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could certainly make far more money in private business.  Adams’ first choice, George 
Cabot, declined, citing his own lack of qualification, and also his “life of indolence” for the 
previous two decades, which he felt certain rendered him physically unfit for the demanding 
workload of a cabinet officer.  He did, however, offer up an assessment of the qualities the 
young republic needed in its first Secretary.   Besides the obvious need for someone holding 
“considerable knowledge of maritime affairs,” the secretary of the navy should possess 
considerable knowledge “of the human heart,” in order to effectively evaluate, motivate, and 
maintain his officer corps.50  For all his doubts about his own fitness for the job, Cabot 
proved remarkably prescient.  The man eventually chosen struggled with the personalities, 
foibles, and stubbornness of his officers far more than he did with strategy, procurement, or 
seamanship.   
Rebuffed, the president then offered the job to merchant Benjamin Stoddert of 
Georgetown.  Though not the man most coveted for the job, few could have questioned 
Stoddert’s qualifications.  A native of Maryland, he enjoyed a modestly successful merchant 
career before the Revolution, and was commissioned as a captain in the Continental Army 
during the war, where he suffered a severe wound at the battle of Brandywine before honing 
his administrative skills as secretary for the Congressional Board of War.  Throughout the 
conflict, the young Marylander received near universal praise, with one superior gushing that 
“all…acknowledge the greatest merit and bravery of Captain Stoddert.  I cannot say enough 
in his favor; he deserves the esteem of his country.”  His postwar mercantile career proved 
successful, but land speculation cut deeply into his finances, a fate he shared with many 
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aspiring Americans in the years after independence.51  It seems the only person ill at ease 
with Stoddert’s nomination was Stoddert himself.  “I hate office – I have no desire for 
fancied or real importance,” he complained to one friend, and after acquiescing to Adams’ 
offer, he lamented that “in conferring the appointment of secretary of the navy upon me, the 
president could not also confer the knowledge necessary for the secretary of the navy to 
possess, to make him most useful to his country.”52 
 The self-doubts and insecurities that Stoddert brought to the capital dissipated as he 
grew more confident in his abilities to perform the duties of his office, but Stoddert always 
relied heavily on subordinates to manage naval affairs.  In part, this was an unavoidable 
outgrowth of communications in the era.  The great distances and slow mail service meant 
that “Stoddert…had to trust the local navy agent and vessel commander.  Rarely was there a 
second opinion to guide the secretary.”53  Moreover, the Navy Department had no apparatus 
for recruiting, training, or evaluating its officers in its early years, and all these tasks fell, by 
necessity, to the officer corps itself.  If Stoddert was dependent on subordinates, he also 
expected peak performance from those he trusted, and seldom hesitated to sharply reprove 
those who failed to measure up.  In his life prior to government service, Stoddert could be 
exceedingly blunt with merchant captains who failed to meet his expectations.  In words that 
he would echo many times as secretary of the navy, he expressed “very great mortification 
and surprise, that your ship still remains in the country” to a lackadaisical merchant captain, 
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and delivered a stinging rebuke to an associate for mutual financial loss that, he claimed, 
“proceeded from…your failure in your engagements.”54   
 But if Stoddert expected merchant captains in his employ to perform well, he also 
trusted them with substantial responsibility.  Merchant captains enjoyed a great deal of 
autonomy on cruises and even over their ships while in port.  They routinely chose their own 
officers, with mixed results.  One captain, days before his ship was to sail, still had not seen 
the man selected to be his first mate, and was contemplating going into town and finding a 
new second in command at the last moment before sailing on a months-long cruise.55  And 
life in merchant shipping did little to hone an officer’s sense of subordination to authority.  
Men might command their own independent vessel as young as twenty-one.  And a good 
captain enjoyed tremendous latitude in his actions while cruising.56  That said, merchant 
captains, like their counterparts in the navy, still had to maintain careful logbooks and keep 
detailed records of their dealings to present to owners.  Their autonomy at sea was difficult to 
check, given communications of the era, but when mercantile firms owned their cargo, ship, 
or both, they were expected to account to the ship owner for all their activities once they 
returned to port.  Captains also carried the responsibility for their cargo, often enjoying 
substantial discretion in negotiating its sale, but also facing the grim possibility of being held 
accountable for its loss.57 
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 Two crucial, and somewhat interrelated, factors separated merchant captains from 
naval officers.  Merchants carried heavy responsibilities for the financial state of their ships 
and cargoes, but not as much for their personal honor.  In determining to set out on another 
voyage to Canton, Samuel Shaw commented that “at the worst, I can lose only my time.”58  
For an officer of the United States Navy, the loss of honor or esteem was the greatest threat, 
worse even than loss of life.  But that sense of honor carried over to his country once a man 
donned the uniform of the U.S. Navy, at least in theory.  The best officers understood that 
they carried a heavy responsibility for their nation’s reputation, and those who earned 
Stoddert’s approbation were those determined to reflect honorably on the United States.  In 
the aftermath of Maley’s disastrous command of the Experiment, Richard Dale (who had by 
then returned to the navy) commented to Stoddert that, although Maley was a capable enough 
seaman, he was “a very unfit person to command a vessel of any description in the Navy of 
the United States.”  “A man may be a very good seaman,” he added, “and be qualified to 
command a merchant vessel, but at the same time be very unfit to command in the Navy.”59  
Carrying the burden of a nation’s standing in the eyes of Europe’s powers required a daring 
and sense of duty far beyond the basic skills needed to sail a cargo across the ocean.  
Stoddert’s foremost task was to separate those mentally capable of being a naval officers 
from the mere “good seamen.”  
 Having dealt with merchant captains for years, Stoddert was fully prepared to 
delegate substantial authority to his captains once he assumed the office of secretary of the 
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navy.  Stoddert’s first priority, remained that his officers be zealous in advancing the infant 
navy’s reputation, and he repeatedly stated his desire to purge those who failed to measure 
up.  “Our navy at this time when its character is to form, ought to be commanded by men 
who, not satisfied with escaping censure, will be unhappy if they do not receive and merit 
praise,” he commented to Adams, adding that “I hope and I believe that there are several 
such men in the service.”60 Disgrace worthy of removal was not limited to cowardice in 
battle or neglect of duty either.  Stoddert showed no patience with captains who dallied in 
getting to sea over difficulties he considered surmountable.  Annoyed that one of his ships 
remained in port long after it should have sailed, despite multiple warnings, Stoddert 
complained that “I have always entertained an opinion that men who suffer trifling 
difficulties to interpose between them and their duty are unfit for public service.  It shall be 
my endeavor to rid our navy of such men.”  Stoddert felt inclined to assume the worst when a 
captain failed to get to sea in a timely fashion.  Although he acknowledged to Adams that he 
was unsure what circumstances kept Christopher Perry from sailing in distant Newport, the 
delay still diminished his trust in the captain.  “Men of real merit,” he commented “always 
know how to get over difficulties.”61  He reiterated the same idea to Josiah Parker later, 
complaining that the country, “had better have no navy than have it commanded by 
indifferent men, and it shall be my study to rid the service of such men.” The consequences 
of timidity or sloth among the officer corps weighed heavily on his mind; the tiny fleet of a 
new and relatively weak nation depended on the character of its leadership to deter attack and 
generate respect for the United States.  Officers of “zeal and spirit” might be able to “make 
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up for want of great force by great activity.”  But if not “we had better burn our ships, and 
commence a navy at some future time when our citizens have more spirit.”62  The first 
secretary felt a “determination to honor and reward, by promotion…the meritorious officers,” 
but he was equally committed to “rid the service of men who disgrace it.”63   
 His hopes for a high quality officer corps were challenged by the massive expansion 
prompted by the Quasi War with France.  Christopher McKee estimates that the corps under 
Stoddert ballooned from the three remaining captains to over 700 officers in the four years 
the United States was at war with France.64  There were two means for Stoddert to choose the 
officers who could lead America’s navy in the aggressive manner he desired.  One was to 
select from among a host of applications himself.  Practical seamanship counted for 
surprisingly little. Stoddert, and his successors, for that matter, did not care if an applicant 
had never left shore or even seen the ocean.  He depended on the current officers to train 
newcomers.  Far more important were an applicant’s credentials as “sprightly young men of 
good education, good character, and good connections.”65  Stoddert wanted not only men 
who were “sprightly” and industrious, but who also exhibited staunch physical courage.  
“The captains should possess…real bravery,” he commented to Alexander Hamilton, adding 
to another correspondent that “bravery is a quality not to be dispensed with in the officers.  
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Like charity, it covers a great many defects.”66  In choosing from among a host of applicants 
which potential midshipmen best fit these criteria, Stoddert relied heavily on letters of 
recommendation from prominent citizens who knew the applicant personally.  There was one 
class of persons whose judgment in recommending officers he never questioned: officers 
themselves. 
With his senior officers already in place, Stoddert looked to them to fill the ranks by 
appointing their own subordinates.67  “I wish you would select, and nominate to me, suitable 
characters for your officers,” he wrote to one man, stipulating only that “men of courage, 
abilities, and patriotism, and such men only” be added to the ranks of “our infant Navy.”68  
While a captain’s appointment of junior officers had to be formally confirmed later, in 
practice the secretary rubber-stamped any acting commissions granted by his captains, and 
openly told his officers that such would be his practice.69   
Beyond merely appointing them, he also looked to captains to maintain the quality of 
the officer corps, pressing them to severely punish those who merited it while also giving 
him detailed reports of those ready to move up in rank.  He even encouraged Silas Talbot to 
bypass him and go directly to the president with the names of those the captain wanted 
appointed as midshipmen, assuring him that Adams would readily approve all 
recommendations.  Stoddert also proved willing to delegate the task of pruning the officer 
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corps to his most senior commanders.  In the same letter to Silas Talbot, Stoddert urged him 
to try everything in his power to induce a few “unworthy” lieutenants to resign.70  Still, 
Stoddert felt strongly that meritorious officers should join with him in nudging out their peers 
who failed to measure up.  In an enclosed missive to Talbot’s apparently frustrated 
subordinates, Stoddert reiterated his theme of acting “to rid the service of them who disgrace 
it” this time urging that it was “the duty of all the other officers” to do so.71  Writing to a 
subordinate to urge his immediate resignation, Alexander Murray cited Stoddert’s opinion as 
corresponding with his own, but also made it clear that the secretary developed his view that 
the man should be removed based on Murray’s report.72  But Stoddert also proved willing to 
defer to his officer corps when they left men in place that he felt the service would be better 
off without.  When a court-martial acquitted a young lieutenant of sleeping on duty, Stoddert 
clearly believed that the evidence was sufficient to cashier him, but chose not to reject the 
court’s findings.73   
 Even ashore, Stoddert was in so sense a micromanager, and he tended to allow 
captains substantial leeway in construction and outfitting of their ships.  He did, however, 
expect careful returns on all expenses, and strictly ordered captains to provide them.74  Like 
Knox, Stoddert believed that the men who commanded ships at sea knew best to supervise 
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their construction, and the autonomy he allowed naval officers was little different from that 
given merchant captains, who also often oversaw the outfitting and sometimes the 
construction of their vessels, and who also, as noted earlier, were expected to provide 
detailed reports of their activities.  Like all his predecessors at the War Department, Stoddert 
faced a daunting workload with a limited staff, making delegation even more of a necessity 
than the communications of the era already dictated.75  He could even be flexible on naval 
regulations when he felt circumstances dictated, as when he told one captain that, although 
regulations prohibited the employment of boys on board ships, he would allow the officer to 
do so anyway, on the grounds that “your opinion…corresponds entirely to my own.”76 
 The area where Stoddert maintained his authority to the greatest degree was in ship 
movements and overall naval strategy.  Stoddert formulated a plan for waging the war 
against France, and he oversaw the movements of the Navy with this broader view in mind.77  
Yet he by no means shut his officers out entirely in this realm either.  He was willing, at 
times, to grant captains discretion on where they sailed.78  That the leeway he granted them 
came in part from his own inclinations and not solely from pressure brought to bear by the 
officer corps can be seen in Alexander Murray’s response to his orders.  Murray felt honored 
by the “extensive and unconfined latitude,” he enjoyed “leaving me at large to act as my 
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judgment shall dictate.”  The freedom granted Murray had a salutary effect, with the captain 
moved to assure his superior “I will not disgrace your confidence,” a vow he reaffirmed later 
with a promise to “achieve something of moment that will meet with your approbation.”79  
Early in the war, Stoddert even sought Truxtun’s advice on “the manner of employing our 
force”.80  When Stoddert considered revising the naval regulations originally penned by 
James McHenry, he assigned Barry, Truxtun, Dale, Stephen Decatur Sr., and Thomas Tingey 
to recommend new regulations.81 
 Stoddert’s desire to grant his captains discretion to utilize their expertise and respond 
quickly to changing events may have stemmed in part from his wish that the president treat 
cabinet officers in a similar fashion.  Adams took a keen interest in naval affairs, and 
Stoddert never acted entirely out of the president’s oversight.82  The two kept up extensive 
correspondence throughout the war, in addition to regular face-to-face meetings to discuss 
the optimal use of America’s navy.  On one occasion, Adams inserted himself directly into 
the use of the navy, ordering the Merrimack to sail and notifying Stoddert afterwards, hinting 
in the letter of his displeasure at the number of vessels still in port.83   
If Stoddert ever complained of the president’s meddling in naval affairs, no record of 
it remains, even when Adams called on Stoddert’s already overworked staff to locate and 
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catalogue the “best writings in Dutch, Spanish, French, and especially English” on naval 
matters and naval biographies – and delegated to the department the task of applying to 
Congress for the funds to complete the project.84  Throughout his tenure, Stoddert regularly 
cited the president’s wishes in his instructions to officers, indicating the two routinely 
consulted verbally on naval affairs in addition to their letters.  And Adams never became 
overwhelming in his oversight of the navy, allowing Stoddert a fair measure of autonomy in 
the use of his ships.  The episode with the Merrimack was the exception, and if it was 
intended to prod the navy into getting ships to sea faster, it apparently worked to the 
commander-in-chief’s satisfaction.  In fact, given Stoddert’s admission of insecurity in his 
post, there are indications that the level of involvement by the president may not have been 
entirely Adams’ doing.  Stoddert wrote to Adams on one occasion begging pardon for his 
failure to communicate more regularly, and later apologetically informed the president that 
officers were resigning in such numbers as to make it impossible for him to clear every new 
appointment with Adams before sending them out.85  There is no record of Adams 
complaining about either practice, either before or after the letters from Stoddert.  Later, 
when Silas Talbot needed additional officers before sailing with the Constitution, Stoddert 
sent him to meet with Adams, carrying a list of possible candidates to fill the vacancies, 
flattering the president with assurances that “you sir can judge better than I” those that would 
make the best officers.86  But even if he at times felt uncertain in his role as secretary of the 
navy, Stoddert still felt comfortable enough to give forthright advice to Adams, even when he 
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it involved recommending against the president’s wishes.87  Overall, the two seem to have 
enjoyed a positive working relationship, and Stoddert remained completely loyal to the 
president even when the rest of his cabinet conspired against him.88   
 Given wide latitude in performing their duties and routinely consulted on all matters 
of naval governance, it should come as no surprise that many officers “shirked” in their 
submission to civilian oversight.89  Some, notably Alexander Murray, scrupulously kept the 
secretary apprised of all their activities and constantly reaffirmed their subordinate status.90  
Others proved less restrained, treating orders as guidelines, greatly overestimating their own 
authority, and putting personal squabbles and concerns about honor and status ahead of the 
needs of the navy.  In addition to his duties overseeing the purchase and construction of 
ships, manning and equipping the navy, and keeping Congress apprised of his activities, 
Stoddert spent a significant portion of his time and energy settling disputes between officers 
and trying to sooth bruised egos. 
 Stoddert’s constant reminders to act aggressively did not always yield positive results 
either.  A zealous desire to win laurels for oneself and the country could be a double-edged 
sword, as many captains proved less careful than Adams would have liked in determining 
whether a ship was from a neutral nation before seizing it.91  “Mistakes of this kind” Stoddert 
                                                 
87 Stoddert to Adams, August 17, 1799, NDQW, IV: 87-88. 
88 Palmer, Stoddert’s War,  
89 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 60.  See chapter 1 for a discussion of Feaver’s “working” and “shirking.” 
90 Murray wrote to Stoddert that he considered it his “duty to give you a particular detail of all my transactions,” 
and kept up a frequent correspondence apprising the Secretary of his activities.  Murray to Stoddert, November 
9, 1799, NDQW, IV: 373-374 
91 Stoddert, “Circular Instructions to the Captains and Commanders of Vessels in the Service of the United 
States,” March 12, 1799, NDQW, II: 447. 
84 
 
complained, “will lead us into quarrels with all the world.”  Having entrusted great authority 
to his officer corps, Stoddert felt the need to rein them in based on repeated errors on this 
score, reminding them that captains “must be governed by laws, and by their instructions 
founded on laws.”  Even at sea, a captain could not consider himself law – though he could 
come close with his own crew – but must remember that his duties were to the president.  
Furthermore, Stoddert expressed great displeasure at officers writing to friends and even to 
newspapers with commentary on the American war effort and executive management of the 
navy.  Doing so clearly violated the duty of a military officer to his government, provided the 
enemy with valuable information, and generally proved “injurious not only to the public 
interest, but to the officers themselves.”92  The practice of writing to newspapers seems to 
have ended once Stoddert directed his captains to cease doing so, though he continued to 
receive unsolicited advice from officers on a variety of matters for his entire tenure.93 
 But the action that elicited the most anger, by far, from Stoddert was captains 
returning home early from cruises.  This remained a constant problem throughout the war.  
Stoddert groused to one correspondent that if it had “not been for the unlucky return of so 
many of our vessels, there would be nothing to regret in the conduct of our navy.”94 John 
Barry, the senior captain and Revolutionary War hero, ranked among the worst offenders.  
Stoddert was “mortified” that Barry neglected a key part of his instructions in where to sail, 
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cut short his cruise, and after his return lingered in port far longer than the secretary would 
have liked.  Barry also proved lax in maintaining communication with the Navy Department, 
and his continued sloth in getting to sea and engaging the enemy prompted Stoddert to 
remind him to “set an example of activity and enterprise” for younger officers, lest they too 
begin displaying similar lethargy in performing their duty.95  Barry’s leisurely attitude 
towards his responsibilities in the Quasi War stands in stark contrast to his aggressive 
Revolutionary War record, baffling observers then and later.  Michael Palmer concludes that 
Barry’s age had stripped him of the vigor he displayed during the previous war.96  At the 
time, Barry’s contemporaries seem to have agreed, with Stoddert considering him “too infirm 
for service,” and complaining to Alexander Hamilton that he was “old and infirm.”97  
Thomas Tingey somewhat less tactfully referred to him as “an old wife,” in private 
conversation.98     
 If his highest-ranking captain caused him grief, the second on the list was even worse.  
Unlike Barry, Samuel Nicholson possessed a spotty Revolutionary War record.99  His career 
in the Quasi War, on the other hand, proved far more consistent; his every voyage was an 
unmitigated disaster.  Nicholson repeatedly failed to make any effort at discerning the 
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national origin of the ships he seized, to the point that Stoddert even toyed with having him 
arrested after one particularly egregious violation of neutrality.100  If Nicholson’s only 
offense had been lack of care in seizing vessels, that would have been frustrating enough, but 
he also displayed a tendency to return early from cruises and dallied in setting sail again even 
after he received orders to do so.101  Moreover, he presumptuously ordered a subordinate 
captain to join his squadron, despite orders to the contrary from Stoddert.102  But here 
Stoddert’s earlier zeal for ridding the service of incompetents clashed with his humanity, as 
he realized that Nicholson’s family suffered from a heavy load of debt and would be 
impoverished if their breadwinner lost his captain’s salary, to say nothing of the humiliation 
they would suffer if he were arrested or cashiered.  So, rather than fire his second-ranking 
officer, Stoddert stationed him where he could do no harm, granting him shore duty 
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and Merchantman’s Convoy… (London: Printed for T. Cooper, 1740), Society of the Cincinnati Museum, 
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supervising ship construction on the pretext that he had been separated from his family for so 
long while at sea (although not as long as his orders actually called for).103 
 Isaac Philips was not so lucky.  He committed the opposite mistake; where Nicholson 
was too quick to act against another nation’s vessels, Philips displayed too much timidity, 
and received no leniency whatsoever from Stoddert.  On November 16, 1798, while cruising 
off Havana in the Baltimore, Phillips encountered a Royal Navy squadron, under the 
command of Captain John Loring.  Loring hailed Phillips and asked him to come on board 
his flagship, the Carnatic.  With the two countries at peace, and fighting a common enemy, 
Phillips probably saw nothing amiss in this and readily allowed British messengers to row 
him across to the Carnatic.  Any hopes he had of a friendly encounter vanished once he 
arrived on board.  Loring, a native of America, had been a Loyalist and prisoner of war 
during the American Revolution, joining the Royal Navy as soon as he obtained his parole.  
His hostility to his native country hung over all that followed.  Although Phillips was clearly 
a commissioned officer in the United States’ Navy and the Baltimore a government ship, 
Loring dismissively asked “who is Ben Stoddert” and said that “the name was new to him.”  
Loring made it painfully obvious that he felt not the least concern for whether the United 
States even had a navy, let alone whether the ship before him was part of such, and 
announced that he would be taking desperately needed seamen for his own ship from among 
Phillips’ crew.  Whatever verbal protests the American officer might have made fell on deaf 
ears, and Phillips meekly returned to his own ship and obeyed British orders to assemble his 
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crew and hand over his muster role.  He watched in dismay as Loring’s men carried off fifty-
five tars, almost a third of the Baltimore’s crew.104  
 Perhaps reflecting on the enormity of his actions afterwards, Loring did send fifty of 
the seamen back the following day.  This small token made it easier for Phillips to sail his 
ship back to the United States, but did him no good beyond that.  Stoddert exploded when he 
read the report, telling his soon to be unemployed captain that “it is impossible to find an 
excuse for…your tame submission to the orders of a British lieutenant, on board your own 
ship.”  It was bad enough that Phillips failed to put up any kind of defense against being 
boarded, “but you descended further, and actually obeyed his orders to have all hands called, 
and to give him a list of their names.”  For such “degrading” conduct, Adams summarily 
dismissed Phillips from the service, and revoked his commission as an officer.105  Although 
the power to dismiss an officer rested solely with the president, Adams acted on Stoddert’s 
recommendation.106  A spirited letter from Phillips defending his conduct got no sympathy 
from the secretary.  Even if he lacked the force to prevent the British from taking his men, 
Stoddert informed him, Phillips should have maintained a vigorous defense and, if defeated, 
struck his flag and surrendered his ship as well as his crew.107  To obey the dictates of 
another nation’s officers, as he would have to a superior American captain was unforgivable.   
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 Despite the obvious hopelessness of his case, Phillips continued to campaign for his 
old job, or at least to punish Stoddert and Adams for dismissing him.  He enticed several of 
his subordinates on the Baltimore to resign in protest to his dismissal.  Although this delayed 
the ship sailing again, Stoddert shed no tears at their loss.108  The example made of Phillips 
apparently had a salutary effect.  When a British officer came aboard the Ganges in February 
of the following year, Captain Thomas Tingey boldly informed him that he would not muster 
his crew, as he “considered all my crew Americans by birth or adoption.”  Furthermore, 
Tingey’s men could not produce individual protections commonly carried by American 
seamen at the time, because their protection was the American flag flying from atop the 
vessel.  Just in case his crew felt any doubt as to their safety, Tingey called all hands on deck 
after the British left, and reiterated that not a one of them would be taken unless the British 
first slew him in combat.  He received a rousing three cheers from his crew and praise from 
the president.109 
While Tingey’s boldness impressed the secretary, his favorite among his officers was 
Thomas Truxtun, supposedly the least qualified of the initial six captains.  Truxtun’s lack of 
service in the Continental Navy, something he considered an asset, did not stop him from 
becoming the most celebrated hero of the entire Quasi-War.  Truxtun, who also enjoyed a 
fairly close personal relationship with Stoddert, embodied his civilian superior’s ideal of a 
naval officer.  He served his country not out of any pecuniary interest, but to perform great 
deeds that would outlive him.  “Does any man enter into (naval service) for the sake of 
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subsistence,” he rhetorically inquired of his brother officer, Richard Dale.  The answer, to 
Truxtun, was perfectly self-evident: “are not glory and fame the grand incentives?”110  He 
possessed tremendous courage in battle and zeal in pursuing the enemy.   In part, this was a 
function of his desire for personal fame and honor, but he also took his duty to his profession 
very seriously.  Truxtun had been openly contemptuous of the Continental Navy during his 
stint as a privateer, and he was determined to insure that his country’s new naval force 
commanded the respect of Europe.111  That meant building the navy on the British model, 
and Truxtun sought to emulate the Royal Navy in establishing an American tradition at 
sea.112 
Emulating Royal Navy discipline, however, did not always sit well with his crew. He 
began his first cruise by facing a potential mutiny, and the angry seamen only relented after 
being threatened with court-martial and execution.113  Tellingly, he learned of the mutinous 
plotting from Stoddert, who forwarded him a letter sent by anonymous members of the 
Constellation’s crew to Congress.  The Speaker of the House had no interest in intervening 
between a naval officer and his sailors, and forwarded the message to Stoddert, who likewise 
preferred to let Truxtun handle the matter himself.114  At the time, and for decades 
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afterwards, captains faced almost no interference whatsoever from civilian authorities on the 
treatment of their crews, and seamen had practically no recourse, other than desertion, for 
having their grievances addressed beyond an appeal to the captain of their ship.115 
Truxtun squelched any talk of mutiny among his crew fairly easily, but he took his 
oversight of the subordinate officers entrusted to his care much more seriously.  Truxtun 
complained endlessly of the lazy, intemperate, and often insubordinate set of officers he took 
on his first cruise, and he expressed the view that the navy’s only hope for producing a 
laudable group of leaders was to “purge well at first.”116  Still, at sea he could hardly 
dispense with the only officer corps he possessed, though he continuously remonstrated them 
for their substandard performance.  He considered the “improper behavior” exhibited by his 
subordinates “hitherto…unprecedented in naval discipline.”117  In speaking to one lieutenant, 
he cited the infancy of his country’s naval service in urging his lieutenants not to be “idle and 
indifferent spectators of what is going on,” but should instead display a “minute attention to 
duty.”118  The recipient of this letter, Lieutenant Cowper, apparently responded by accusing 
Truxtun of making no allowance for his inexperience.  Truxtun summarily dismissed this 
complaint, calling it a “heinous crime indeed,” to neglect any and every chance to develop 
the experience necessary for the performance of his duty.119  Truxtun continued to express 
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vexation at the “very much neglected” performance of duty, on board the Constellation, and 
eventually created a book for superior officers to list all their complaints against inferiors, 
which he planned to regularly forward to Stoddert.120  He keenly felt the youth of the United 
States Navy, and the need for officers devoted to its reputation, urging his lieutenants not to 
expect the comparatively luxurious treatment of their peers in European navies, but instead to 
“say, I prefer the attention I owe the infant marine of my country, to every indulgence, and 
pleasure,” at least until such time as the service had established itself.121  
Clearly, Truxtun was an exacting officer, and expected his subordinates to perform 
their duties well, but he saw himself as a mentor as much as a commander.  After reproving 
one midshipman, he offered paternal counsel on the proper conduct of a naval officer, and 
concluded by telling the young man, “this is the advice of a friend.”122  When young David 
Porter complained at his superiors’ swearing at him constantly, and threatened to resign, 
Truxtun chose not to simply let him go, but instead exploded 
Why you dog! If I can help it you shall never leave the Navy! Swear at you? Damn it, 
sir – every time I do that you go up a round on the ladder of promotion!  As to the 
first lieutenant’s blowing you up every day, why, sir, ‘tis because he loves you and 
would not have you grow up a conceited young coxcomb. Go forward and let us have 
no more whining. 
 
Porter apparently took Truxtun’s words to heart, for he remained in the navy and went on to a 
celebrated career.  Later, he openly credited his successes with having been trained “in such a 
thorough naval school,” on board the Constellation.123  Truxtun chose well in insuring Porter 
remained, and it was not out of character in doing so, for he readily reserved for himself the 
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discretion as to which officers to push out of the service and which to retain.  In addition to 
preventing Porter from resigning, he later chose not to bring charges or report to Stoddert 
when the troubled midshipman struck a superior officer during a confrontation.124  He even 
ignored Stoddert’s and Adams’ repeatedly-stated desire that only men of proven character 
and good reputation be named officers, appointing the son of a close friend in hopes that 
naval service would transform him into “a useful member of society.”125  He was even 
capable of affection for some of his men, and expressed genuine grief when one of his 
lieutenants died of fever late in the war.126 
Truxtun’s relentless discipline of his officers and crew paid off.  Despite his 
seemingly constant complaining about their laxity and sloth, he worried that other officers 
would become jealous at how quickly his subordinates received promotions.127 And his men 
eventually recognized that they were fortunate to have him as a mentor, even to the point of 
declining independent commands to remain under his tutelage.128 The Constellation’s captain 
may have thought little of the men under his command, but they performed well enough to 
make their ship the first in the republic’s navy to capture an enemy vessel.  In a fierce action 
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on February 9, 1799, the French frigate L’Insurgent surrendered to Truxtun.  The battle was a 
remarkable victory for the infant navy of the United States.  The Constellation lost only one 
man killed, compared to seventy Fernch sailors.  Truxtun was justly proud of what he and his 
men had accomplished, and he knew he could expect the profuse praise of his country upon 
his (premature) return home.129   
Truxtun’s victory sparked celebration in Washington, but two other events marred the 
triumphant atmosphere.130  The sole death for the American ship was a young man named 
Neal Harvey, who, for the crime of appearing cowardly, was run through by Lieutenant 
Andrew Sterrett in the midst of the action.  Sterrett felt no shame afterwards for his actions, 
boasting to his brother that “we would put a man to death for even looking pale on board this 
ship.”131  Truxtun, as well as his government, tacitly approved his conduct by failing to issue 
even the slightest rebuke, despite attacks from the Republican press.  While he had endlessly 
chastised his subordinates for every trifling error in shipboard management, cutting down an 
American seaman in battle apparently did not merit a response in Truxtun’s mind.  In any 
navy of this era, life was brutal and cheap, and actions such as this were not unheard of.  That 
said, not many years later Sterrett would have, at the very least, been called before a court-
martial to explain his actions.  There is no record of him ever specifying exactly what Harvey 
did to warrant death.  In the heady celebration of the nation’s first naval victory, and with the 
navy suffering from a shortage of competent officers, the entire matter was forgotten.132 
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Truxtun also felt the need to accompany his victory with his own commentary on the 
war effort.  In his report to Stoddert, he famously announced that French Captain Barreaut 
“tells me I have caused a war with France, if so I am glad of it, for I detest a thing done by 
halves.”133  Truxtun’s inclusion of his opinion of government policy clearly crossed the line 
separating the military force and its civilian government.  Moreover, it identified Truxtun 
with the radical wing of Adams’ Federalist Party, which broke with its president and loudly 
clamored for a declaration of war, even as Adams strove to keep the conflict contained.  
Alexander Hamilton, who acted as the leader of the Radical Federalists, hoped to shore up 
his own power by openly challenging the president’s desire to avoid war.134  No doubt he 
was delighted to read the comments from the navy’s premier captain in an official report.  
While Truxtun was certainly entitled to his opinion in a democratic society, his thinly veiled 
criticism of his own government’s policy flouted the authority of civilian control of the 
military.  With the navy short on victories and in desperate need of popularity, and with 
Truxtun a national hero, the department apparently chose to ignore his implied criticism.135  
Like Sterret’s slaying of Harvey, the matter was ignored. 
Truxtun’s euphoria over his capture was short-lived.  With the war expanding – if still 
not declared – Silas Talbot returned to service.  He received his orders recalling him in the 
summer of 1798, and was already preparing to return to sea when Truxtun captured the 
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L’Insurgent.  Ostensibly, Talbot outranked Truxtun.  He had been ahead of him on the initial 
list of captains, and had never resigned from the navy, even serving in a government post 
during part of his absence.  Truxtun, however, was by far the most successful of America’s 
captains, and he felt that his accomplishments, and Talbot’s time away, made him superior in 
standing to Talbot.  While he had willingly agreed to be last among captains at the outset of 
his career, sensitivity over the issue of rank set in very soon thereafter.  As early as 1796, he 
was “mortified” at the slightest rumor that Talbot might return to service, citing both the 
British and French precedents that active duty officers surpassed those who spent time away 
from service in rank.136   
In truth, the question of relative rank had vexed Stoddert from the beginning of his 
administration.   He probably regretted the precedent he set early in his tenure of referring 
complaints about such matters to the president to settle.  Rather than explicitly order two 
officers to accept their relative standing based on the dates of their commission, he told them 
that such standing would remain in place until Adams ruled with finality.137  Alexander 
Murray, one of the captains involved in that dispute, soon needed additional soothing, after 
he protested to Stoddert being placed under Truxtun’s command.  Murray’s protest, Stoddert 
claimed, “gave me real pain,” and he assured his injured officer that “nothing was ever 
farther from my thoughts, or the thoughts of the president, than to do any act, which might 
imply a distrust of you.”138  Although he was nothing but conciliatory here, within a few 
months his patience for officers complaining of insult in their standing seems to have worn 
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thin.  He mildly rebuked a master commandant for complaining about his standing vis-à-vis 
officers commissioned to newly constructed ships.  Stoddert informed him that he should be 
satisfied with his condition, although the letter is nonetheless primarily an attempt at 
conciliation.139   Although he could sharply reprove any officer who displeased him, with 
those he favored Stoddert found it difficult to issue directives he knew they would object to, 
and in matters of relative rank he preferred to conciliate, or pass the issue on to the 
president.140 
With Truxtun and Talbot, he certainly made his views perfectly clear.  Stoddert sided 
whole-heartedly with Truxtun, but more importantly he wanted to keep the navy running at 
peak efficiency, and that meant keeping Truxtun placated.    And so, Stoddert somewhat 
disingenuously assured his favorite captain that all was well, and that there was no doubt the 
president would see Truxtun’s merits and grant him seniority.141  The truth was that Adams 
felt far more inclined to take Talbot’s view of the matter.  Talbot, moreover, marshaled the 
influence of any political connections he could find to make his case for him.  Henry Knox’s 
relationship with Talbot dated back to the Revolution, and Talbot had appealed to their 
friendship in 1794 when he sought a commission in the new navy.  Talbot now turned to him 
again for help in the controversy with Truxtun.  Knox apparently did intervene on Talbot’s 
behalf, as Stoddert wrote to Knox afterwards to assure him that “the president…will never 
consent to injure any person to gratify popular clamor.”  He went on to inform Knox that it 
“was my intention to place your son under the command of Captain Truxtun,” but Truxtun’s 
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subsequent resignation forced Stoddert to put the younger Knox under another officer’s 
tutelage.  This may have been an innocent enough attempt to keep Knox apprised of his son’s 
naval career, or it could have been a veiled rebuke of Knox for contributing to the navy’s loss 
of one of its best officers.142  Talbot also called on Alexander Hamilton, the former Treasury 
Secretary, right-hand man of George Washington, and de facto commander of America’s 
Provisional Army to present his case before Adams, which was probably not the wisest move 
given Adams’ hostility towards Hamilton at the time, but still an indication of Talbot’s 
willingness to use powerful political connections to compel the secretary of the navy to do 
his bidding.143  
Ever the mediator, Stoddert tried calling the two feuding captains together for a 
meeting to discuss their differences.  Incredibly, Talbot simply failed to show up.  His inside 
connection with the president allowed him to ignore anything as trivial as a conference 
between officers called by the secretary of the navy.  There is no record of any kind of 
reprimand from Stoddert to his captain for ignoring the conference.  Instead, Stoddert 
resorted to what historian William Fowler dubbed a “lame stratagem that fooled no one.”144  
When Talbot was formally named one of the initial six captains, none of them were issued 
commissions.145  Stoddert now decided to mail one to Talbot, but dated it 1798.  Infuriated, 
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Talbot immediately went over Stoddert’s head and threatened Adams that he would resign if 
the issue were not settled in his favor once and for all.146   
Adams had favored Talbot throughout the entire ordeal, and his opinion did not 
change now.147  He ordered Stoddert to place Talbot ahead of Truxtun on the list of captains.  
While Adams lauded Truxtun’s service, and expressed his hope that the captain would not 
prove himself a man of “selfish vanity and aspiring ambition,” by resigning, he was unshaken 
from his view that Talbot had held the same commission from 1794 up to that day, 
unaffected by his time away from the service.  While Adams insisted that his decision came 
from “mature deliberation, impartial consideration . . . and conscientious opinion that it is 
right,” he likely had two other, possibly subconscious factors influencing his views.148  The 
Continental Navy had not performed well, and Truxtun had always been adamant that his 
lack of service in it did not diminish his qualifications.  Not surprisingly, Adams, one of the 
key figures in the creation of that naval force, took a different view.  His letter to Stoddert 
made a point of noting that Truxtun was a latecomer to the navy, while Talbot had an 
impressive Revolutionary War record.  Secondly, there was the issue of the frigate 
Constitution, which Adams desperately wanted to get back to seas soon as possible.  A 
resignation from Talbot and a search for a new captain would mean a lengthy delay.149 
Stoddert then had to break the news to Truxtun.  Not surprisingly, the hero of the 
Constellation immediately offered his own resignation.  He felt insulted that the navy did not 
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fully appreciate his accomplishments, and refused to continue serving having had his 
reputation, in his mind, impugned.  “It as little becomes my character to yield my rank 
against what I think a well founded right as it would my ship to an enemy unequal in force.  I 
have therefore thought it proper to quit,” he informed his officers on the Constellation, in the 
process undermining the selfless attention to duty he had worked so hard to instill in them.150     
Truxtun did not, however, fade quietly into the sunset.  One of his fellow officers, 
though upset at his decision to leave the service, took heart when he saw “in today’s paper 
that he will still act as his own trumpeter.”151  “He might more aptly have been likened to a 
full brass band,” comments Truxtun’s generally sympathetic biographer, for the wounded 
captain made sure his side of the story was not lost.  Truxtun loudly proclaimed his ill 
treatment to anyone who would listen until the public lost interest and he faded from view.  
He was left to spend a few months simmering in his home at Perth Amboy, New Jersey.152 
Stoddert never lost interest.  Upon receiving his wounded captain’s letter of 
resignation, he put it in a drawer, and for a time he and Adams simply allowed Truxtun to 
remain in the United States Navy, even while he refused to perform any duties associated 
with the position.  He somehow convinced George Washington himself to invite the captain 
to Mount Vernon, where the Father of his Country urged him to reconsider.  Once the 
situation had quieted down sufficiently, Stoddert personally went to Truxtun and asked him 
to return to the service.  Whether bored with civilian life, believing himself indispensible to 
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his country, or genuinely moved by the secretary’s appeal, he agreed, but only on the 
condition that he never be ordered to serve under Talbot.153 
Having enticed Truxtun back into the service, Stoddert’s next task was to prevent any 
other officers from leaving over rank.  Had Truxtun’s resignation been accepted, and then the 
former captain readmitted to the navy, several other officers would have passed him in 
seniority.  Stoddert’s next step after readmitting Truxtun was to write a soothing missive to 
Stephen Decatur, urging him not to also resign over relative rank.  Once the other officers 
knew that the president had not accepted Truxtun’s resignation, Stoddert expressed 
confidence that “it cannot give a moment’s uneasiness” to them that they still ranked beneath 
him.154  Perhaps recognizing this statement for the wishful thinking that it was, he went on to 
describe the “great pain” he and Adams would feel if the rest of the officer corps objected.155 
Even with the clash between Truxtun and Talbot settled, Stoddert’s duties grew 
increasingly overwhelming.  He briefly held the dual roles of heading the Departments of 
War and the Navy, and the massive increase in the size of the navy during wartime had not 
brought a corresponding increase in Stoddert’s staff.  In addition to overseeing the activities, 
and occasionally soothing the egos, of his officers, Stoddert often acted as a liaison between 
his officer corps and Congress.  He regularly reported to the House of Representatives and 
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Senate on naval activities, and took upon himself to appeal to Congress for better pay for his 
captains, and to encourage the creation of the rank of admiral.  Moreover, he sought the 
creation of 74-gun ships that could compete with the mightiest vessels in the Royal Navy, 
and fought an ultimately futile battle with a parsimonious Congress for a program of naval 
expansion.156  He also faced constant pressures from merchants, who consistently felt he 
provided them with insufficient protection, and who cared little how many ships he actually 
had available to convoy them.  Defending himself before accusations of inadequacy or 
deliberate failure to protect all of America’s commerce wore on him, and the strain began to 
show in his relations with subordinates.157 
In the midst of such a workload, Stoddert understandably expected his captains to 
continue showing the initiative that he so prized.  He found it annoying when officers looked 
to him to issue orders for steps that he felt they could easily take on their own authority, 
especially in terms of dealing with their own subordinates.  He wrote James Sever to express 
his hopes that actions “so obviously dictated by common sense” had been taken without 
waiting for specific orders from him, and further urging Sever to deal as severely as 
necessary with a problematic subordinate, in hopes of driving him to either resign or to 
commit some offense that would provide a pretext for cashiering him.158  His concern with 
the sensitive feelings of captains also diminished, and he crossed out a section of a letter to 
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Talbot reassuring him of the president’s confidence in his abilities, and sent only a fairly 
terse list of directives instead.159 
Even Truxtun did not escape censure.  When he wrote to the secretary asking for 
permission to court-martial several mutinous seamen, Stoddert testily informed him that he 
should have taken the initiative to do so himself, without consulting the department.  
Furthermore, he informed Truxtun that “I do not like this method of appealing to the head of 
the Department by officers who are themselves competent to the object of appeal.”160  The 
following day, he wrote Truxtun again, even going so far as to tell him to start acting as an 
admiral, as he would probably be one soon enough.  “You must act,” Stoddert informed 
Truxtun, “with all the authority…as if you had command of the whole navy.”161 
The letter proved to be a mistake, in more ways than one.  Congress did not create the 
rank of admiral, at least not for another sixty years, and Truxtun took Stoddert’s comments to 
heart far more than the secretary ever intended.   The following month, Truxtun approved a 
court-martial sentence and signed it “Thomas Truxtun, Vested with the power of 
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the US.”162  Seeing Captain Andrew Murray’s vessel 
idle in port awaiting instructions from the Department, Truxtun ordered him to sail 
immediately, giving him instructions on his own authority, which, he had every reason to 
believe, included command of “the whole Navy.”  Unfortunately, Murray sailed in the 
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opposite direction Stoddert intended.  The Navy Department had intended for him to relieve 
Talbot at Cape François, and when he left before orders reached him, the Department 
scrambled to find another officer to allow Talbot to return home.163 
For the second time in less than a month, Stoddert reprimanded his favorite captain, 
informing him of Murray’s intended duty in Cape François and adding that his hasty 
departure meant that his ship sailed without valuable supplies.  Stoddert also, apparently for 
the first time, thought to instruct one of his officers on the details of civil-military relations.  
“I am extremely mortified,” he complained at the “unwarrantable” and “in every way 
improper” step taken by Truxtun.  Seemingly reversing his earlier instructions, Stoddert 
noted that certain decisions “belong to the Executive exclusively.”  “You must avoid such 
interference in the future,” he warned.164  Within a week, though, Stoddert cooled down, and 
sent a very conciliatory letter to Truxtun, assuring him that the navy would be able to work 
out all the confusions resulting from Murray’s early sailing, and expressing a wish that 
Truxtun visit him in Washington if he decided to return from Norfolk by land.165  He may 
have realized that he ultimately had no one to blame but himself for the episode with Murray, 
and likely felt some guilt for his outburst at an officer who genuinely believed he was 
fulfilling his superior’s wishes.  That Truxtun took a somewhat loose view of civilian 
authority should have been obvious by that time though, and by mellowing his earlier 
expressions of dismay, Stoddert may have missed an opportunity to deter his favorite officer 
from causing injury to the service in the near future.   
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 Truxtun had no choice but to keep detesting the war effort, for Adams never ceased 
waging it “by halves.”  Even as Alexander Hamilton schemed to seize the power of the 
presidency from him and field a massive army, Adams continually sought a peaceful solution 
to America’s differences with France, and he succeeded in 1800.  The United States and 
France signed a new treaty, although it would take years to sort out all the competing claims 
for damages.166   For the remainder of his life, Adams regarded the peaceful resolution of 
hostilities with France as one of his greatest legacies, but at the time it cost him dearly.167  
Having infuriated the radical wing of his own party, Adams fell to Thomas Jefferson in the 
election of 1800, and his cabinet prepared for a transfer of power.   
Stoddert knew all too well that Jefferson’s backers included many of those most 
hostile to the creation of the navy in the first place, and that the new president had won the 
election on promises to dramatically reduce federal spending.  His last days in the Navy 
Department were thus spent scrambling to lay a foundation that could survive Jefferson’s 
Administration.  Stoddert reluctantly conceded that the peacetime navy should sell all but 
thirteen of its frigates, but he could not resist trying again to get Congress to build 74s.  
Knowing the Jeffersonians would insist on reducint the officer corps, he campaigned for 
those released to receive half-pay for life, financed by the sale of the navy’s unneeded ships.  
Congress balked at much of Stoddert’s proposal plan, instead allowing half-pay only for 
those officers who were retained but not on active duty.  The captains released from the navy 
received nothing.  The United States would not send out a seventy-four gun ship for almost 
                                                 
166 DeConde, Politics and Diplomacy 259-293; Allen, Our Naval War with France, 245-251. 
167 Ferling, Adams, 384-405. 
106 
 
two decades, and of the thirteen frigates retained, seven were stored “in ordinary” until such 
time as they might be needed.168 
 Although Stoddert did not leave the navy as powerful as he would have liked, he did 
bequeath it an officer corps capable of future greatness.   Complete incompetents such as 
Nicholson had been stationed far from any potential damage, and aging patriots like Barry 
had been nudged towards retirement.  The reduction of the naval officer corps under 
Jefferson finalized their removal, but both were clearly on their way out by the time Stoddert 
left office.169  More importantly, captains who displayed cowardice or simply lacked drive 
had been made into examples.  Phillips and Maley offered ample excuses for their poor 
decisions, but Stoddert was singularly unimpressed, and cashiered both men.  On the other 
hand, he readily tolerated threats to resign and hypersensitive egos from officers who brought 
credit to the service.  Truxtun, for a time, was allowed to remain on the rolls of the navy, 
even as he refused to perform any duties associated with the job.  Even after he returned, he 
dictated to the Department what orders he would accept, refusing to serve in any capacity 
that might cross paths with Talbot. 
 Stoddert not only tolerated behavior such as this, he encouraged it by consistently 
delegating authority for running the navy to his officers.  Those that met his expectations 
played a major role in choosing subordinates, determining strategy, and enjoyed near-total 
autonomy over their crews.  Stoddert left something of a mixed legacy to his successors.  
Robert Smith, who followed him in the Navy Department, inherited an officer corps that was 
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daring, bold, and zealously determined to combat any enemy.  On the other hand, they 
showed a willingness to include their civilian superiors and each other among their list of 
enemies to be zealously combated.  Thomas Jefferson and Robert Smith assumed command 
of a competent but highly contentious officer corps, and like Stoddert, they would spend 
much of their time struggling to control it. 
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“To Save What’s Far More Valuable:” Honor and the Naval Officer Corps in the 
Tripolitan War, 1801-1805 
 
I owed my life to the service of my country.  But I knew of no 
duty imposing on me the obligation to sacrifice my reputation.  
Commodore Thomas Truxtun1 
 
I have great cause to complain of the conduct of the 
midshipmen of this ship (with some exceptions).  They are 
young men totally regardless of any order they receive and pay 
no kind of attention to their duty, answer to no purpose on 
board but to create noise and confusion, and set an ill example 
to the people, who I’m loath to punish for conduct which 
officers use with impunity. 
Commodore Samuel Barron2 
 “I think I shall have to advertise for a secretary of the navy,” Thomas Jefferson half-
joked at the beginning of his Presidency.3 As the leader of a party traditionally hostile to 
naval forces and elected in part on promises to drastically reduce government spending, 
Jefferson hardly appeared a friend to the navy.  He was dismayed to find that no one wanted 
the job of gutting its fleet and officer corps.  Naval advocates, already alarmed by Jefferson’s 
election, surely found no reassurance in his lengthy quest for Stoddert’s replacement.  The 
man he eventually chose, Robert Smith, had little in his background to reassure proponents of 
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a strong navy, but he proved an inspired choice.  Smith’s legal experience and administrative 
skills more than compensated for his lack of naval expertise, and he proved an effective 
wartime leader during America’s four-year conflict with Tripoli.  Although no more qualified 
than his predecessor, arguably less, Smith brought none of the crippling doubts and self-
consciousness that plagued Stoddert, and he evinced a willingness to rebuke and oversee his 
officers.   Still, he also found it important to delegate, entrusting tremendous autonomy to 
commodores and even consulting them on one occasion regarding the treatment of a brother 
officer.  In short, Smith strove to maintain a professional and efficient maritime force, but the 
management and oversight of the navy remained a joint venture between civilian and military 
with the lines of authority not always clear.  The nature of communication played a role in 
this, for officers stationed in the Mediterranean could be supervised only with great 
difficulty.  Yet the hesitancy that Smith showed in dealing with rowdy subordinates and 
limiting frequent duels between officers is remarkable, especially given the difficulties it 
caused the navy both internally and with America’s relationship to other nations.  Ultimately, 
he struggled as much with the officer corps’ intense sense of personal honor as with foreign 
nations, for the officers of the early American navy, while they valued the ideal of 
subordination, civilian control, and duty, often proved unwilling to subordinate their own 
reputations to orders they feared would fail to bring credit to their names. 
 In fairness, the government did not always inspire submission by its actions either.  
Commodores to the Mediterranean struggled to wage an effective war while their civilian 
masters quibbled over legalities of the use of naval power.  While the Constitution seemed to 
make clear that the president was commander-in-chief of the military, in practice Jefferson 
assumed the Presidency with serious doubts about his authority to wage war.  The debates 
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over executive authority took place simultaneously with the war itself, often leaving 
commanders in the Mediterranean uncertain as to what actions they were authorized to take 
and frustrated by limitations that kept them from bringing the conflict to an honorable end 
sooner. 
 
 The navy may have represented only an economic issue to Jefferson, but members of 
the recently beaten Federalist Party were determined to make it a central issue of his 
administration.  The navy seems to have factored into Jefferson’s ability to assume the 
Presidency.  The election of 1800 ended in a tie between Jefferson and his supposed Vice 
president, Aaron Burr.  While Burr initially indicated he would step aside if all Republican 
electors cast votes for him as well as Jefferson (who no one doubted was the true Republican 
candidate), he later reneged and tried to use the uncertainty to his own advantage.  A 
Federalist-dominated House cast seemingly endless ballots, but never produced a decisive 
winner.1  Key Federalist leaders approached both candidates through intermediaries, seeking 
concessions in return for votes.  Governour Morris openly informed Jefferson that the 
Presidency would be his if only he would promise, among other things, not to abolish the 
navy.  Jefferson sharply rejected this advice, saying he would “never go into the office of 
president by capitulation, nor with my hands tied by any conditions.”2  Nevertheless, 
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Jefferson appears to have tacitly authorized Samuel Smith to assure Federalist James Bayard 
that Jefferson would preserve the navy if elected, and those promises at least helped members 
of the defeated party stomach the thought of Thomas Jefferson as their new president.  After 
thirty-six ballots, he finally received the required votes and became the nation’s president-
elect.3 
 With the election settled in his favor, Jefferson could finally begin assembling a 
cabinet.  Among his first decisions was one that must have chilled the Federalists who 
supposedly voted for him based on promises to preserve the navy.  Albert Gallatin, the man 
Jefferson chose to be head of the Treasury Department, was among the most vocal and 
uncompromising opponents of a navy.  He had vigorously opposed its creation as a member 
of the House, and was zealous to see debt reduced and public expense minimized as a 
member of Jefferson’s cabinet.4   
Finding someone to counter Gallatin proved difficult.  Jefferson’s first choice was 
eminently sensible.  Samuel Smith, a prominent merchant, declined the post, but when 
Jefferson pleaded with him a second time he agreed to serve on an interim basis until a 
replacement could be found.  John Langdon then declined the post, twice, as well.  William 
Jones, who would eventually agree to serve as secretary during the War of 1812, refused to 
leave his lucrative merchant career at this time.  As one man after another rejected the 
president’s offer, Smith’s brother Robert finally accepted the nomination on July 27, 1801.  
Jefferson, relieved at finally filling the position, surely had modest expectations for his new 
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Secretary, but the younger Smith would go on to be one of the most influential figures in 
American naval history and a crucial player in the administration.5    
 One of the reasons that so many men were hesitant to take on the job was that among 
the new Secretary’s duties would be gutting the officer corps.  Adams and Stoddert had tried 
to head off Jefferson’s probable drastic cuts by preemptively slashing the navy in both ships 
and men, but even so more cuts remained.  One of Robert Smith’s first acts was to reduce the 
size of the corps by removing several “meritorious” officers.6  Moses Brown, a captain who 
served heroically in the Quasi War, received a form letter from Acting Secretary Smith 
within weeks of the new president’s inauguration, informing him that his vessel had been 
sold and that he was now unemployed.7   Robert continued the purging when he took office.  
Among his first acts was to send a terse note to Daniel McNeill informing him that his 
services were no longer needed under the Peace Establishment Act.  Times had apparently 
grown harder in the interim, as McNeill received nothing but orders to surrender his 
accounts, as opposed to the four months severance given Brown.8 
As Brown’s case illustrates, it was not only officers, but ships as well that 
disappeared from American service, as Smith, along with his predecessors, had to sell several 
vessels to generate revenue while reducing expenses.  Ironically, the new secretary often had 
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more officers than he could use even with a drastically reduced corps.  He liberally granted, 
and at times ordered, furloughs for young officers to spend time in the merchant service, 
honing their nautical abilities and saving their government the expense of training them.9 
 While Jefferson wanted a smaller navy, he by no means wanted to eliminate it 
altogether.  Jefferson’s chief concerns, it seems clear, were to maintain a fiscally responsible 
government and avoid what he feared would be a disastrous war with Great Britain.  To that 
end, he concocted an elaborate scheme to replace America’s large frigates with gunboats, 
while putting the frigates in ordinary until such time as they might be needed.  His hope was 
that the gunboats would be cheaper to man and maintain than frigates, and that they would be 
less likely to make Britain feel threatened and launch a preemptive strike against their former 
colonies.10  He was not willing to completely abandon the frigates immediately upon 
assuming power, however, as they promised to serve a very useful purpose.  The navy that 
his party had so zealously opposed finally gave the new president a chance to fulfill a 
decades-long dream: humbling the Barbary corsairs.  Situated along the Mediterranean coast 
of North Africa, the Barbary regencies of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco were 
nominally subordinate to the Ottoman Empire, but enjoyed near-complete autonomy in their 
affairs so long as they provided regular tribute to the Turkish Sultan.  Their economy hinged 
on piracy; although prohibited by Islamic law from plundering fellow Muslims, they preyed 
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upon shipping from Western states, seizing cargoes, enslaving crews, and demanding 
exorbitant ransoms for the release of captives.  European nations paid regular tribute, bribes 
in all but name, to maintain peace with the Barbary rulers, but a change in leadership of one 
of the regencies – a frequent occurrence – or simply a desire for more wealth could prompt 
any one of the four to withdraw from a treaty and resume plundering.  Wars between the 
Barbary corsairs and European nations were frequent, but Westerners usually fought to gain 
the best deal possible, not overthrow the existing tribute system.  Great Britain alone 
possessed the naval might to humble the corsairs, but it considered them useful in weakening 
rival European states and Barbary rulers were wise enough to keep their demands of the 
British well within reason.11 
 While part of the British Empire, the Americans colonies enjoyed the Royal navy’s 
protection, and the Barbary powers meant nothing to them.  Victory in the American 
Revolution changed all that, and the newly created United States had to determine a course of 
action to deal with Mediterranean piracy.  Almost from the moment of American nationhood, 
Jefferson advocated sending a squadron to the Mediterranean.  He hoped a simple display of 
American might would be enough to compel the Barbary rulers to honor existing treaties, but 
he was also willing to fight if necessary.  Not only was tribute humiliating, it interfered with 
his vision of enlightened economic freedom, and besides he felt certain that the cost of tribute 
would eventually exceed the cost of using force.12  He had more in mind than just American 
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freedom in the Mediterranean, however.  The new president saw renewed negotiations and 
treaties without tribute, even if it meant war with one or more of the Barbary powers, as a 
chance to demonstrate his nation’s mettle to Europe, and possible improve America’s 
standing, and bargaining strength, in the eyes of other nations.13   
 Meanwhile, in Africa, the Muslim rulers had equally strong incentives to strike at 
American shipping.  The United States always proved slow in delivering its promised tribute 
to the Barbary powers, and as it grew in economic strength in during the Washington and 
Adams administrations Barbary rulers naturally expected more lucrative treaties.  For Yusef 
Karamanli, the Bashaw of Tripoli, the incentive to declare war was even greater.  Yusef 
seethed at the American agreement with Algiers, which recognized the Algerines as the 
preeminent power in the Mediterranean and granted them greater tribute than any other North 
African principality.  War with the United States – an untested power who, the British 
assured him, was incapable of a major military operation – gave him a chance to solidify his 
hold and the throne and increase his country’s wealth and standing.  So it was that even as 
Jefferson planned to avoid war by a mere show of force, the Tripolitans chopped down the 
American flag from its embassy in a symbolic declaration of war.14 
 Jefferson was unaware of this development for some time, and prepared to send a 
squadron only to enforce existing treaties and take stock of the situation.  Knowing that war 
with Tripoli was a possibility, however, the new president at least considered the 
constitutionality of using force in the Mediterranean.  The issue vexed him considerably, for 
he entertained grave doubts about his ability to wage war, even against an openly hostile 
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nation.  Jefferson had long been a strict-constructionist of the Constitution, arguing that the 
branches of government could each exercise only the powers explicitly allotted to them.  And 
the Constitution granted Congress, not the executive, the power to declare war.  He consulted 
his cabinet on May 15, 1801, but they were hardly of one mind on these issues, and offered 
little clarity.  Even sending the squadron, some argued, constituted an act of war.  Still, they 
were aware of Tripoli’s threats to declare war and recognized that something needed to be 
done.  Even Gallatin, no friend of naval forces, argued that the Constitution granted Congress 
the power to declare war, but that the president needed no authorization to defend the country 
if another nation went on the offensive.  Jefferson nonetheless adhered to his limited view of 
executive power; his orders to commanders in the Mediterranean starkly curtailed their 
ability to engage Barbary vessels in battle, even if one of the Barbary powers had already 
initiated hostilities.15 
 In a foreshadowing of things to come, the government’s first choice, Thomas 
Truxtun, initially set about preparing for a voyage but ultimately stayed behind.  He at first 
indicated that he would decline command of the squadron unless it “should be intended to act 
decisively.”  Acting Secretary of the Navy Samuel Smith then outlined for him the intended 
purpose of the cruise, but unfortunately gave tacit recognition to the legitimacy of Truxtun’s 
threat to decline to obey specific orders while remaining in the navy.  That is precisely what 
happened shortly thereafter, as the hero of the Quasi War determined that the proposed 
mission was beneath his stature, and convinced Smith to release him from an obligation to go 
to North Africa.  “Peace can afford no field for me on the ocean,” he complained, and the 
Acting secretary finally relented and allowed Truxtun to withdraw as commander of the 
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squadron.  Despite his grousing and ultimate refusal to obey orders, he remained on the rolls 
as a captain.  Smith did, however, somewhat testily inform the recalcitrant captain that he 
would not discuss some perceived injury to Truxtun’s honor regarding relative rank.16 
 Richard Dale received command of the first Mediterranean Squadron instead, though 
his orders indicate why Truxtun was so frustrated with the assignment.  In keeping with 
Jefferson’s decision to proceed with caution, Samuel Smith ordered Dale to assure all the 
Barbary powers of America’s friendly intentions, and to “enjoin upon your officers and men 
the propriety and utility of a proper conduct towards the subjects of all those powers – a good 
understanding with them being extremely desirable.”  The purpose of the squadron was not 
to make war or negotiate a new treaty, but rather to deter the Bashaw from violating the 
current agreement, and only in the event that Tripoli had already declared war (which it had) 
was Dale allowed to use force.  His instructions limited him even in that event, however.  He 
could “protect our commerce and chastise their insolence” through attacking outgoing ships, 
but offensively he was limited to a blockade of the capital city; no attacks on Tripoli itself 
were allowed.17 
 Dale’s squadron, the President, Philadelphia, and Essex, along with a schooner, the 
Enterprize, departed for the Mediterranean in the spring of 1801.  Although ostensibly on a 
mission to maintain peace, it did not take long for his cruise to turn bloody.  Andrew Sterrett, 
captain of the Enterprize, detached from the squadron, became the first to “chastise” the 
Tipolitan ruler’s “insolence” in April, but his situation illustrates the frustration American 
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naval officers felt at their country’s seemingly timid policy.  While flying a British flag from 
the mainmast of his ship, a common practice at the time, he encountered a Tripolitan vessel, 
which gleefully informed him that they were seeking American merchantmen to capture.  
Their pride turned to horror as Sterrett dropped the British flag and replaced it with the Stars 
and Stripes.  The American lieutenant hurriedly called his men to battle, and boasted to Dale 
that “the officers and men throughout the vessel behaved in the most spirited and determined 
manner, obeying every order with promptitude and alertness.”  For three hours the two 
vessels dueled, and the men of the Enterprize repelled three boarding attempts “with great 
slaughter.”  Incredibly, the Americans suffered no casualties of their own in the fighting, 
despite repeatedly being duped by false surrenders from their enemies.  Finally, the slaughter 
aboard the Tripoli became unbearable, and the Tripolitan captain surrendered, genuinely this 
time, just as Sterrett was giving orders to sink the enemy vessel.18 
 The carnage on board was horrific.  Twenty men, a full quarter of the crew lay dead, 
and another 30 wounded.  The ship itself sustained crippling damage, and was little more 
than a hulk.  Although justly proud of his victory, Sterrett now found himself in an awkward 
position.  Technically, his capture violated international law, for the United States had not 
declared war on Tripoli, nor had his civilian superiors authorized him to seize its ships.  
Ruefully, he let the corsairs go.19  To complete the neutralization of the vessel as a threat to 
his country’s commerce, Sterrett ordered its guns thrown overboard and surviving masts cut 
down.  The floating hulk then drifted back home, where, if newspaper accounts are to be 
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believed, its captain was severely beaten and forced to ride through the city “on a jack 
ass…as an object of public scorn.”20 
 The secretary’s orders to Dale promised further such frustrations.  His instructions 
defined his mission as one of observing the situation in the Mediterranean, training his green 
seamen, and displaying such force as America was willing to send out.  Throughout the 
summer and fall of 1801, Yusef entertained limited communications with Dale, in which he 
indicated at least some interest in a temporary truce, but the commodore did not believe his 
limited orders allowed him to enter such a parley, and the opportunity passed.21  If Dale did 
not consider himself able to negotiate at all, his view of his ability to wage war was little 
better.  He contented himself with blockading the port of Tripoli as best he could with 
inadequate resources.  Dale perceptively informed his government that a complete blockade 
was impossible, especially without gunboats to stop smaller ships from hugging the coastline 
where the water was too shallow for frigates to attack.  Moreover, he believed a blockade 
would not force an honorable treaty in and of itself, and pleaded with his superiors to 
authorize an attack on the Tripolitan capital.22 
 Such an attack remained more than the president was willing to stomach.  Jefferson’s 
primary concerned remained keeping government expenditures contained, and he feared an 
attack on the capital would lead to a lengthy and prohibitively expensive war.  He and Smith 
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loosened their restrictions only slightly, authorizing the next commodore to restrict all 
shipping in and out of Tripoli and prevent its ships from preying on American vessels.  
Dale’s hoped for assault on the capital city would have to wait for another failed expedition 
and a state of desperation on the part of the civilian government.23 
 Early forays against Tripoli revealed a deeply flawed oversight of the war effort.  
Naval officers missed promising opportunities under inadequate authorization leaving them 
unable to achieve the government’s political objectives. Meanwhile, their civilian superiors 
argued over what war-making abilities they even possessed.  The Federalists in particular 
blasted the president for his constitutional scruples.  Alexander Hamilton was especially 
outraged when he learned of Sterrett releasing his captured.  It “excites our surprise” he 
complained, to learn that “though Tripoli had declared war in form against the United States, 
and had enforced it by actual hostility, yet there was not power…to capture and detain her 
cruisers.”  Jefferson’s view of his authority to wage war, Hamilton argued, amounted to 
“nothing less than this, that between two nations there may exist a state of complete war on 
the one side – of peace on the other.”24  While Hamilton’s attack on his rival was not entirely 
fair, it is undeniable that American naval officers were dispatched to the Mediterranean with 
unclear, contradictory orders as a result of Jefferson’s highly restricted views on executive 
authority and desire to pinch pennies while fighting a war.  
 In the summer of 1801, the composition of the cabinet changed, with profound 
implications for the navy.  Jefferson finally found a permanent secretary of the navy, none 
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other than the Acting Secretary’s brother, Robert Smith.  Smith accepted the post on July 27, 
1801. Unlike Samuel, Robert had no experience whatsoever with anything maritime-related, 
and historian Charles Oscar Paullin speculates that his chief qualification for the job (besides 
the fact that he agreed to do it) was that he could rely on his brother for advice.25  Moreover, 
the Smiths were a very prominent and influential family, and if Jefferson could not have the 
member most qualified to head the navy, he at least managed to secure a political alliance 
with them through Robert’s appointment.26 
  Smith had other qualities, however, that proved highly beneficial in managing the 
Navy Department.  He brought a keen mind and superb organizational abilities to the office 
and he had none of his predecessor’s self-doubts about his fitness for the post.  This is 
surprising for the younger Smith’s resume appeared wholly unsuited to the post.  He had 
served in the Maryland legislature and was a respected lawyer in his home state, but had 
never served in any capacity aboard a ship, merchant or naval.  Moreover, he lacked 
Stoddert’s experience managing merchant captains.  Yet Smith managed quite well, and even 
developed a measure of popularity with his officer corps.  If he lacked maritime experience, 
in one historian’s estimation he “possessed in considerable measure the lubricating qualities 
of a politician, which by reducing the friction may greatly accelerate the speed of the 
administrative machine.”27  In short, Smith knew how to get things done.   
 He had no qualms about reminding his officers of their subordinate status when the 
occasion required.  When one purser complained of his assignment, Smith informed him that 
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he was under no obligation to “consult the conveniences or wishes” of his officers, nor 
should they “expect never to be ordered upon service that may be irksome or disagreeable.”28  
Still, if he could be abrupt and imperious in his communications, he also displayed a warm 
and even pleasant side when he had no grounds for complaint with an officer.  One anxious 
midshipman, newly admitted to the service, found himself completely at ease after a 
conversation with Smith, having been treated with “the utmost politeness.” and reassured that 
his ignorance of navigation was easily remedied.29  He was the image of compassion and 
patience when illness incapacitated a meritorious captain.  Despite his advanced age and the 
certainty that he could never again take to the sea, Smith tried to find manageable tasks for 
John Barry to justify keeping him on the rolls, and he expressed genuine sadness upon 
learning that the aged commodore was beyond performing any duties.30  Edward Preble 
found himself “at a loss to express” his “highest gratification” at Smith’s kindness in refusing 
his resignation due to illness.  Bedridden, Preble had returned his commission, believing he 
would be unable to recover within a reasonable timeframe for the navy to retain him on its 
rolls.  Smith responded with the highest praise of Preble’s abilities, refused the resignation, 
and granted him a furlough instead.31 
Like Stoddert, Smith proved willing, at times, to trust officers he considered reliable 
with virtually any other matter of naval oversight.  He consistently affirmed the absolute 
authority of a captain over every person and aspect of his ship. Once a ship sailed, Smith 
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never acted to undermine the authority of its captain over all other persons on board, and 
even deferred to captains on the assignment and use of subordinate officers.32  During the 
Tripolitan War, he remained detached from the incessant dueling by junior officers in the 
Mediterranean, leaving it to captains to handle such situations.  Naval officers worked hand-
in-hand with civilian negotiators in Barbary, with the lines between spheres of responsibility 
often blurred.  Smith also delegated the task of writing new naval regulations to an officer, 
Thomas Tingey, then circulated them to several senior officers for comment before 
approving them.33  He also systematized promotion, while still leaving it primarily the 
domain of the officer corps.  Rather than relying solely on individual captains to recommend 
their own midshipmen for lieutenancies, he ordered that impartial officers examine 
candidates for promotion.34  While this was more restrictive of individual captains’ influence 
over promotion than Stoddert had instituted, it remained the case that the officer corps itself 
was responsible for evaluating candidates for higher rank.35  Outfitting ships and managing 
seamen remained almost exclusively the prerogative of captains, and they continued to enjoy 
wide latitude in this regard.36 
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Nevertheless, Smith found conflict almost immediately upon assuming control of the 
navy.  Among the first officers he dealt with was none other than Thomas Truxtun.  Knowing 
that the next commodore sent to negotiate with the Bashaw would be allowed much more 
leeway to go on the offensive, Smith rightly concluded that Truxtun would find an 
assignment as commander of the Mediterranean squadron more to his liking.  Once again 
called on to represent his country’s interests at sea, Truxtun discovered that he could no 
longer expect his demands to be catered to by the navy.  What he wanted, in this instance, 
was hardly unreasonable.  Given the multitude of responsibilities of governing an entire 
squadron, Truxtun requested a flag-captain to handle his own ship, allowing him to focus on 
broader responsibility.  Throughout the controversy that followed, he insisted, rightly, that 
this was standard practice in the British Navy, that it was promised to him(true) and that it 
was a privilege accorded both Dale and the man who eventually replaced him, Richard 
Valentine Morris(also true).37 
Truxtun wrote the secretary informing him of the difficulties he had had organizing 
the squadron to that point and pointing out that the crews he had been assigned suffered 
greatly from inexperience, and the condition of his ships posed significant difficulties in 
getting them ready for sailing.  He considered it impossible for the squadron to function 
effectively unless he had a flag captain.  There was more on Truxtun’s mind than the 
efficiency of the squadron.  Making no effort to conceal his motives, Truxtun informed Smith 
that “having a reputation to lose which I am very tenacious of,” he demanded another officer 
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to see to the details of captaining his flagship.  Failing that, “I must beg leave to quit the 
service.”38 
Truxtun almost certainly expected a repeat of his resignation of 1799, with Smith 
immediately acceding to his demands rather than lose his services.  Given his earlier conduct 
and subsequent correspondence, it seems probable that that is the course Stoddert would have 
followed, had he still been Secretary.  Smith, however, responded unequivocally.  Citing the 
reduction in the size of the navy, and its officer corps, under the Jefferson Administration, 
Smith claimed to have no suitable officer to serve under Truxtun.  He therefore wrote 
Truxtun that he considered his letter to be an “absolute” resignation, and informed him in the 
same letter that he had already dispatched Richard Valentine Morris to replace him.39  
Subsequent historians have interpreted his response two ways.  Truxtun biographer Eugene 
Ferguson asserts that “his ejection from the Navy…could have been avoided by a more 
diplomatic and less hostile secretary of the navy.”40  Naval historian Ian Toll, on the other 
hand, is somewhat less sympathetic, saying that “Smith had reached the end of his tolerance 
for Truxtun’s Olympian ego and his high, whining tone.”41 
Both interpretations of the end of Truxtun’s naval career contain a measure of truth.  
But this was more than just a personality clash between two headstrong men.  Truxtun’s 
removal set a major precedent for the navy.  During the Quasi-War, Talbot’s plans to resign 
threatened the launch of the Constitution and all of the navy’s plans for that cruising season.  
To cater to Truxtun now would have had the same effect, delaying sending a relief squadron 
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to the Mediterranean and preventing the United States from escalating the conflict with 
Tripoli.  It would also have set a precedent that an officer could stop the navy and demand 
his own desires be met by simply threatening to resign.  For all his previous contributions to 
his country, Truxtun had become too great a liability to the service.42 
Reading Truxtun’s letter, it is difficult to view it as anything but a resignation.  He 
specifically used the words “quit the service,” so he could hardly have been surprised when 
Smith removed him from the navy.  He later insisted, however, that resignation was the 
farthest thing from his mind, and that he had hoped to continue in the service of his country, 
despite refusing to follow the Secretary’s orders.  His biographer speculates that this was the 
last of multiple instances of Truxtun convincing himself of his own outlandish claims, 
arguing so vehemently that even he came to believe he had not intended to resign.43  In a 
pamphlet distributed to counter supposed attacks on his honor made by the National 
Intelligencer, Truxtun insisted that he only meant to decline his orders to the Mediterranean, 
as the elder Smith had allowed him to do, and that had Robert insisted on his proceeding, he 
would have done so despite the absence of a flag-captain.  His letter, he insisted, was merely 
a request for a more agreeable service than the one he was ordered to.44  
Smith could have easily ignored Truxtun from this point on.  He clearly resigned 
from the navy in his last letter to Smith, and his delay in responding when the new secretary 
returned his commission stripped him of any legitimate claim to the contrary.  Truxtun 
waited a full three years before trying to return to the navy, in 1805, and he then insisted that 
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his health had been too debilitated for him to respond when he received the Smith’s letter 
informing him he was being replaced.  While Truxtun was legitimately ill at the time, this 
assertion strained credulity.  It also raises the question of why he did not ask to be relieved of 
command of the squadron to take a sabbatical for his health, as he certainly could not have 
commanded multiple ships if he was unable even to write a letter.   
However outlandish Truxtun’s case might have seemed, Smith apparently hesitated to 
handle the matter himself.  Perhaps he feared alienating his current officers by harsh 
treatment of a war hero, or he may have hoped to build goodwill with them by including 
them in the decision to allow a brother officer back into the ranks of captains.  Conceivably, 
he saw some merit in Truxtun’s claims.  Most likely, though, Smith simply wanted support 
before making the decision to reject a man who enjoyed considerable public support 
following his exploits in the war with France.  Whatever his reasoning, Smith apparently 
pondered the idea of seeking counsel for some time.  He wrote to Stephen Decatur alone at 
first, explaining Truxtun’s argument and asking for the celebrated war hero’s opinions.  
Decatur responded unequivocally that he did not “consider it in the power of an officer to 
resign any particular service he may be ordered to, however hazardous or disagreeable.”45  
Not fully satisfied, Smith then sent a circular letter to four of his most noted captains.  The 
brothers Samuel and James Barron, Edward Preble and William Bainbridge were all asked to 
give their professional opinion on Truxtun’s claims, and encouraged to discuss the matter 
amongst themselves.  The verdict was unanimous: Truxtun had specifically stated that he 
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wanted out of the service.  His letter could only be interpreted as a resignation, and he was no 
longer an officer in the United States Navy.46 
 Truxtun never gave up; for the remainder of his life, he pontificated to anyone who 
would listen about his qualifications to return to the navy and the cruel injustice of his 
government.  He never budged from his insistence that members of the Jefferson 
Administration had acted maliciously towards him and that he was a victim of a conspiracy 
to ruin his reputation.47  He even found a sympathetic ear in his former superior; Stoddert 
and Truxtun kept up regular correspondence after both retired.  The former secretary wrote to 
Truxtun in 1810 that he expected Samuel Smith to be impeached from Congress and spoke 
contemptuously of the “two infamous brothers.48”  Stoddert proved wrong in his views, and 
Truxtun’s relentless campaigning was to no avail.49  For all his laudable attributes, for all that 
he had given America, his ego had become too much of liability, and Smith turned to other 
officers to wage war in the Mediterranean.   
Unfortunately, Truxtun was not the only officer in the U.S. Navy whose concept of 
personal honor interfered with the service.  Steeped as they were in a tradition that allowed 
no insult, however trifling, to be ignored, many of junior officers showed more interest in 
fighting each other than in defeating the Barbary corsairs, and Smith could exert little 
influence over their conduct from thousands of miles away in Washington. 
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 Confined to minute quarters, with the accompanying boredom, chafing under the 
command of often-haughty captains, and without an outlet for their passions, it is not 
surprising that violence broke out among the earliest midshipmen of the navy.  On top of all 
this, young officers in the U.S. Navy carried a hypersensitive sense of honor, and refused to 
tolerate the slightest insult.  The “insults” that drove men to duel would be comical were the 
results not so deadly.  One young man died for refusing to remove his hat upon entering a 
room; others traded shots over a spilled container of ink ruining a new vest, and one 
lieutenant sacrificed his life “for the preference in a simple game of billiards.”50  Prevailing 
views on honor made it difficult for men to avoid duels even when they wanted to.  That a 
man did not feel slighted by another’s action could not absolve him from issuing a challenge 
if his companions viewed him with contempt for refusing to do so, as seen in the clash 
between Richard Somers and his shipmates.51 
 Duels even occasionally took place between officers of unequal rank, such as a 
conflict between Marines James McKnight, the brother-in-law of Decatur, and Richard 
Lawson, both of the Constellation.  The two men served together in 1802, during the early 
stages of the Tripolitan War.  McKnight was a captain and Lawson a lieutenant.  Lawson 
responded to a challenge from McKnight by insisting that they exchange shots from a 
distance of only three paces, prompting McKnight’s second to refuse the terms and label 
Lawson an “Assassin.”  The matter should have ended there, yet Lawson could not resist the 
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opportunity to trumpet himself as having “proved the famous duelist a coward,” and sent a 
message to all the officers onboard to that effect.  Such conduct could have no other result 
than to goad the captain into accepting the challenge.  McKnight apparently intended to 
refuse to fight for a time, but the two continued quarrelling, until they had “aggravated each 
other to the highest pitch,” and finally agreed to fight at the still murderous distance of six 
paces.  Lawson’s shot went directly through McKnight’s heart.52       
 Thousands of miles away, and often learning of such incidents well after the fact, 
there was little Smith could do to curb dueling. Jefferson and the Congress likewise ignored 
the problem.  One Congressman even urged that no action be taken against a duelist who had 
killed a young member of his family. Cornelius Dehart avoided prosecution for slaying 
William Nicholson in a duel when Joseph Nicholson, a member of the House of 
Representatives, wrote to the secretary of the navy asking him to allow Dehart to go free and 
maintain his rank.  However “reprehensible” dueling might be, it remained “one of those 
evils consequent upon society,” which “the wisest legislators and the most able magistrates 
have for some hundred years in vain endeavored to check.”  Nicholson generously, though 
almost certainly with accuracy, assumed that the duelist had only been following the example 
of “older, wiser, and more exalted men than himself” and more importantly “conceived in 
that moment his own life or that of his adversary a necessary sacrifice to his reputation.” 
Representative Nicholson and his family called for their loved one’s killer to be released and 
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wished for Stoddert and others to act “as though this unfortunate event had never 
happened.”53   
American legislators were not the only officials to show magnanimity to duelists who 
killed their opponents.  In February of 1803, while stationed at Malta, Midshipman Joseph 
Bainbridge, with Stephen Decatur acting as his second, killed a young Irishman, John 
Corcoran, employed by the British government there.  Sir Alexander Ball, British governor 
of the island, allowed the two Americans to escape to their own ship, where their superiors 
sent them back to the United States with no (surviving) rebuke.54  Both young men returned 
to the Mediterranean within a matter of months.  Henry Wadsworth, a midshipman, kept a 
diary of his time in the Mediterranean that included a brief account of this episode, which 
stressed Bainbridge’s complete justification for his actions.55  Unlike later sources, he makes 
no mention of Ball demanding the two Americans’ arrest, for which there is no contemporary 
evidence.  The British governor also declined to press charges against the British man who 
had acted as Corcoran’s second.56  Whether the American government would have handed 
over Bainbridge and Decatur to avoid an international incident is an interesting question that, 
unfortunately, cannot be answered.   
 It had to be embarrassing for Smith to learn of so many of his future leaders killed in 
petty disputes with each other, and even more so to hear of them potentially creating 
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international tensions.  But whatever emotions he may have felt never led him to take action 
against affairs of honor.  As under Stoddert, much of the burden of policing junior officers 
and culling troublemakers from the ranks fell to captains, and this was especially true in the 
area of dueling.  After losing McKnight to Lawson’s bullet, Murray even proposed amending 
the naval regulations to include harsh penalties, including the revocation of commission, for 
anyone who participated in or failed to prevent a duel.57  Nothing came of it.  After losing his 
brother-in-law in a foolish affair of honor, Stephen Decatur curbed his own propensity for 
engaging in duels and closely monitored his subordinates, eventually issuing a standing order 
that all disputes be referred to him, as captain of the ship, for arbitration before resorting to 
violence.58  Nonetheless, a decade later he felt no compulsion to take a similar dispute to his 
civilian superiors, and Decatur himself died in a duel.  Ideas about honor held at all ranks in 
the navy made the practice inevitable, and most captains seem willing to turn a blind eye 
unless it became epidemic.59   
 The propensity to duel was but one symptom of an officer corps that could be brash, 
reckless, or simply uncontrollable, and although successive commodores in the 
Mediterranean found their hands full of such men, they also worked to purge the corps of the 
most problematic.  “I have great cause to complain of the conduct of (my) midshipman,” 
Samuel Barron, the fourth commodore sent to Tripoli, bemoaned.  “They are young men 
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totally regardless of any order they receive and pay no kind of attention to their duty…no 
greater scene of confusion and disorder can possibly exist than at times does on this ship.”60  
Even worse, such rowdy behavior was not confined to ships, as midshipmen and lieutenants 
on shore in neutral ports could wreak havoc among America’s allies. The burden for dealing 
with such situations fell on commodores, with mixed results.  Even officers who insisted on 
strict discipline aboard ship could be lax in checking the excesses of their men on shore.  
This was especially true when the targets of young officers’ explosive tempers and violent 
behavior were haughty British officers.61  Even when captains viewed their subordinates’ 
behavior with dismay, there does not seem to have been anyone with Truxtun’s force of will 
to maintain order over an unruly group of young gentlemen.   
Moreover, captains often took upon themselves the authority to overlook or excuse 
unacceptable behavior, if they judged a young officer worthy of a second chance.  While on 
shore leave in Syracuse in December of 1803, Midshipman Walter Boyd became roaring 
drunk and displayed blatant public intoxication, even abusing several locals.  Exactly what 
Boyd did is unclear from the report sent to Commodore Edward Preble, only that he was 
guilty of some form of “abuse.”  His attacks were not only against the civilian inhabitants of 
Syracuse, however.  Two lieutenants, either also on leave or sent to find Boyd, ordered him 
back to his ship, whereupon Boyd began verbally abusing them as well.  When one officer, 
identified only as Lieutenant Thorn, grabbed him, Boyd tackled his superior and it took three 
other officers to drag him back to his ship, where Preble placed him under arrest.62 
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Boyd sent the commodore a contrite letter, after sobering up, and promised to conduct 
himself honorably from that point on.63  He swore that his actions were the results of too 
much drink, and purely an isolated incident.  For restless young men confined to a ship for 
long periods of time and then released for brief periods of freedom, the fact that many of 
them used the opportunity to become drunk and create mischief should not come as a 
surprise.  Two aspects of Boyd’s case are remarkable.  Not only did Boyd create havoc at a 
vitally important neutral port, he also physically attacked at least two superior officers.  Yet, 
if Boyd is to be believed in his letter to Preble, the lieutenants whom he attacked granted him 
their forgiveness.  Moreover, despite the gravity of his actions, Preble never bothered to 
summon a court martial, clearly within his rights under the Articles of War, and left no 
record of a written reprimand.  Whatever private discussions he had with his errant 
midshipman, Preble had a record of displaying mercy to subordinates whom he believed 
would benefit from a second chance, and this is yet another case of his doing so. While he 
did value the service and wanted to purge it of young officers who would bring their country 
grief, he preferred to do so himself rather than allowing official procedures to dictate the 
consequences.  There were in fact no courts-martial during Preble’s tenure in the 
Mediterranean.  This does not mean that he had no difficulties with his officers, as Boyd 
demonstrates, or that he uniformly let them escape without punishment.  Officers who were 
obviously unfit to hold commissions in the navy could usually be induced to resign, sparing 
them the stain of removal.  But Preble regularly took it upon himself to excuse with light 
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punishment offenses that, while warranting dismissal, he believed to be aberrations in 
promising young men.64   
 If Smith and Jefferson were happy to let their senior officers remove or retain 
unworthy subordinates at their discretion, the two shared Stoddert’s willingness to personally 
yank captains who dallied in the performance of their duty, as Richard Valentine Morris 
painfully learned after replacing Truxtun.  Morris’ instructions, like Dale’s, limited him to 
defending American commerce from attacking corsairs and blockading the coast of Tripoli.  
He managed to fall short of even those restricted orders, however.65  Bringing along his wife, 
young son, and personal servant, Morris dallied in Gibraltar for two months, enjoying the 
fine company of his naval brethren from Britain there while the coastline of Tripoli remained 
open.  Upon finally leaving Gibraltar, he took a less than direct course for Tripoli, escorting 
American and Swedish merchant ships, a decision for which the owners were no doubt 
grateful but which did little to aid the overall war effort.  He then stopped off at Leghorn, 
where he again lingered longer than was absolutely necessary, and arrived at Tripoli in late 
January of 1803, only to return to Gibraltar in March, just when the weather was optimal for 
Tripolitan cruisers to go out against American merchantmen. 
Morris’s lackadaisical blockade infuriated the president, who ordered the captain 
home to face a court-martial for his conduct.  “His conduct has been astonishing,” Jefferson 
complained to Gallatin.  “I know of but one supposition which can cover him; that is, that he 
has so far mistaken the object of his mission as to spend his time convoying.”  Even if Morris 
did interpret his orders that way, which seems unlikely given Smith’s explicit instructions to 
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maintain the blockade, the president would not have been satisfied.  Jefferson’s response 
explicitly outlined his expectations for his ships’ captains, and implicitly revealed his vision 
for civil-military relations.  Morris had received “latitude” and “discretion” in his instructions 
based on the supposition that “he had an ambition to distinguish himself.”66  The long 
distances and slow communications demanded both discretionary orders and ambitious 
officers to fill the gaps in those orders, and any officer who lacked such ambition was 
unworthy of his commission.   Smith was equally incensed at the commodore, though for a 
slightly different reason.  “We can obtain no information (from Morris) on what he is 
proposing to do.  We have to generally rely upon others with respect to his movements,” 
vented Smith to John Rodgers.  Not only had Smith just learned second-hand of Morris’ 
having left Gibraltar, where he should not have been in the first place, but “neither do I know 
where he is or what he is proposing to do.”67 
Morris was guilty of two failures in terms of civilian expectations of naval officers at 
the time.  On the one hand, he failed to display a vigorous, fighting spirit.  Even if his orders 
did not grant him the ability to attack Tripoli on land, neither did they permit him to cruise 
entirely at his leisure.  As Jefferson noted, the American government expected naval officers 
to zealously pursue distinction and give evidence of a willingness to risk their personal safety 
in combat.  Young officers who were too brash or hot-tempered might be forgiven, even if 
they killed one of their own on the field of honor.  But a mature commander who seemed too 
intimidated or lazy to wage warfare was inexcusable.  Morris received orders that granted 
him a measure of discretion in the hope that he would make the most of his leeway.  On the 
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other hand, the extent of the discretion given came from the Navy Department and the 
president, not naval officers.  Smith still expected to be apprised at all times – as best as 
possible given communications of the era – on where Morris was and what he planned on 
doing.  For failure to do that, he incurred his superior’s wrath.  Furthermore, Morris lacked 
any discretion whatsoever on one point.  “Whereas Richard V. Morris was specially 
instructed to…lay off against Tripoli and closely and vigorously blockade that port…and 
whereas a close and vigorous blockade of Tripoli hath not been made” Smith ordered a court 
of inquiry into Morris’ conduct.68    
The court did not issue the ultimate rebuke on one of their own, ruling that Morris’s 
actions did not result from “any deficiency in personal courage.”  While this was no doubt a 
relief to the commodore, the verdict still stung.  It conceded that he rendered some “essential 
services” to the navy, but he nevertheless failed to “throw any degree of luster upon our 
arms.”  Simply performing the minimal requirement of his duties, without gaining honor for 
the service, was not enough.  The court ruled that Morris might have been an acceptable 
commander of a single ship, if another stood in authority over him, but was unfit for 
command of a squadron.  While it could have been worse, the court’s findings were damning 
enough, and Morris resigned.  In the meantime, John Rodgers was left in temporary 
command until a replacement for Morris arrived.69   
 At this point, Smith finally found a competent officer who could lead his men 
effectively while also waging an aggressive war against the enemy.  Edward Preble had been 
offered the Mediterranean command before, but he declined because of ill health.  By the 
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time the cabinet determined to recall Morris, Preble felt up to the task, and Smith 
enthusiastically sent him to chastise Karamanli and achieve an honorable peace for the 
United States.  Political considerations did intrude somewhat into Preble’s selection.  The 
captain, despite leaning towards the Federalists in his political outlook, managed to build a 
close personal friendship with Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, which allowed him to be 
invested with such momentous responsibility despite an as yet unimpressive naval career and 
frequent health problems.70 
  For Rodgers, the interim until Preble arrived was a chance to show his mettle in the 
navy, and establish his own reputation.71  Yet by the time he received orders granting him 
temporary command, and fought through foul weather from his station at Leghorn to the 
American station at Gibraltar, Preble had already arrived, and Rodgers was denied his chance 
at “erecting a lasting monument to the zeal and regard I have for my country.”  Furthermore, 
Preble proudly displayed the commodore’s pennant from his flagship, the Constitution, 
which Rodgers, who technically outranked Preble, deemed insulting.72  Preble, who was by 
nature more conciliatory, wrote to assure him that he only flew the pennant so that the ships 
of his squadron would know where their commander was located, and not seek out a ship 
from another squadron for orders.  He assured his fellow officer that the flag “is not hoisted 
for the purpose of injuring your feelings,” and that he had “no disposition to be on such 
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terms…as to injure the interests of our country,” and expressed hope that Rodgers would let 
the matter rest.73 
 His hopes proved in vain.  “Permit me to observe,” Rodgers sniped back, “that this is 
not an affair between private individuals, and that my feelings as an officer have been most 
sensibly injured.”  Preble need not bother citing the will of the government to justify his 
pennant either.  “I do insist that, if the date of your commission is subsequent to mine, it is 
not in the power even of the government (italics added) to place you…in a situation…of 
treating me with disrespect.”  Such language almost invariably would have preceded a 
challenge, however, Rodgers held back from this drastic step, citing “the interest of our 
country.”  He promised to take the matter up again with Preble at a time when they were not 
on a distant station overseeing a war.  In the meantime, he agreed to meet with Preble to 
discuss strictly naval and diplomatic matters.74  It would appear from all available evidence 
that the two did indeed set aside their egos for the duration of Rodgers’ time in the 
Mediterranean, despite the obvious animosity that existed between them.75  Had the two not 
been so far from home at the time, the situation likely would have escalated.  Yet given that 
they were thousands of miles from the United States, and consequently certain that it would 
take months for the secretary to learn of their quarrel, a resignation from either officer at this 
point would have been nothing short of treasonous.  Preble, furthermore, held the advantage, 
and therefore had less reason to feel injured.76   
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 With matters with Rodgers settled, Preble could finally begin with his real job of 
humbling Tripoli and achieving an honorable peace for his country.  Like his predecessors, 
Preble enjoyed a measure of autonomy in the use of the forces under his command.  “The 
varying aspects of our affairs in the Mediterranean,” along with the “great distance between 
this country and the probable places of your operations” led Smith to conclude that it would 
be “improper for the government to prescribe to you any particular course of conduct.”  
Instead, the secretary informed Preble that he would be “unrestrained in your movements and 
at liberty to pursue the dictates of your own judgment,” within the confines of broadly 
outlined orders.  Preble’s mission was to protect all American commerce and seamen, and to 
maintain the blockade of the port of Tripoli.  Recalling Morris’ lackadaisical performance, 
Smith especially stressed the latter point.  Lest the commodore entertain any doubts that he 
was expected to exceed the dilatory performance of Morris, Smith concluded by reminding 
him that  
(the) conduct for some time past pursued by our squadron in the Mediterranean 
has, unhappily, not been calculated to accomplish the object of government nor to 
make an impression on the enemy of our national character.  We have therefore 
transferred to you the command of our forces in that sea in full confidence that 
you will maintain the dignity of your station and the FLAG of your country will 
not be dishonored in your hands. 
 
In addition to pointedly reminding him to act aggressively for the sake of his country’s 
honor, Smith also restricted Preble’s ability to seize prizes, reminding him that his foremost 
duty was to protect American vessels, and that the capture of Tripolitan ships could only 
come as a byproduct of such actions.  Finally, Smith cleared up the issue of negotiations with 
Karamanli.  Preble could negotiate prisoner exchanges, should the opportunity arise, but 
Jefferson calculated that the time was right for a civilian emissary, and Tobias Lear sailed 
with the squadron to act as consul to Algiers and also to negotiate a treaty with Tripoli.  
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There would not be a repeat of Dale’s missed opportunity to end the conflict because of 
confusion over the power to treat with the Bashaw.77    
 Although initially very optimistic about his chances, disaster struck almost as soon as 
Preble arrived.  In November of 1805, while serving in Preble’s squadron as captain of the 
Philadelphia, Bainbridge allowed himself and over 300 other Americans to fall into the 
hands of the Bashaw of Tripoli.  While pursuing an enemy vessel, he strayed too close to 
shore, and grounded his ship.  Faced, he believed, with the choice of either surrendering or 
destroying the ship and all aboard, he wasted no time on making a decision.  “I never 
presumed to think that I had the liberty of putting to death 306 Souls because they were 
placed under my command,” he insisted to Preble.78  Indeed, Bainbridge’s mortification at 
his plight is clearly evident from the stream of letters he sent Preble in the days immediately 
following his capture, filled with excuses and assurances of the impossibility of preserving 
the ship.   
 In the opening of his letter to the Secretary, Preble was furious.  “This affair 
distresses me beyond description and very much deranges my plans,” he lamented.  In that 
same letter he put forth thinly veiled criticism of his now imprisoned subordinate.  “Would to 
God, that the officers and crew of the Philadelphia had one and all determined to prefer 
death to slavery,” he bemoaned, concluding that “it is possible such a determination might 
have saved them from either.”79  While it is unlikely Preble truly wished that Bainbridge had 
led his crew on a mission of collective suicide, Preble was also a fighter, waging near 
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constant battle against the city while he was in command.  It strains credulity to envision him 
surrendering a vessel as quickly as had his subordinate, without even token resistance.  
Worse, if Preble had hoped that the ship was damaged beyond hope upon grounding, and was 
unable to offer any resistance, he soon learned that Tripoli now had the Philadelphia in its 
possession, in near perfect condition, for use against his remaining squadron.  Historian Craig 
Symonds notes that Bainbridge had given up the fight “so precipitously that (he) had to send 
Porter out in a ship’s boat to inform the incredulous Tripolitians that the Philadelphia had in 
fact surrendered.”80  
    His outburst to the secretary about “(preferring) death to slavery” was the last Preble 
ever said on Bainbridge’s conduct.  Even given the obvious distress he felt at the loss, there 
is little in this document that actually reflects negatively on Bainbridge.  He immediately 
eased his tone after this comment, however, offering to let the secretary form his own 
opinion from Bainbridge’s report.81  From captivity, Bainbridge received a generous letter 
from Preble offering reassurance of the commodore’s full confidence in his abilities as an 
officer, despite the loss of his ship.82  Despite his frustration at the setback, Preble maintained 
a calm demeanor and never again disparaged Bainbridge.83     
After the war, Bainbridge appeared before a court-martial to account for the loss of 
the Philadelphia, a routine practice at the time, and escaped without censure.  This must have 
come as a tremendous relief, for he surely spent many an hour in his captivity reflecting on 
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Isaac Phillips and William Maley’s fate.  Losing his ship might have been forgiven him, even 
if he erred in allowing it to be stranded.  But to give it up without a fight could have easily 
cost him his commission.  The reasons for Bainbridge’s generous treatment are unclear.  
Following the successful treaty ending the war with Tripoli, the mood in the Navy 
Department was celebratory, and no one felt the need to tarnish victory with proceedings 
against an officer.  Decatur’s subsequent burning of the Philadelphia directly under Tripoli’s 
guns was a source of tremendous pride for the navy and the American public, and it seems 
likely that no one wanted to darken the memory of the event by suspending or cashiering 
Bainbridge.  Furthermore, Bainbridge had been in captivity in Tripoli for several months by 
the time the treaty secured his freedom, regularly providing intelligence in the form of 
invisible ink to Preble.  His services likely gained him a measure of goodwill, and he had the 
benefit of not being tried for the loss of his vessel until well after the fact, when the shock of 
the event had passed.84   Whatever the reason, Bainbridge’s treatment after his release from 
captivity marked an exception to the navy’s usual policy of removing any officer who 
displayed the least timidity. 
Although the loss of the Philadelphia frustrated Preble’s plans it did not dampen his 
ardor to wage an effective war.  He oversaw the daring raid by Stephen Decatur to burn the 
Philadelphia while it sat in Tripoli’s harbor, catapulting the younger Decatur to fame.  He 
also enjoyed more freedom to launch attacks against Tripoli itself than his predecessor’s had, 
and he sent gunboats against the city multiple times.  He even tried using a fireship, a vessel 
loaded with combustible material sent as a giant weapon, but the attempt failed when the ship 
exploded prematurely, killing its entire crew without injuring Tripoli in the slightest.  All his 
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efforts came to little, in fact.  Undermanned after losing the Philadelphia, Preble made do as 
best he could with limited resources, but Karamanli stubbornly held on, believing that his 
American prisoners provided him with a trump card that would guarantee a favorable treaty. 
While Jefferson and Smith were perfectly satisfied with Preble’s performance, an 
accident of command structure forced them to recall him.  While Bainbridge’s capture took 
place in November of 1803, it was months before word could travel back to Washington and 
Jefferson did not learn of the loss until spring of 1804. When he finally learned the fate of the 
Philadelphia, Jefferson immediately sent reinforcements, but had to send a commander 
senior to Preble in charge of the forces, forcing the commodore’s recall.  The man chosen to 
replace Preble was Samuel Barron, the brother of James Barron and a man who, like Preble, 
was prone to illness.  Barron’s squadron arrived with word that Preble had been relieved in 
September of 1804.85   
Along with the change in command of the squadron came a new development.  
William Eaton, a captain in the U.S. Army and also the resident diplomat in Tunis, finally 
received permission to recruit Yusef’s brother, Hamet Karamanli, for an expedition to depose 
the troublesome Bashaw and establish a regime friendlier to the United States in Tripoli.  
Eaton and Barron sought to force the Bashaw to terms while Lear prepared to negotiate an 
end to hostilities.86  This three-headed command structure was bound to create tension, all 
the more so since Eaton had a long history of friction with naval officers.  He had repeatedly 
accused naval officers of neglecting their duties to him, and took it upon himself to provide 
the secretary of State with a detailed account of every shortcoming displayed by one of his 
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brethren at sea that he encountered (in fairness, many of his criticisms were not inaccurate, 
especially with respect to Morris).87  He also wrote Alexander Murray to censure his 
conduct, prompting the captain to remind him that “our government will determine whether I 
was right or wrong in my proceedings.”88 
Finally free to launch his daring expedition, Eaton enjoyed great success.  A force 
under his and Hamet’s command captured the city of Derne, second only to the capital of 
Tripoli in importance, and they prepared to launch an attack on the capital.  Jefferson, 
however, never actually planned to assume responsibility for propping up a ruler in Tripoli 
who had already failed to maintain power once before, and who lacked his brother’s ability to 
manage affairs of state effectively.  Hamet was intended solely as a way to put pressure on 
Yusef, a fact Eaton never fully appreciated.  While Lear scrambled to complete an acceptable 
treaty, and Yusef Karamanli, suddenly in a more conciliatory mood with his brother 
threatening, began backing off his more outlandish demands, Eaton gleefully prepared to 
march on Tripoli.89 
It was not to be.  Fearing for the lives of over 300 Americans held in captivity in 
Tripoli after the loss of the Philadelphia, Lear decided to go ahead and sign a treaty.  The 
United States paid $60,000 in ransom to Tripoli for the release of the crew of the 
Philadelphia, despite Eaton’s certainty that Yusef Karamanli was on the brink of total defeat. 
He despondently evacuated Derne, leaving Hamet to face Yusef’s wrath with little hope of 
American support.  The change in fortunes was “as strange a reverse in so short a time as was 
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ever recorded in the disasters of war,” he complained, lamenting that he had been thrown 
from proud success and elated prospects to an abyss of hopeless wretchedness.”90   
Eaton vigorously proclaimed in pamphlets and correspondence that a treaty could 
have been had without any ransom or tribute, if only a final attack had been mounted.91  The 
terms were certainly better than any European power enjoyed, but Eaton remained convinced 
that peace was available for the taking at no cost if only his attack had been pressed with 
support from Barron’s squadron.  Once the Senate ratified the treaty, Eaton shifted his attacks 
to anyone who had supported it..92  He found an ally in Preble, who wrote him to 
commiserate over the humiliating terms.  The “sacrifice of national honor which has been 
made by an ignominious negotiation” sickened the former Mediterranean commander, and 
Preble expressed hope that the Senate would recall Lear and appoint Eaton in his stead.93  
The former Mediterranean commodore’s support, however, came only in the form of private 
condolences.  Preble never publicly opposed the treaty, and loyally stood by his government. 
 The controversy surrounding the treaty nearly cost the navy the services of two of its 
most valued officers.94  Almost immediately following the conclusion of hostilities, the ailing 
                                                 
90 Eaton to Rodgers, June 13, 1805, NDBW, VI: 116-117. 
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Samuel Barron returned to the United States to recover, leaving Rodgers in command of 
American forces in the Mediterranean.  During his tenure as commander, Rodgers apparently 
either made comments disparaging Samuel Barron’s leadership, possibly regarding his 
reluctance to resign command sooner, or the Barron brothers came to believe he had done so.  
James Barron, younger brother of Samuel, unsurprisingly took offense at this, and sent 
Rodgers a letter in the care of William Bainbridge expressing his displeasure.  The 
communication reached Rodgers at the worst possible time.  Already feeling that his 
reputation had been under attack during his absence, he returned to the United States in the 
summer of 1806 determined to take revenge on all whom he believed had “injured” him.95  
Outraged, he wrote to Barron assuring him that he was more than ready to meet him and 
“account for his claim.”96 
 By late 1806, the conflict between the two had degenerated into a seemingly 
inescapable morass.   Barron insisted he fought for “vindication of his brother’s honor,”97 
while Rodgers felt he had no choice but to take to the field of honor or face disgrace.  
Rodgers named Thomas Tingey as his second, while Barron chose Franklin Wharton, both 
fellow naval officers.  Fortunately, before the two could schedule an “appointment,” illness 
seized Barron, and the matter had to be delayed.98  In the meantime, the entire messy episode 
became known among the officers of the navy and officials in Washington.  Barron wrote in 
January of 1807 that the delay “has produced a family of opinion…greatly injurious to my 
                                                 
95 B. Cocke to James Barron, July 29, 1806, James Barron Papers, Box I, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of 
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96 Rodgers to Barron, July 23, 1806, James Barron Papers, Box I. 
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character,” and insisted that his health had recovered and the duel must take place soon, lest 
he be forever branded a coward.99     
 As the affair between two of his most senior officers reached its climax, Smith finally 
broke his silence on the matter.  Yet even now, Smith was unwilling to directly address the 
approaching duel.  Instead, he vaguely informed Barron that his “services will soon be 
required for purposes other than those to which they are now directed,” an oblique reference 
to the preparations for meeting Rodgers on the field of honor.  He then pointedly ordered 
Barron to “give all your attention to the gunboat building under your direction...you will of 
course remain where the boats are building, and you will not move from that place without 
special orders from me.100”   Smith gave similar orders to Rodgers, thereby making it 
impossible for them to meet in person without an act of blatant insubordination.101  Yet that 
is precisely what both were prepared to do.  So insistent was Barron that the two meet, he 
expressed a willingness to violate orders to bring the matter to a close.102  Like Truxtun, 
Rodgers and Barron felt that they had no duty to follow orders that they believed would 
tarnish their reputations.   
The duel was scheduled to take place at Havre de Grace, with Rodgers incredibly 
hoping “that it will be with such circumspection as to prevent the knowledge of his friends or 
the civil authorities,” despite the fact that the forthcoming meeting was by this point common 
knowledge in the Navy Department.103  Where the wishes of their civilian commander in 
                                                 
99 Barron to Rodgers, January 20, 1807, James Barron Papers, Box I. 
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Washington failed, however, the intervention of fellow officers succeeded in preventing 
bloodshed.  Unlike many duels, the seconds in this situation strove to bring about a peaceful 
settlement.  Delays from Barron’s illness and separation had, as Tingey hoped, given time for 
the principals to reflect on the enormity of their actions.104   
 John Stricker, a fellow officer, wrote to Rodgers that he believed the controversy 
“might be settled without resorting to arms.”  Apparently, he had talked the matter over with 
Barron as well, and informed Rodgers that his potential opponent was having second 
thoughts about “calling” on him, but still felt insulted by “the style of your reply” to his letter 
sent via Bainbridge.  By merely conceding that “your reply was the hasty suggestion of the 
moment-the effect of an instantaneous irritation that was excited by so unexpected a 
notification,” he could settle the matter.  Stricker felt confident that Rodgers could do so 
without a diminution of honor, and “put an end to an affair of much concern to your friends-
and particularly so to the secretary of the navy.”  Rodgers succumbed to the prodding of his 
friends, and conceded to the terms outlined by Stricker.  The seconds published a pamphlet, 
including the full text of Stricker’s letter and a heading assuring readers that Barron and 
Rodgers’s friends considered the terms “highly honorable to both parties.”105  Although 
pamphlets tended to have a fairly limited readership, the most crucial audience, Barron and 
Rodger’s naval peers, would have certainly either read it or quickly heard of its contents.  It 
was crucial that the two men not only avoid a duel and comply with the secretary’s wishes, 
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but that their peers recognize that they did so of their own volition and in perfect keeping 
with the standards of honor.106 
 How much credit did Robert Smith deserve for the peaceful settlement?  It seems 
probable that, despite their claimed intention to ignore his orders and trade shots in secret, 
Smith’s intervention at least influenced both Barron and Rodgers to settle the matter 
peacefully.  Neither ever said so, however, and agreed to set aside their differences only after 
being pushed to do so by their seconds, who were also fellow naval officers and therefore far 
better qualified to comment upon the implications for both men’s reputations of failing to 
resort to the field of honor.  Smith was apparently just relieved not to lose either man, and let 
the matter rest, though he must have known of their plans to fight anyway despite his orders.  
Two captains agreeing that their honor could be satisfied without resorting to arms in so 
long-standing a dispute was undoubtedly precedent enough.  Besides, Smith had long ignored 
constant dueling for far more trivial causes among his younger officers, and he apparently 
felt no need to initiate a practice of civilian interference in such matters with the two 
celebrated naval heroes.  Like Stoddert, he wanted an effective officer corps that did not 
irreparably damage itself through constant dueling, but that remained committed to the era’s 
ideals of honor.  By not dueling, Barron and Rodger’s satisfied Smith’s wishes for an 
effective officer corps that knew when to show appropriate restraint.  By showing their 
willingness to duel unless absolutely certain settling their differences would leave their honor 
intact, they proved that American naval officers were in way weak, effeminate, or 
contemptible, a crucial point for a young nation still trying to prove itself.      
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Historians generally view the Tripolitan War as a partial success.  The United States 
achieved a treaty with Tripoli that surpassed any terms enjoyed by Europe’s powers, but 
failed to achieve its objective of total freedom of trade in the Mediterranean.  Jefferson was 
obliged to keep a squadron in the Mediterranean at all times just to maintain the status quo, 
and within a few years America was at war in the region again.  Still, the conflict provided 
another chance to train up a generation of naval officers and cull the corps of undesirables, 
two things that would be of immense value when the nation found itself at war with the 
Royal Navy during Madison’s Presidency.  The first war formally declared by at least one 
side under the Constitution, it gave the country a chance to work out the role of the president 
and Congress in the use of military forces during wartime.   
The war also demonstrated anew the limits of civilian control over the navy.  Civilian 
officials “supervising” officers thousands of miles from Washington, could only give broadly 
outlined orders, and stood by helplessly while brash young officers slew one another and 
embarrassed their country.  Even among senior officers, the ability of the secretary of the 
navy to control their behavior had its limits in the face of entrenched ideas about personal 
honor.  On the one hand, an officer, even one of Thomas Truxtun’s caliber, could not bring 
the service to a standstill for the sake of his reputation.  On the other hand, in personal 
squabbles Smith usually hesitated to intervene, and he nearly lost the services of two crucial 
captains, either from a lack of resolve to order them to settle their differences peacefully or 
because he knew they would ignore such an order.  Naval officers were not insensible to their 
country’s needs, however.  Rodgers and Preble set aside their differences in the 
Mediterranean when a duel might have crippled America’s war effort, and Rodgers again 
proved willing to compromise when his fellow officers intervened to prevent an affair of 
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honor with Barron.  The two captains were surely happy to have the matter behind them, but 
the reprieve would be short-lived for Barron.  His reputation was about to suffer a far more 
grievous blow than an angry verbal exchange. 
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“A Government Rigorously Frugal and Simple:” Naval Politics under Jefferson and 
Madison 
 
I am for relying, for internal defense, on our militia 
solely, till actual invasion, and for such naval force 
only as may protect our coasts and harbors from such 
depredations as we have experienced; and not for a 
standing army in times of peace, which may overawe 
the public sentiment, nor for a navy which by its own 
expenses and the eternal wars in which it will implicate 
us, will grind us with public burdens and sink us under 
them. 
Thomas Jefferson1 
 
Oh, that some of the murderous balls had deprived me 
of the power of recollection the moment our colors 
were struck…you cannot conceive of my feeling…to 
have the finger of scorn pointing me out as one of the 
Chesapeake. 
Lieutenant William Allen2 
 
Few men knew the inner workings of the Navy Department more intimately, or cared 
more about its success, than Charles Goldsburough.  Initially Stoddert’s clerk, he was 
subsequently appointed Chief Clerk of the Navy Department, and went on to become one of 
its most influential men, serving in a variety of capacities until 1843.3  He worked closely 
with Robert Smith throughout Jefferson’s administration, and later acted as interim secretary 
                                                 
1 Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, January 26, 1799, Paul Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Federal 
Edition. 12 volumes, (New York and London, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904-5), VII: 327-328.  
2 Lieutenant William Allen to General William Allen, June 24, 1807, quoted in Ian Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic 
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154 
 
of the navy under Madison.1  All that lay in the future in February of 1801, however, and 
Goldsburough foresaw only a bleak future for his beloved navy in the aftermath of 
Jefferson’s election.  Writing anxiously to Edward Preble, he feared the “new order of things 
[that] is now to be adopted” and expressed his dread that “our political ship is about to be 
launched…with an unskilled pilot at the helm.”  If Preble hoped to read some hint of 
optimism as the letter progressed, he was sorely disappointed.  Goldsburough abruptly closed 
his missive, lamenting that “I forebear any reflections on this subject, as they cannot be 
otherwise than painful.”2  Goldsburough’s fear is understandable, even if it proved 
unfounded.   No one, Federalist or Republican, doubted Jefferson’s staunch commitment to 
reduce government spending, and his party’s opposition to the navy was widely known. 
By the end of his administration, however, Jefferson’s image among naval officers 
and naval advocates had improved considerably.  Goldsburough himself became a close 
confidant to his boss at the Navy Department, Robert Smith.  Captains drifted towards 
Republicanism in their politics, and some even showed genuine support for the gunboat 
program, more support, in fact, than many subsequent historians.3  Jefferson and Madison are 
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justly criticized for the thoroughly unprepared state of the U.S. Navy going into the War of 
1812, but they labored under a host of political and fiscal constraints.  Though their 
administrations were not without mistakes when it came to the navy, they maintained the 
loyalty and support of the officer corps.4  The first decade of the nineteenth century could 
easily have become a crisis point for the infant navy.  Instead, for all their devotion to honor 
and fears of Jeffersonian Republicans, the officer corps never wavered in its willingness to 
subordinate itself to the government.  Slashed budgets, purging of the corps, and a hotly-
contested gunboat program never provoked blatant insubordination.  Robert Smith and his 
successor, Paul Hamilton, continued to negotiate spheres of authority with their officers, 
particularly in terms of duty assignments and the use of government funds, but where they 
held firm on their authority, it went unchallenged.  Naval officers groused among themselves 
about their civilian superiors, but neither secretary ever faced a crisis of his authority.     
While they felt frustration with their civilian superiors, the greatest threat to the 
officer corps’ reputation came from one of its own.  James Barron’s humiliating performance 
as captain of the Chesapeake brought disgrace on the officer corps as a whole, and they 
labored under a cloud of shame until the outbreak of the War of 1812.  The Chesapeake-
Leopard incident did have the salutary effect of insuring that naval officers and the secretary 
of the navy were pursuing the same goal.  Both recognized the humiliation of the officer 
corps, and the need to redeem its honor and professional image.  James Barron became an 
unfortunate casualty of this, as his reputation was sacrificed for the good of the corps.  But 
the entire affair only reinforced existing trends in the navy.  Officers were subtly and not so 
                                                 
4 For some of the more scathing criticisms, see Adams, History of the United States; and Andrew Lambert, The 
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subtly pressured to act aggressively to redeem their corps’ honor, while those who were 
perceived as timid, even if their actions were technically correct, received no mercy.   
 
Jefferson came into office convinced that his election had narrowly subverted a 
Federalist plot to use the military as a tool for bypassing the will of the people and 
establishing a despotic government. His mission, however, was not to strip America of 
military power – he understood all too well the hostility of the Old World to his country – but 
to build a distinctly republican, and therefore Republican, style of military.  As such, regular 
army officers were stationed on the frontiers, where they posed little threat to the civilian 
government. Somewhat ironically, he also fulfilled a longtime dream of the Federalists by 
creating the Military Academy at West Point, but not for the reasons that Federalists had 
proposed it.  He hoped for an academy that would train up an officer corps steeped in 
Republican ideals.  He also made political ideology one criteria for retaining or removing 
current officers, though merit was decidedly important as well.5  The naval officer corps 
experienced a purge as well, though Stoddert and Adams had already begun that process by 
the time Jefferson assumed office.  But Jefferson’s views on the country’s maritime force 
extended beyond simply making it smaller and cheaper.  The new president held two 
somewhat contradictory goals for the U.S. Navy.  While he intended to use it to squelch 
Barbary piracy and improve America’s international standing, he hoped to reform it to be 
more in keeping with the country’s militia tradition, with a program that has become 
synonymous with his name: gunboats.   
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It is easy to see Jefferson’s two key contributions to American naval history, the 
Tripolitan War and the gunboat program, as in conflict.  That Jefferson would use the large 
frigates his party had opposed building in an overseas venture, while at the same time 
planning to mothball them in favor of small, supposedly useless gunboats, is written off as a 
quirk of his often-contradictory personality.6  In truth Jefferson was never thoroughly anti-
navy; he merely wanted to minimize expenditures and avoid provoking a war with Britain.7  
He best summarized his views on naval forces in a letter to Elbridge Gerry just before the 
election of 1800.  “I am for a government rigorously frugal and simple,” he told Gerry, and 
went on to emphasize the importance of avoiding a navy that would suck America into 
Europe’s “eternal wars.”8 A small enough blue-water navy to enforce treaties in the 
Mediterranean and protect American commerce was sufficient in Jefferson’s mind.  And a 
navy, as opposed to an army, posed no threat to the American people.  “Every rational citizen 
must wish to see an effective instrument of coercion, and should fear to see it on any other 
element but the water,” Jefferson wrote to Monroe shortly after the Revolution. “A naval 
force can never endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would do both;” 
Jefferson saw in the navy a means of maintaining America’s independence, both political and 
economic, without endangering the liberties they had fought for in the first place.9 
Westward-focused, particularly after the Louisiana Purchase, his primary concern 
was defending America’s coastline against attacks from the Royal Navy.  Gunboats could 
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accomplish this, without at the same time provoking Britain into war, since they lacked any 
offensive capacity to threaten rival nations.10  That the gunboats ultimately proved woefully 
inadequate to this mission in the War of 1812 should not obscure the fact that they were not 
universally despised during Jefferson’s administration.  For all their trepidation prior to the 
election, no naval officers viewed the gunboat program as an existential threat at the time.  
Many even showed genuine support for it.  The views of the gunboat ranged from thorough 
distaste to genuine support.  But, in a sign of growing commitment among the officers to 
complete civilian control, the attitudes of officers never hindered the program.  While they 
might complain privately to one another, officers all set about constructing the vessels and 
fulfilling Jefferson’s wishes to the best of their ability.  Unlike the recently departed Truxtun, 
no officer threatened to resign rather than face the shame of being assigned to gunboat duty, 
and none turned to newspapers or pamphlets to oppose the program to the public, even 
anonymously.  Whatever long-term problems the gunboats created – and these were certainly 
real – they did not precipitate a crisis of civilian control, but rather demonstrated the officer 
corps’ growing devotion to it. 
As to the gunboats themselves, historians have begun to rehabilitate the frequently 
lambasted program.  No one has gone so far as to say it was a good idea, but scholars are at 
least more sympathetic to the challenges Jefferson faced and acknowledge his logical basis 
for creating the system.11  Gunboats were small, shallow-draft vessels limited in their ability 
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to go far beyond the coastline, but they were rowed independent of the wind, and could 
cripple larger ships in enclosed waters, especially when they were becalmed.12  Since 
Jefferson wisely decided to spread construction across the country, insuring economic benefit 
to numerous cities, there was no single design, but all ranged from forty-five to seventy feet 
in length and mounted one or two guns in the bow.13  They were not Jefferson’s invention, 
nor were they particularly novel when he began the program.  European powers had been 
using them in the Baltic and Mediterranean for over a century by this point.  The shallow 
coastal waters in the Mediterranean were ill-suited to large frigates, and as early as 1794 
Thomas Truxtun had urged the creation of a fleet of gunboats for use against the Barbary 
Powers.14  His ideas were vindicated after he left the navy.  Gunboats proved valuable in the 
Tripolitan War; Preble used them in an offensive capacity in shallow waters, and 
commanders in the region contracted with Italian states to build more.  Meanwhile, tensions 
with Spain over the Mississippi River basin at New Orleans demonstrated the need for 
riverine vessels at home.  Jefferson soon went beyond simply building a few gunboats for use 
in the Mississippi, however.  He determined to build a fleet of them.15 
                                                                                                                                                       
History 76 no. 4 (October 2012), 973-1000 critiques Jefferson’s entire military policy as unfit to meet his goals, 
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  They were never intended to remove the need for frigates.16  Albert Gallatin 
presciently warned the president that his opponents would cast them as such.  In his 
comments on Jefferson’s 1804 annual message, he lamented that “the efforts made in the 
federal papers to impress the idea that this establishment is intended as a substitute for the 
navy have so far succeeded that some distortion of the president’s recommendations will take 
place.”17  He was certainly proven right, though how much credit he deserves for correctly 
predicting the Federalist press would lambast anything Jefferson did is debatable.  William 
Plumer, a prominent Federalist Senator, blasted the vessels as being “incapable…of being of 
use to us.”18  Meanwhile, the Washington Federalist printed a letter referring to Jefferson’s 
program as a “wasteful imbecility.”19   
One group that did not attack the gunboats, however, was the Navy Department.  
While Robert Smith apparently felt some qualms about the force, he mostly kept them to 
himself.20  Naval officers themselves generally accepted the new fleet as well.  They 
expressed concern that shore-based small vessels would be inadequate for training young 
officers, but managed to work around this difficulty.21  Their personal views on the gunboats 
                                                 
16 Even John Adams acknowledged Jefferson’s pro-navy credentials, once the bitterness over the 1800 election 
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as a fighting force were mixed but muted.  Early in his assignment to supervise construction 
of several gunboats, Stephen Decatur privately grumbled to Bainbridge that it would not be 
any great loss if the whole fleet of them sank, and during the war scare with Great Britain in 
1807 he urged the secretary to assign him to a frigate, believing that such a post offered more 
prestige.  But he otherwise energetically performed his duty to make sure his particular 
gunboats were of the highest quality and kept his personal feelings to himself.22 When 
Jefferson consulted Samuel Barron and Thomas Tingey for their views, both strongly 
encouraged the use of gunboats to defend rivers and shallow coastal waters.  Tingey even 
acknowledged that the Royal Navy made substantial use of gunboats.  Neither in any way 
implied that gunboats could replace frigates, or that they believed that was the president’s 
intention.  Rather, they acknowledged the defensive value of gunboats in coastal waters and 
rivers.23  William Bainbridge likewise campaigned for the construction of gunboats and later 
supervised their construction without voicing any objection to them.24   
Not only did officers grant support to the gunboat program, but many in the process 
became more friendly towards Jefferson himself. Preble, although a longtime Federalist, 
became a genuine supporter of his Republican commander-in-chief.  Indeed, he was even 
widely rumored as a possible nominee for secretary of the navy should Robert Smith step 
down.  While nominally Federalist, Preble’s first devotion was to his country and its naval 
service, and his biographer identifies him as “apolitical” and largely supportive of the 
administration, making him an early paragon of what would later be held up as the ideal 
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military officer under a democratic government.25  Having used gunboats against Tripoli, he 
became a fairly enthusiastic proponent of their value, and threw himself into the task of 
overseeing their design and construction.26  Isaac Hull likewise drifted towards 
Republicanism at this time, and applied himself to the president’s gunboat program without 
complaint.  After accusations from a naval agent by the name of Constant Taber that Hull 
was a staunch Federalist, Robert Smith thoroughly vetted his politics, and found him and his 
family to be strong supporters of Jefferson.27  Hull was allowed to continue work on gunboat 
construction, and he determined to produce vessels of the highest possible quality. 
All these officers were outspoken men who had commanded frigates before, and none 
would have failed to raise some objection if Jefferson had indeed planned to scuttle the 
seagoing navy in favor of an exclusive focus on coastal defense.  Rather, naval officers 
recognized the gunboats’ value as part of a varied force that could respond to all potential 
threats.  No one resigned in a huff over being assigned to oversee their construction, nor were 
there any openly critical letters sent to the Department protesting their use.  With the country 
at peace, however temporarily, there were few opportunities for officers to distinguish 
themselves at sea, and they genuinely believed the gunboats would be useful protecting 
coastal cities in the event of a war. Perhaps too, they hoped that the presence of gunboats 
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along the coast for defense gave them their best chance of taking the larger frigates out to sea 
and challenging the Royal Navy.   
All of these reasons, however, should not detract from the reality that an officer 
corps, possessing a carefully-cultivated culture of aggressive pursuit of honor, completely 
accepted the transition to a fleet of small gunboats intended solely for defense.  While the 
administration wisely consulted at least some officers for their expert opinions, it seems clear 
that all the officers set aside whatever qualms they might have felt and fulfilled their duties 
assigned by the administration.  No crisis of civilian control arose, and Robert Smith never 
had to assert his authority on the issue; all officers complied without complaint.   
 
One of Jefferson’s greatest fears when it came to seagoing frigates was antagonizing 
the British.  He was well aware of the recent example made of the Danes.  When the Danish 
government proposed armed neutrality in the Anglo-French war, refusing to participate but 
repelling attempts by either to interfere with its shipping, Britain sent a squadron to 
Copenhagen in 1801 and utterly destroyed or seized the entire Danish Navy.  Jefferson had 
no desire to watch his country suffer a similar fate.28  Britain, on the other hand, lacked 
Jefferson’s concern when it came to avoiding provocation.  Throughout his administration, 
the Royal Navy continued its practice of seizing men from the U.S. Navy, despite the 
provocative nature of such actions.  In August of 1805, Lieutenant James Lawrence reported 
that his ship, Gunboat No. 6, had been stopped by two significantly larger British vessels, 
and that three of his men had loudly called out to their former shipmates on board that they 
were British subjects, one of them even confessing to desertion.  Lawrence rowed over to the 
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Flora to discuss the matter with the British Admiral Rothman.  He positively refused to 
surrender the men, but assured Rothman that he would investigate the matter when they 
reached Gibraltar and gladly hand them over if American authorities determined their claims 
to be British subjects were true.  Rothman was unimpressed.  Meanwhile, Lawrence’s second 
in command, Lieutenant Roach, ignored positive orders not to allow the men to be taken and 
stood by as they were rowed over to the Flora only a few minutes after Lawrence.  One can 
only imagine Lawrence’s humiliation when, even as he adamantly protested that he would 
never surrender a single man under his command, he glanced out the window of the 
Admiral’s cabin and saw the three alleged British sailors gleefully returning to the Royal 
Navy.29     
Roach pleaded that the men had jumped overboard without his knowledge, although 
depositions from some of the crew claim that he tamely allowed the British to seize the 
men.30  Lawrence, highly conscious of standing orders in the navy, duly offered up his sword 
and his ship as soon as he saw the men had been taken back into the Royal Navy.  Rothman 
brusquely refused, and sent him away.  He could count himself lucky.  The navy apparently 
felt he had done his duty and responsibility rested with Roach and the deserters.31  Other 
victims of Britain’s desperate need for seamen would not be so fortunate. 
Despite accusations that Jefferson wanted to disband the frigates altogether, he 
continued to send them to the Mediterranean well after the final treaty with Tripoli was 
signed.  Determined to hold on to the hard-won gains of the recent war, he planned to keep at 
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least one frigate there at all times to enforce existing treaties.  By the summer of 1807, it was 
time to relieve Rodgers and the Constitution.  For this mission, Robert Smith dispatched a 
vessel soon to acquire a reputation as a cursed ship, the Chesapeake, captained by Rodgers’ 
recent nemesis, James Barron.      
Late in life, Barron penned a brief account of his naval career.  Perhaps he hoped to 
use it to repair his shattered image, but if so he obviously judged the effort as hopeless, 
because the account was never published.  Any reader unfamiliar with his life would 
probably conclude that Barron played only a minor role in American history.  While he 
dwells on his creation of a naval signal code that greatly improved ship communication, a 
source of legitimate pride for the remainder of his life, the rest of his discussion of his own 
career includes only minor episodes and stints as commander of the Philadelphia Navy Yard 
and the Naval Asylum.  The truth, however, is that Barron is among the most discussed 
figures in the formative years of the American navy, but not for anything which he wanted to 
include in his own life story.32  There is no mention of his near duel with Rodgers, no 
mention of his fatal encounter with Decatur and absolutely no mention of his command of 
the Chesapeake.  Barron had the misfortune to preside over one of the most embarrassing 
episodes in American military history, and spent the rest of his life trying to rehabilitate a 
ruined career and reputation.   
 He set sail for the Mediterranean on June 22, 1807.33  No doubt his mind was fixated 
on American relations with the Barbary Powers, and how he could best maintain the recent 
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treaties and promote his country’s interests.  Britain was among the least of his worries.  
Nonetheless,1807 was a troubled year for American relations with its former colonial 
masters.  British seizure of American cargoes and impressments of American sailors were on 
the rise.  Locked in a desperate battle with Napoleon and increasingly irate at the desertion of 
sailors into America’s navy and merchant fleet, the island nation prepared to take drastic 
steps.34  Upon learning that British deserters were not only aboard the Chesapeake, but 
openly (and foolishly) flaunting the fact to British officers they encountered on shore in 
Norfolk, Vice Admiral of the White, Sir George Cranfield Berkeley, Commander in Chief of 
the British North American Station, sent out a circular to all captains in the area alerting them 
about these men, and giving orders for the Chesapeake to be stopped and its crew mustered 
and searched. This was a seriously belligerent order, even by the standards of British practice 
at the time.  While British officers had attempted to take men off American naval vessels 
during the Quasi-War, as Isaac Phillips could so painfully attest, these had been actions of 
individual captains on their own authority.  A British admiral was now ordering all ships 
under his command to openly violate the sovereignty of a man of war in the service of a 
nation which even Berkeley admitted to being “in terms of peace and Amity” with his own.35  
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That Berkeley would take such a drastic step demonstrates the level of frustration Britain felt 
over its desertion rate, as well as the arrogant disdain with which it viewed the United States.  
Unaware of Berkeley’s orders, Barron set sail in a ship woefully unprepared for any 
kind of hostile encounter.  As historian Henry Adams noted, “the gun-deck between the guns 
was encumbered with lumber of one sort or another; the cables were not yet stowed away; 
four of the guns did not fit quite perfectly to their carriages, and needed a few blows with a 
maul to drive the trunnions home.”  Such glaring deficiencies in preparation, he notes wryly, 
“escaped the eye.” Meanwhile, “in the magazine the gunner had reported the powder-horns, 
used in priming the guns, as filled, whereas only five were in fact filled.”36   
The blame for this sorry state partly lay with Barron’s flag-captain, Charles Gordon, 
whom Barron held a fairly low opinion of.  Barron might have requested a new flag captain; 
whether such a request would have been granted is impossible to know, but asking would not 
have been unheard of.  Gordon, however, was politically well-connected, with an uncle in the 
Senate and connections to Albert Gallatin, so Barron overlooked his short-comings.  Even 
with Gordon’s connections, however, Barron still could have taken Gordon to task for his lax 
performance and demanded more efficient oversight.  Even if Gordon had complained to 
Smith, the secretary certainly would have backed Barron; the practice of secretaries staying 
out of a senior officer’s way in his dealings with subordinates was already well-established at 
this time.  Nevertheless, after assuming command of the squadron, he issued no rebuke for 
Gordon’s appallingly lax discipline nor did he take steps to correct it.37  Barron was no fool, 
and he certainly knew of Gordon’s connections, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
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the primary reason Barron ignored the sorry state of his ship was that he simply did not care.   
The division of responsibilities between a commodore and his flag-captain was an ambiguous 
one.  In theory, the routine maintenance of the ship and crew should have been Gordon’s 
responsibility, but this was never specified in any regulations, and the decision of the 
subsequent court-martial would seem to indicate the officers of the court felt that it was 
primarily Barron’s job.38  
Besides the general disarray of the military stores aboard the ship, Barron also carried 
with him several civilian passengers, whose baggage remained strewn across the decks as the 
ship took to sea.39  Historians will always wonder, as Barron no doubt did for the remainder 
of his life, why the captain did not take steps to improve his vessel’s condition more 
promptly.  Adams notes that, as was common at the time, a great part of the crew was sick.  
Barron of course, still had sufficient men to begin the relatively simple task of clearing the 
decks, otherwise he would never have sailed.  The most likely answer is that, with no fear of 
hostility until he reached the Mediterranean, and likely not even then, Barron simply chose 
not to bother.  It would prove to be a devastating lapse in judgment.   
At about 3:30 that afternoon, Captain Salusbury Price Humphreys of the British 54-
gun ship Leopard hailed Barron.  It was fairly common at the time for nations at peace to 
carry mail and other communications for one another, and Barron probably assumed this was 
all Humphreys wanted.  He welcomed Humphreys’ lieutenant, John Meade, on board.  Only 
after Meade entered his quarters to speak with him privately did Barron realize that the 
British meant to seize from the Chesapeake four known deserters from His Majesty’s Navy.  
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Meade presented Barron with a copy of Berkeley’s circular and another letter from 
Humphreys expressing his duty to comply with the orders of his commander and also his 
hope that the entire affair could be settled amicably.40  Barron responded that he was not 
aware of any such men among his crew, stretching the truth as he did know of at least some 
British deserters on board, but also that these did not come from Berkeley’s squadron.41  He 
nonetheless indicated to Meade that his crew was wholly American and promptly returned 
him to his own ship with a message that he would only allow the Chesapeake’s crew to be 
mustered by American officers and that it was impossible for him to comply with 
Humphrey’s desire.  This was his only legal recourse, especially since he surely recalled the 
example made of Phillips just a few years prior.  He did indicate to Gordon that he should 
look into whether or not there really were British deserters among there crew, but Gordon 
would later testify that he did not complete this investigation because, “the manner in which 
Commodore Barron spoke to me, [led] me to believe that he did not wish such examination 
made.”42 
 Tucker and Reuter assert that, after sending Meade back to his captain, Barron 
expected no more that “an angry verbal exchange.43”  Gordon later testified that, upon 
Meade’s departure, he believed that “nothing more would ensue.”  The commodore’s actions 
tell a different story.  As soon as Meade was gone, Barron told Gordon that he had “better get 
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the gun deck clear, as their intentions appear serious.”  Incredibly, Gordon testified that he 
regarded this as more of a “request” than an order, and for the second time that day he failed 
to comply with Barron’s instructions.  When Barron came on deck, he gave orders for the 
crew to be sent to quarters, but that it should be done quietly so as to escape the notice of the 
British vessel.44  His hope seems to have been that he could be prepared if Humphreys tried 
to forcibly carry out his orders, without provoking an attack.  The last thing he wanted was to 
attach blame for an attack to himself by engaging in potentially provocative maneuvers. 
 Ultimately, it mattered little if the British saw the American crew mustering.  
Humphreys would later, after his actions had created an international incident and he found 
himself sacrificed to appease the Americans, claim that he recognized the harshness of 
Berkeley’s order but had no choice but to obey.  In 1851, Humphreys, by then Rear Admiral 
Sir Salisbury Davenport,45 wrote that he felt intense regret over the “apparent severity and 
harshness” of Berkeley’s order, but “as an officer and a gentleman,” he could only obey and 
try his best to minimize the damage.46  Interpreting his orders in the broadest possible terms, 
Humphreys believed he had no choice but to use force.  As soon as he heard Barron’s reply, 
he prepared to open fire on the Chesapeake.  When a warning shot was ignored, he gave 
orders for a general engagement.47  The Leopard unleashed a broadside on the Chesapeake. 
 The scrambling efforts of the American crew to resist the attack produced something 
akin to a comic opera.  Men stumbled over baggage strewn across the decks amid enemy fire, 
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fumbled with cannons that were never loaded, and generally displayed shocking ineptitude at 
the most basic tasks of a man-of-war.  Many of the seamen failed to report to their proper 
battle stations throughout the fight, whether from cowardice or, more likely, because the 
untrained crews did not know where to go or could not find their way in the confusion.48   
Under the oppressive fire of repeated broadsides from the Leopard, men scrambled to load 
guns with improperly fitted cartridges, only to find it impossible to light them.  “For God’s 
sake gentlemen, will nobody do his duty?” Barron screamed amidst the chaos, then piteously 
added, “is it possible we can’t get even one of the guns to fire?”    Barron himself suffered a 
serious laceration to his leg in the midst of the onslaught, but bravely pressed on, trying to 
direct his befuddled crew to accomplish something before the inevitable surrender. 49 
 Finally, one of the mightiest ships in the United States naval force managed to get off 
a lone token shot.  Barron sharply ordered Captain John Hall to get “one shot off for the 
honor of the flag” and promised to strike once this was done.  Unable to locate any matches, 
Lieutenant Allen grabbed a hot coal from a stove and, reportedly juggling it in his bare 
hands, carried it across the ship to light a canon.50  After firing a single ball, Barron 
immediately struck his colors before the Leopard could inflict further damage.  Once 
Humphreys boarded, he immediately offered up his ship as a prize.  The British captain 
declined to assume command of the ship.  His orders were only to seize the four deserters 
and the two nations were, after all, technically at peace.  He even offered assistance to his 
American counterpart, though he must have known this would be ignored.     Once the 
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Leopard had sailed away, the officers surveyed the damage.  Three men were dead, sixteen 
wounded.  Three feet of water stood in the hold, and the general state of the vessel was 
hopeless.51  Barron and his officers concluded that the ship was far too damaged to go on, 
and limped back to Norfolk, Virginia.52    
 For the rest of his life, Barron genuinely believed that he had done the best that could 
be expected of him, under the circumstances.53  Virtually none of his peers agreed.  Barron 
became the scapegoat for the navy.  His fellow officers blamed him for humiliating the 
service, while the men under his command set to work placing the entirety of the guilt for the 
debacle on him to preserve their own careers.  The very next day, six officers present at the 
attack wrote to Secretary Smith, blaming the entire disaster on Barron and asking for his 
arrest.54  That Smith not only overlooked their disregard for protocol but wrote back to them 
with praise is puzzling; they had clearly and egregiously violated the chain of command.55  
We can only speculate at Smith’s motives for allowing these junior officers’ actions to stand.  
Smith may have felt that if these men turned on Barron, he must have been a poor leader, and 
had only himself to blame.  Then too, whatever the faults of his subordinates, final authority, 
and responsibility, rested with Barron, and perhaps Smith assumed from the moment he 
heard of the attack that all culpability would naturally fall on the commodore.  Smith also 
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must have understood the implications of the disaster.  The navy had been humiliated, and if 
the entire complement of officers on the ship was defective, that would stand as a devastating 
indictment of his leadership and of the men he selected for commissions, not to mention a 
poor reflection on the country.  If, however, the entire debacle were the work of one 
incompetent officer, then the corps’ reputation could be salvaged by dealing appropriately 
with the outlier.  Whatever the reason, Smith took the officers at their word that Barron had 
bungled the entire episode, and from that moment his fate was sealed. 
Even before court-martialing Barron, Smith needed to find someone who could repair 
the moral and physical damage done to the Chesapeake.  Lieutenant Allen, no doubt knowing 
he would be called to account in the forthcoming inquiry, reiterated to Smith his assurance 
that the fault for the debacle was entirely Barron’s, and that under better leadership the vessel 
would perform valiantly.  “Give us a man to lead us to glory,” he appealed, clearly a jab at 
his former commodore, “and there is not an officer on this ship who will not immolate 
himself to serve his country.”56  The man chosen was Stephen Decatur, and Smith could 
hardly have made a better selection.  Decatur was well-known, and not a little envied, in the 
navy for his remarkable ability to inspire loyalty in his tars.57  Believing a British attack on 
Norfolk could be imminent, he threw himself into the task of rebuilding the ship with zeal.58  
His avowed intention, which Smith apparently never discouraged, was the have the ship 
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perpetually ready for an encounter with the Leopard, and he was prepared to strike first to 
avenge the Chesapeake’s honor even if the United States and Britain remained at peace.59  
His correspondence with Smith during his command at Norfolk sent mixed messages.  
Decatur, of course, wanted to demonstrate his own competence and rebuild the navy’s 
reputation.  In short order, he assured Smith that, should the British attempt an attack on 
Norfolk, “you may rely most confidently on the ‘Chesapeakes’ retrieving their reputation.”  
Yet in almost the same breath, he expressed a dim view of the crews of the gunboats under 
his command, complaining that “they are entirely ignorant of the duty that must be 
performed, and are extremely averse to control.”  He begged for “men subject to the articles 
of war.”  Specifically, he desired “men who, if not disposed to do their duty, I can force to do 
it.”  Inferior crews notwithstanding, Decatur wanted the secretary to know that he was wholly 
committed to his duty.  Provide him with the proper crews, and he assured Smith that “if I 
fail to do everything you expect from me, I beg you will not spare me.”60  A few weeks later, 
however, he also reported that the marines under his command were “the worst detachment I 
have ever seen.”  They were almost entirely foreigners, and “bad soldiers, turbulent men, and 
few of them able bodied.”61    He also reported difficulties with his subordinate officers.  
Despite their supposed willingness to immolate themselves for their duty, they proved 
unwilling to check their drinking habits for it.  Decatur removed one officer for drunkenness, 
and probably would have booted another had the lieutenant not saved him the trouble by 
                                                 
59 Toll, Six Frigates, 303. 
60 Decatur to Smith, July 8, 1807, Captains’ Letters.   
61 Decatur to Smith, August 25, 1807, Captains’ Letters. 
175 
 
shooting himself in the head.  Finally, he could not trust the purser with the ship’s funds 
because of the man’s notorious gambling habit.62 
 As if all this were not enough, Decatur also had the unpleasant duty of trying and 
sentencing his former friend and mentor, James Barron.  Any chance that Barron might have 
had for a fair trial vanished when Smith named the officers to serve on his court-martial.    
Upon receiving orders from the Smith to sit on the court, Decatur openly acknowledged his 
hostility towards Barron and asked to be excused from participating, saying that he had 
already “formed and expressed an opinion that Commodore Barron had not done his duty” 
and admitting that “it is probable I am prejudiced against Commodore Barron.”  He frankly 
stated that he could not trust himself to give an unbiased hearing to the commodore, and 
asked that another be appointed in his place.  Smith refused, saying that he did not have 
enough captains available to fill out the court-martial as it was.63  In addition to Decatur, the 
senior officer of the court was the very same man Barron had almost dueled with the 
previous year, John Rodgers.  David Porter also served on the court, and although not openly 
hostile to Barron the way Rodgers and Decatur were, he was also close friends with both 
men, and unlikely to challenge their views.64  
There were indeed few officers available senior enough to try Barron, so Smith’s 
spoke truthfully when he told Decatur his options were limited.  That said Smith also put 
very little effort into finding unbiased officers to decide Barron’s fate.65  The court-martial 
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system was designed so that, while the president held ultimate authority to accept or reject a 
court’s findings, in practice officers’ fitness to serve and consequences for failure would be 
decided by their fellow officers.  In this case though, Smith was, at the least, passively 
allowing a court filled with personal enemies of the defendant and officers who openly 
admitted to prejudging his guilt.  At worst, he was arranging the court to insure a guilty 
verdict.   
 Barron did little to improve his situation however.  He selected as his council his own 
cousin, Robert Barraud Taylor, who provided a miserable defense.  Decatur, still desperate to 
avoid serving, or perhaps simply believing it the ethical thing to do, sent a copy of his letter 
to Smith asking to be relieved to Taylor, believing the attorney would surely challenge his 
presence on the court after reading his opinions.  Taylor inexplicably ignored the letter.66  
During the trial, he ignored weak points in the case against Barron, and failed to exploit 
Gordon’s rather blatant failures to perform his own duty and obey Barron’s orders.67  
Complete hearsay, impermissible even under the more lenient rules of the time, was allowed 
to stand and questionable evidence admitted without objection.68  While it is possible to 
censure the presiding officers for their biases against Barron, it was not their responsibility to 
take the initiative to make judgments on the permissibility of evidence or testimony, only to 
rule where one of the counsels raised objections.  The failure to oppose some of the more 
blatant instances of illegal testimony or evidence rests with Taylor. But even if Barron had 
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enjoyed a vigorous defense, the verdict was likely predetermined.  The court convicted 
Barron of failure to have his ship ready for action, and sentenced him to a five-year 
suspension from the navy, without pay. 
Historians have largely agreed with the court’s findings and sentence, though they 
have voiced some doubts about the legality of the court’s proceedings.  Michael Latshaw is 
the glaring exception, unreservedly arguing that Barron was grossly maltreated.69  While the 
near-complete exoneration of Gordon and most of the other officers seems dubious, it is 
difficult to agree with Latshaw’s judgment.  It simply staggers the imagination to try and 
conceive of Truxtun, Decatur, or Preble going to sea with their ship is such a state, or 
bungling the attack quite so spectacularly.  And given the prevailing sentiment in the navy at 
the time, it was simply impossible for such a debacle to pass without someone being 
punished.  Considering the Navy Department had already cashiered officers for allowing men 
to be seized by the Royal Navy, Barron’s sentence was arguably quite lenient.      
 Smith and Jefferson readily accepted the court’s findings and sentence.  While there 
is no reason to doubt that all involved sincerely believed Barron deserved his fate, it was also 
a convenient outcome for everyone involved (except Barron).  The officer corps salvaged its 
own honor by ruling that the fault for the debacle lay entirely with one man.  Widespread 
laxity in enforcing regulations and failure to adequately equip junior officers for their duty 
had nothing to do with the loss of the Chesapeake, according to the court’s findings.  
Likewise, Smith enjoyed indirect justification for his oversight of the Navy Department; only 
one officer was deficient, not large numbers of the men under his supervision.  By purging 
themselves of Barron – who they rightly judged would face great difficulty returning to duty 
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once his suspension ended – the rest of the officers could continue to look on themselves 
with collective pride.  Barron’s fate was also consistent with existing trends in the navy.  
While he had not erred as egregiously as Maley or Phillips, who had failed to put up even 
token resistance, he had still dishonored his profession by not being perpetually willing to 
fight.  His one ball fired, while he might have thought it symbolically significant, could not 
compensate for the fact that an American ship and crew looked amateurish against a vessel of 
the Royal Navy.   Barron had shamed the service, and it could only begin to restore its 
imagine by sending a message to all officers, yet again, that such behavior would never merit 
compassion or leniency.  In addition, it now fell to the rest of the navy to prove that Barron 
was an aberration as soon as they got the chance. 
While naval officers focused on recovering the pride of their profession, Jefferson 
desperately sought to keep the United States from going to war.  He released a proclamation 
to the American people describing the incident with just enough outrage to reflect the 
severity of the offense but not enough to stir up the already growing war fever.70  He ordered 
all British vessels from American waters and forbade them from entering American ports 
except in emergencies.  This temporarily placated Americans, but still left the issue of how to 
retaliate against Britain’s long list of depredations.  He came up with the unconventional 
solution of punishing American merchants for British depredations, establishing an embargo 
that forbade all trade with Europe.  He acted under the not unreasonable assumption that 
Britain was too dependent on American goods to endure long under such a state of affairs, 
and he considered whatever costs the American people might have to bear better than the 
devastation of a war the country was woefully unprepared for.  Still, the embargo prompted 
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fierce opposition and widespread smuggling, and the financial toll on many American 
merchants ranged from onerous to crushing.71   
Smuggling was rampant, and it fell to the navy to enforce the president’s policy.72 As 
with the gunboat program, naval officers dutifully set about performing a distasteful duty for 
the Jefferson administration.  Policing American merchants in gunboats, rather than pursuing 
glory against enemy navies in large frigates, was surely the least desirable job imaginable for 
men with pretentions to honor and gallant images to uphold.  Their frustration was 
compounded by the fact that they consistently lacked the tools to accomplish the job.73   
 It was not only American merchants who complained of financial toils during this 
period.  Tensions over money within the Navy Department began even before the Leopard-
Chesapeake incident.  It was not the gunboat program, but simple squabbling over salary that 
generated the most civil-military tension during the Jefferson and Madison Administrations.  
Numerous officers objected to their low pay throughout Smith’s tenure, with limited success.  
Smith oversaw a department being downsized, and sparred constantly with Gallatin for what 
little money he did receive.  Meanwhile, he was expected to oversee a war with Tripoli 
thousands of miles from the United States, and by the time a peace treaty was finally signed 
most of the funds for the department were gone.  In the midst of these frustrations, he had 
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little patience with officers who clamored for more pay or looser restrictions on expenditures.  
Thomas Tingey, upon being appointed commander of the Washington Navy Yard in 1803 
asked Smith for a raise.  In this case, Smith complied, but Tingey still considered his salary 
insufficient, and threatened to resign if he did not receive more money.  Having just let 
Truxtun, a far more successful and valued officer, walk away from the navy, Smith seems to 
have been perfectly content to do likewise with Tingey.  But in this case the commander-in-
chief intervened.  The Washington Navy Yard was a favorite project of Jefferson’s, since it 
would enable him to maintain ships at a much lower cost, and he was determined to have a 
competent commander running it.  He urged Smith to make Tingey another offer, though still 
less than what he had demanded.74 
 Tingey again rejected the offer, but remained on the rolls as a naval officer.  Smith 
appointed a new superintendent for the Navy Yard, one junior to Tingey, and then changed 
the captain’s title to financial agent.  Tingey passed off this bizarre solution as a temporary 
demotion, and it seems upon having his bluff called he decided to remain in the service after 
all.  It is worth noting that Tingey’s near resignation came after Smith let Truxtun go, but 
before he consulted other officers on the legitimacy of Truxtun’s claims.  Jefferson’s 
intervention on Tingey’s behalf may very well have been what caused him to doubt his 
previous decision to release Truxtun and consult other opinions before refusing to reinstate 
him.  Nonetheless, Tingey could count himself fortunate that his brethren never evaluated his 
own threat to leave the corps, as the language he used in his resignation was almost exactly 
the same as Truxtun’s.  Once the matter passed, he and Smith eventually settled into a fairly 
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harmonious relationship.  Still, both Smith and his successor had to repeatedly remind 
Tingey to watch his spending habits with government funds.75 
Tingey was not alone in bickering with the government over finances.  Upon his 
return from the Mediterranean, Smith ordered David Porter to New Orleans, where his 
primary job became chasing smugglers entering the port.76  While in New Orleans, David 
Porter grew infuriated at what he perceived as Smith’s parsimony.  His troubles began on the 
journey down the Mississippi.  Porter claimed that the gunboats he was authorized to use for 
the trip were not seaworthy, and on his own authority he purchased a galley for himself, his 
officers, and his family.  Unfortunately, when he notified Smith of the unauthorized 
purchase, he used the same letter to also ask for a higher salary.  Infuriated, Smith rejected 
Porter’s request and refused to refund him for the cost of the galley.  He later informed Porter 
that he would not be accepting any expenses sent from New Orleans unless the Navy 
Department had authorized them beforehand, and further rebuked the captain that “the 
constant enormous expenditures of the New Orleans Station exceed all calculations.”77 
 Porter tried to alleviate his perceived poverty by suggesting that a committee of active 
naval officers approve expenditures, rather than leave that duty entirely in the hands of the 
civilian secretary.  He probably believed that his naval brethren would be more sympathetic 
than Smith, but his suggestion called for a drastic restructuring of the civil-military division 
of labor within the Navy Department.  Porter wanted to severely curtail the power of the 
president’s representative over how taxpayer dollars were spent in favor of increasing the 
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power of the officer corps in a policy matter.  Considering just a few years later the Navy 
Board would indeed assume considerable responsibility over expenditures, Porter’s 
suggestion is not as outrageous as one might think, but it nevertheless probably came as no 
surprise when Smith ignored it.  Porter grew increasingly frustrated with is civilian superiors 
during his time in New Orleans, having grown so “disgusted with the management of naval 
affairs,” and that he possessed “no confidence in its justice.”78  Even after he returned from 
the Gulf coast, he continued to fight for funds he felt he was entitled to, and the Navy 
Department only settled in his favor in 1846, when the commodore had been dead for three 
years.  It seems Porter’s complaints reflected real destitution.  Porter sent a desperate note to 
his friend Samuel Hambleton one night, pleading that he found himself “destitute” and feared 
he would be unable to buy food the next morning.  Would Hambleton “have the goodness to 
keep him from starving,” by loaning him whatever money he had in his house?79 
Porter was certainly not the only officer whose accounting practices annoyed the 
Secretary, and he sent out a circular to all his captains ordering them to keep more careful 
records.80  Smith never bent on his determination that decisions about how Department funds 
be spend should come from his office, and he constantly reminded his officers to check their 
spending habits.  One reason Preble was among his favorite officers is that he was the most 
scrupulous at keeping expenses to a minimum wherever he was stationed.81          
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While Smith clung tightly to his prerogatives as civilian head of the department to 
make final decisions on finances, he continued the precedent of granting officers broad 
autonomy on a host of other matters, especially in their dealings with subordinates.82   Even 
as he ignored or angrily rejected Porter’s endless requests for more money, Smith continued 
to hold himself aloof from inter-officer relations in the station.  Although he considers him 
“no Captain Bligh,” Porter’s biographer concedes that the commodore’s relationship with his 
subordinates and enlisted men was never particularly good.  Porter kept the secretary 
apprised of his frustrations and occasionally harsh discipline, but it appears Smith never 
considered getting involved, and Porter’s relations with subordinates remained entirely his 
responsibility.83 Smith did occasionally have to insert himself in disputes between officers of 
the same rank.  He did so very reluctantly in Rodgers’ near duel with Barron, and he later 
reprimanded John Dent for presuming to issue orders to Marines who were outside his 
jurisdiction.  Dent, commandant of the Charleston Navy Yard, wrote to complain that his 
orders to Marines to assume guard duty were not being followed.  An exasperated Smith 
replied that the regulations were quite clear and “fixed” on the chain of command.  Marines 
were under the command of the senior Marine officer on station, not the senior naval officer.  
“You cannot order” Smith sharply reproved Dent, “you are to make requisitions.”84   
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Smith’s irritation with Dent may have stemmed in part from his belief that he should 
not have had to trouble himself with the matter.  Smith firmly believed in trusting officers to 
manage details that fell under their expertise, and he avoided needlessly adding to his own 
responsibilities at his captains’ expense. “Exercise your own judgment entirely…upon all 
other points” related to outfitting gunboats, Smith cheerfully informed Decatur in one 
letter.85 His willingness to trust their judgment was probably a major reason he remained 
generally popular with his officer corps, despite supervising a cash-strapped service in the 
midst of downsizing.  Early in the gunboat program, Smith floated the idea to Preble of 
appointing merchant captains as a separate class of officers to command the gunboats, 
leaving the current officer corps to command frigates.  Preble strongly objected, believing 
that this would weaken discipline, since such commanders would never have served as 
subordinates, and that it would diminish the standing of the officer corps in society.  Upon 
reading Preble’s objections, Smith dropped the idea.86    
In addition to letting trusted officers nix his own ideas, Smith occasionally allowed 
them wide latitude on other matters.  For example, he allowed Thomas Tingey to draft new 
Naval Regulations in 1802.87  He later let Tingey draft regulations for the Washington Navy 
Yard that substantially increased the commandant’s authority over personnel in the Yard.  
While accepting Tingey’s draft, Smith did, however, sternly warn him, again, to rein in his 
expenditures.88  Stuck at the Philadelphia Navy Yard with restless young officers, who 
seemed to have a knack for getting themselves into trouble during their idle hours, Alexander 
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Murray took it upon himself to commission several gunboat expeditions up the Delaware 
River, where young officers learned pilotage, seamanship, and sustained themselves from the 
abundant fish and game available, rather than from government expense.  The plan became a 
great success, and Smith, always an advocate of officer training, was no doubt thrilled by 
Murray’s initiative.89  Finally, he even allowed the occasional act of nepotism from 
trustworthy officers.   He allowed Isaac Hull to hire his father as a naval contractor, a job that 
the elder Hull was never particularly zealous nor good at.  Hull took up the slack for his 
father, insuring that the necessary work got done, but the elder Hull continued to draw a 
government salary without objection from Smith.90   
 After a difficult second term, Jefferson gladly followed George Washington’s 
precedent and stepped down from the Presidency in 1808.  Not surprisingly, the office went 
to his longtime friend and collaborator, Secretary of State James Madison.  With the 
changing of presidential administrations came new leadership to the Navy Department.  
Robert Smith left to become Madison’s secretary of state, a highly honored position since it 
was at the time seen as a stepping-stone to the Presidency.  The post would have been 
especially satisfying to Smith, since Madison’s first choice was his old rival Albert Gallatin.  
Congressional pressure forced Madison to leave Gallatin in the Treasury, and Smith assumed 
the duties of the State Department.91   
While personally gratifying to Smith, the move proved unfortunate for the navy, as 
the new head of the department proved woefully unsuited to managing a wartime naval force.  
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Paul Hamilton hailed from South Carolina, where he owned a large plantation, and like 
Stoddert boasted service in the Revolutionary War.  He did not lack for executive experience, 
having served as governor of his home state prior to taking over as secretary of the navy.  He 
came into the office with no shortage of enthusiasm or good intentions.  Christopher McKee 
lauds his integrity, loyalty, and genuine concern for his fellow man, while Charles Oscar 
Paullin praises him as having “a kindly heart, high sense of duty, and honesty of purpose” 
and acknowledges that his character had “a wholesome influence upon the navy.”  
Unfortunately, Hamilton also indulged in his enjoyment of alcohol enough to raise eyebrows 
in Congress – though none of the naval officers who worked closely with him ever accused 
him of drunkenness.  More problematic, he simply lacked administrative abilities.92   
 Such faults were not initially apparent.  Thomas Tingey, who as commandant of the 
Washington Navy Yard interacted with Hamilton the most of any officer, considered him “an 
ardent advocate of the service.”93  Hamilton assumed office with the laudable goal of 
improving the administrative efficiency and educational apparatus of the Navy Department, 
and the rumors of alcoholism were nonexistent for the first two years of his administration.  
Like Smith, he valued economy, and he wrote Goldsburough before leaving the capital for a 
short time to not exceed appropriations whatsoever unless specifically authorized to do so by 
the president.94  He also displayed concern for the moral character of his officers, which led 
him to occasionally overstep long-accepted boundaries of civilian control.  When he learned 
that some midshipmen were frequenting taverns where they spent their free hours playing 
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billiards and getting drunk, he ordered Thomas Tingey to rein them in.95  He also, no doubt 
to his officers’ dismay, proved more willing than either Stoddert or Smith to meddle in 
captains’ relations with their subordinates.  Alarmed at what he perceived as Isaac Hull’s 
overly harsh treatment of his crewmen, he wrote to urge the captain to avoid “degrading 
punishments.”96  Hamilton’s compassionate side also showed in his relations with his 
officers, however.  He reinstated a midshipman who had been removed for repeated displays 
of temper at the appeal of John Rodgers, believing that yet another second chance would 
finally make a good officer out of him.97   
 Hamilton’s thinking meshed perfectly with his predecessors’ in one crucial respect: 
he had no tolerance for any officer who passively allowed the American flag to be insulted.  
He issued orders to all his officers reminding them of “the injustice and insults heaped on our 
country” by both Britain and France, and specifically of “the inhumane and dastardly attack 
on the frigate Chesapeake, an outrage which has prostrated the flag of our country and has 
imposed on the American people cause of ceaseless mourning.”  How should captains of the 
U.S. Navy respond to such outrages?  In Hamilton’s mind, the answer was clear: “it is 
therefore our duty to be prepared and determined at every hazard to vindicate the injured 
honor of our navy” and “maintain and support at any risk and cost the dignity of your flag.”  
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Hamilton expected that no officer under his command would allow Britain to humiliate the 
United States again, and he soon had the chance to put this resolve on display.98  
Lieutenant John Trippe, a celebrated fighter from the Tripolitan War, lost any favor 
he had built up in the Navy Department on June 24, 1810.  Trippe’s vessel, the Vixen, came 
under fire from a British ship, whose captain immediately apologized and claimed he had 
believed Trippe to be a French privateer.  Although his ship was badly damaged, Trippe 
accepted the captain’s apology at face value and proceeded on his way.99  Hamilton was 
furious.  “I fondly cherished the hope that our officers needed only an opportunity to 
vindicate the wounded honor of our flag,” he blasted to the unfortunate lieutenant.  Trippe 
had let just such an opportunity slip by him and the Secretary immediately recalled him to the 
United States to face a court-martial.100  Yellow fever ended Trippe’s career before the 
Hamilton could, but his explosive reaction to what was, technically, the proper course on 
Trippe’s part shows how desperately the United States Navy desired vindication of its honor 
and fighting spirit.101 
By May of 1811 the navy had labored under a cloud of shame for four long years.102  
Upon learning that a British ship had seized and impressed an American sailor off the coast 
of New York, Hamilton ordered John Rodgers and the President, to sail to the area and 
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protect American vessels.  Spying a strange ship in a dense fog, Rodgers called for 
identification.  He would later insist, to the satisfaction of a court-martial, that the vessel had 
responded to his inquiry with a shot across the bow.  The British report, however, insisted 
that the President’s attack was totally unprovoked.  Whatever the case, Rodgers, fully aware 
his opposite was a British vessel, unleashed the full firepower of the President, killing or 
wounding 32 men from the other ship.  He later discovered that he had opened fire from his 
44-gun frigate on a corvette armed with a mere 20 guns.103 
 Rodgers apologized to Captain Arthur Bingham for his error, but did so in such a way 
that Bingham found it “evident, that had he fallen in with a British frigate, he would certainly 
have brought her to action.”    It seems beyond question that Rodgers sailed out hoping for a 
fight.  Certainly attacking a vessel of equal size would have brought more honor to his 
profession, and we may believe his insistence that he was not fully aware of the other ship’s 
size in the dense fog.  His inclination apparently was to open fire on any pretext, however, 
regardless of the possible ramifications.  Hamilton expressed no dismay at his commodore’s 
trigger-happy display.  The “chastisement” Rodgers had delivered was “very properly 
inflicted” the secretary gushed, and promised Rodgers whatever he needed to repair the slight 
damages to his own ship immediately.  “You must want nothing,” he pledged.  The lone 
“wounded boy” from Rodgers ship deserved appropriate reward, and Hamilton inquired if he 
was appropriate material for a midshipman’s warrant.  “I would hug him to my bosom … 
while I made him an officer,” if only he had character to match his gallantry, promised the 
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Secretary.  As for Rodgers, “I declare that my sentiments towards, and estimation of you, go 
beyond what may be expressed.”104 
 While Hamilton’s effusive praise for his commodore’s destruction of a ship less than 
half the size of his own may seem excessive, Rodgers’ actions carried much deeper 
significance.  He showed a perfect willingness, even a desire, to fight at a time when the 
navy’s last two encounters with British vessels had produced disgrace and humiliation.  More 
importantly, his ship had been fully prepared for action.  In his orders to Rodgers to 
rendezvous with Decatur, Hamilton urged him to insure that Decatur’s crew was “equally 
prepared,” to his own.105  The secretary wanted it clearly understood that, while captains who 
went to sea unready to face any threat could expect shame and chastisement, those who 
evinced a fighting spirit that credited the service could expect to enjoy the highest praise.  
  Jefferson managed to avert war with Great Britain through the embargo, but he also 
did little to prepare the navy for the quite likely occurrence of a future war.  He has been 
justly criticized for this, but most of the country shared his belief at the time that no amount 
of expansion could make the navy ready to face the mighty fleets of Great Britain.106  He 
bequeathed to James Madison a small naval force consisting largely of gunboats, which 
would prove useless against the British.  Stoddert, Smith, and Hamilton also left a more 
positive legacy to the next president, however.  The naval officer corps consisted of captains 
whose burning ambition for honor, while highly problematic from a civilian control 
standpoint, made them ideal for facing the staggering odds of a war with the Royal Navy. 
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“The Precious Germ of Our National Glory:” The Navy Department and the War of 
1812 
Honor is a jewel of more value than whole fleets and armies 
and public prejudice waits not to inquire into the particulars of 
a defeat where the result is so mortifying. 
Philip Broke1 
The flag of my country will never be struck, so long as there is 
a hull to wave it from. 
Stephen Decatur2 
  
If anyone in the early republic should have been used to humiliation, it was William 
Bainbridge.  The son of Loyalists during the American Revolution, he convinced the Navy 
Department of his patriotism enough to earn a captain’s commission, but his early career was 
plagued by failure.  Three times he lowered his flag in surrender, including the humiliating 
loss of the Philadelphia, which resulted in him sitting out the Tripolitan War in the Bashaw’s 
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prison.1  Yet even after repeated disgrace, he retained enough pride that he could not stomach 
the reports he heard in February of 1812.  With war almost certain between his country and 
Great Britain, Bainbridge learned that Madison and his cabinet, including Secretary of the 
Navy Paul Hamilton, were seriously contemplating confining the entire U.S. Navy to port.  
The ships could serve a purely defensive purpose in the event of a British invasion, for the 
cabinet, again including Hamilton, was convinced that sending them into the Atlantic was as 
good as giving them to the British.  Horrified at the possibility of such humiliating service, 
Bainbridge and Charles Stewart fired off a forceful letter of protest to the president.  The 
Navy, and the nation, could handle the loss of ships, they assured Madison, provided their 
captains fell honorably.  But the country would be forever disgraced if its forces failed to 
make even an effort to wage war against their rival.  The letter had its intended effect; 
Madison relented, and allowed naval vessels to sail out against the Royal Navy.2  If rumors 
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are to be believed, members of the cabinet hostile to naval forces (one of them was almost 
certainly Gallatin) agreed with Bainbridge and Stewart on the grounds that once the Royal 
Navy captured all of America’s ships, the country would no longer have to pay for 
maintaining them.3  
The two captains’ willingness to forgo the niceties of military subordination and 
protest their civilian head’s decisions was fortunate for the country.  Although the Royal 
Navy technically triumphed, at least at sea, the US Navy enjoyed enough success that its 
existence was never again a subject of debate in Congress or with the American people.4  
The episode speaks to the Royal Navy’s dominance at the time, but it also reveals Hamilton’s 
weak leadership in the Navy Department.  Despite repeatedly urging his captains to 
aggressively defend their honor, he was apparently unwilling to challenge Madison on such a 
disgraceful policy.  His flaws were only magnified once the war began.  Although he 
presided over a series of single-ship actions that sparked wild celebrations across the nation, 
as a wartime leader he was found lacking.  Historians are quick to note his administrative 
shortcomings, and certainly the volume of work he faced once war broke out increased 
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dramatically.  But more telling was his willingness to defer a host of major decisions to his 
captains. The senior officers of the U.S. Navy often lacked clear orders or even guidance on 
how to engage the enemy.  Civil-military relations within the Navy Department changed with 
Hamilton’s ouster, however.  William Jones, a prominent merchant, ship captain, and 
Revolutionary privateer took over the Navy Department in 1813, and brought to that office 
the clear-thinking and force of personality necessary to impose order and control the officer 
corps. 
Despite Jones’ good qualities, his tenure was not without conflict.  Naval officers had 
to deal with recalcitrant and sometimes openly hostile civilians, both in the general public 
and local officials, particularly in New England where opposition to the war ran strongest.  
Their authority in cities fell short of martial law, even when their jurisdiction was facing 
almost certain invasion by the British.  Underfunded and undersupplied, they lacked the 
resources to enforce their will on populations that were, in some cases, openly siding with the 
enemy.  Although the War of 1812 proved difficult for the U.S. Navy in all aspects of civil-
military relations, the growing sense of professionalism and Jones’ late-war leadership 
enabled it to function as well as could reasonably be expected throughout the conflict. 
 
The entire nation was woefully unprepared to engage Great Britain, and the navy was 
no exception. Jeffersonian Republicans, although bitterly hateful of the British, feared the 
threat that large military forces (and the taxes to sustain them) far more, and so kept the 
country’s ability to wage war small even as they moved ever closer to a declaration of war 
against the world’s mightiest military power.  Madison abandoned his predecessor’s embargo 
when he became president, but even as hostilities became increasingly certain during his first 
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term, he never called for naval expansion, nor did he significantly expand the land forces that 
would be desperately needed for a likely invasion of Canada.  Congress increased the army 
only slightly, but just months before declaring war overwhelmingly voted against increasing 
the navy.5  Hamilton faced a host of manpower and materiel shortages at the outset of the 
conflict.  Most of the men, munitions, and supplies the navy had available went to the 
frigates, leaving the navy yards that would play a crucial role in combating smuggling and 
repelling British invasions with deficient materials, or none at all.6  To his credit, Hamilton 
appealed to Congress for greater appropriations to address these problems, but he met with 
limited success.7 
The Great Lakes were in even worse condition, a problem all the more inexcusable 
since American strategy hinged on seizing Canadian territory.  Believing that defeating the 
Royal Navy was impossible, Madison and his cabinet concluded, not unreasonably, that the 
best strategy was to seize all or part of Canada and then barter it for concessions on 
impressments and neutral commerce.8  Controlling Canada, however, hinged on controlling 
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the Great Lakes.  Yet naval officers in charge of gaining and holding these waters had to 
build fleets from scratch with minimal support from Washington.  Although Congressional 
parsimony contributed to these problems, Hamilton bears part of the blame too, having sorely 
neglected in the Lakes in favor of the Atlantic.  Because of the great distances and unreliable 
mail service, commanders in the Great Lakes Theater were far more cut off from their 
civilian superiors than those on the Eastern Seaboard.9  Hamilton’s neglect of his 
responsibilities on the Canadian border vexed his officers considerably.  Lieutenant 
Melancthon Woolsey, who sent far more letters to the Department than he received, begged 
Hamilton at one point to simply provide him enough officers to man the few ships he did 
have.  “I am now about to sail without a single officer that has seen any service in the Navy,” 
he complained, adding that “not one of my midshipmen have ever been at sea.”  He 
continued to supply Hamilton with regular reports of his efforts and plight, still without a 
response.  “It is much to be lamented, sir, that we have not sufficient means of defense,” he 
pleaded a few days later.  He finally received a perfunctory response from Hamilton that 
assured him a few more cannon were en route, but gave him little reassurance that the 
secretary was aware of his desperate straits.10 
Hamilton’s leadership during wartime was unquestionably lacking, but he did not 
differ from the president in this regard.  Madison was almost no help.11  Having initially 
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opposed the creation of the Navy as a member of the House of Representatives, as president 
he shared his cabinet’s conviction that Britain would annihilate the force in short order.  
While he hoped privateers would harass British commerce and possibly help hasten John 
Bull to the negotiating table, he assumed American frigates would play no role in the conflict 
and did not factor them into his strategy.  As noted earlier, he was open to the idea of simply 
using America’s frigates as floating defensive batteries, until persuaded otherwise by 
Bainbridge and Stewart.  He reportedly assured the two captains, after agreeing to let them 
engage the enemy, that “it is victories we want; if you give us them and lose your ships 
afterwards, they can be replaced by others.”12  This was patently false; Congress had already 
rejected calls to build more vessels at the time of this conversation, and Madison was more 
likely giving assurances to a navy he believed would soon be swallowed up.  Hamilton 
entertained similarly defeatist sentiments.  “[When] I reflect on the overwhelming force of 
our enemy,” he wrote to his son-in-law, “my heart swells almost to bursting, and the only 
consolation I have is that in falling they will fall nobly.”13  Hamilton’s fears were not 
unreasonable.  The United States had sixteen ships that were seaworthy at the outset of the 
war.  Britain had over six-hundred.14  As if the staggering numerical odds were not already 
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bad enough, America’s navy was under the authority of a weak and indecisive civilian head 
and a largely indifferent president.  For the first six months of the war, it was the captains 
themselves who forged what strategy the navy possessed and put it into operation.   
Ignored by the president, Hamilton turned to two of his senior officers to provide him 
with a strategy.  Early in the summer of 1812, with war looming, Hamilton asked John 
Rodgers and Stephen Decatur what they believed should be done with American naval 
forces.15  Both of them offered reasonably sound advice, though they each offered plans that 
would work to their own personal benefit.  Both sensibly argued against keeping the entire 
navy in one location, where America might have “the whole of our marine crushed at one 
blow.”16  Decatur, apparently more concerned about this, argued for sending out all of 
America’s ships individually, or at most in pairs.  Rodgers was a bit less worried about 
grouping ships together, since he would be in command of the largest squadron, and he was 
also seemingly less cognizant of just how tiny his own country’s navy was.  He advised that  
to dispose our comparatively very small force, in such a way as to harass 
[Britain’s] West India commerce by our lightest vessels, and her coasting trade, 
East India trade and other foreign trade by our Frigates & one or two of our fastest 
sailing sloops of war: our small vessels to be disposed in a way, according to 
circumstances, to annoy to the greatest extent all the avenues leading to and from 
her West India Islands, Surinam, Berbice, and Denamara (sic): a small squadron 
of two, or three of our fastest sailing frigates and a single sloop of War, to cruise 
on the coasts of England, Ireland, and Scotland; and the residue of our frigates to 
act separately, or in squadron on our own coasts to harass the enemy by cruising 
in the tracts of his ships trading between him & his colonies of Canada, Nova 
Scotia, and Newfoundland; and occasionally to unite all our frigates & attack his 
East India convoys.17 
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Such an ambitious plan was possible, he argued, because the British sent all their vessels out 
at the onset of a war to attack the enemy’s forces in their own harbors, leaving the British 
coast undefended.  His judgment was later vindicated, when American privateers wreaked 
havoc on British shipping, even on the very coast of England.18  Nevertheless, Rodgers also 
enjoyed immense personal benefit from his plan.  As the senior officer, he would be in 
command of this large squadron, and thus would be the most likely to win laurels for himself, 
while Decatur and other ambitious officers would be under his command.19  If the American 
navy were divided up, other officers might win great victories apart from him.  Moreover, as 
squadron commander over Decatur, Rodgers would stand to receive a share of all prizes, 
whereas with Decatur in command of his own squadron, any prizes those ships under the 
younger officer’s command captured would be of no financial benefit to Rodgers.   
Rodgers also displayed greater bravado about challenging the Royal Navy.  Perhaps 
bolstered by his encounter with the Little Belt, or perhaps still smarting at having “defeated” 
such a tiny ship and hoping for a more glorious encounter, he pleaded for command of one of 
the squadrons off the British coast.  “[The British] have already…honored me with the title 
of Buccaneer,” he chortled to Hamilton, “and nothing on this side of the grave would afford 
me with more satisfaction, than…affording them a more bitter subject for their still more 
bitter and illiberal animadversions.”  He was not only zealous for his own reputation, 
however.  Rodgers’ goal for the U.S. Navy was nothing less than to “astonish all Europe.”  
While Britain had enjoyed a string of unbroken success against other European powers, let 
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them challenge Americans and “they will soon find that we are neither Frenchmen, or 
Spaniards, Hollanders, or Danes.”   
While Decatur was less verbose in his response, it is worth noting that he too had a 
self-serving aspect to his recommendations.  It would be best, he suggested, to send 
American ships out individually or in very small squadrons, thereby insuring that the British 
could not wipe out nearly the entire Navy in one action.  As to what should be done with 
these ships, he encouraged the secretary to send them out “without giving them any specific 
instructions, as to the place of cruising, but to rely on the enterprise of the officers.”  His 
advice was sound, and probably more realistic than Rodgers, but he did not miss the 
opportunity to call for greater autonomy for himself and his fellow officers from 
Washington’s control.  Also, by separating ships, he insured at least a small squadron for 
himself, whereas under Rodgers’ plan he would have been under Rodgers’ command. 
Hamilton, and the entire cabinet, continued to waffle on the best use of the navy even 
after a declaration of war.  Gallatin, not unreasonably, hoped to use what forces America had 
for commerce protection.  How naval officers would have reacted to such a mission can 
never be known, but it seems probable they would have complied only grudgingly.  The 
officer corps had been molded since its creation to favor aggressive action against the enemy.  
They thirsted for glory, and taking ships from the greatest naval power of the age was their 
ultimate prize.20  Hamilton again dithered in making a decision, but ultimately yielded to 
Gallatin’s urgency.  In the process, he also avoided definitively siding with either Rodgers or 
Decatur on whether American ships should cruise in squadrons or separately.  On June 21, he 
sent orders to his captains informing them that they were “entitled to every belligerent right 
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to attack and capture and defend,” and urging them to act aggressively against the enemy.21   
But less than a week later, he apparently caved to Gallatin and sent orders to Rodgers 
informing him that “it has been judged expedient to employ our public armed vessels as to 
afford our returning commerce all possible protection.”  He ordered Rodgers and Decatur to 
cruise separately, but to stay in constant contact in case they determined it would be best to 
link up into a single squadron.  The likelihood that Decatur would ever judge it best for him 
to leave independent command and suborn himself to Rodgers was quite remote, of course, 
but on paper that door was left open.  Hamilton thus managed to concur with both Rodgers’ 
and Decatur’s suggestions, which charitably might be regarded as an effort to draw on both 
men’s expertise, but is more likely another example of the secretary’s inability to make a 
decision.  In any case, Hamilton now stressed that the foremost purpose of the navy was to 
protect American commerce, and striking at the enemy was of decidedly secondary 
importance.22   
But by this time Rodgers was already gone to sea.  Interpreting Hamilton’s initial 
orders as giving him the right to immediately sail out against the Royal Navy, he rushed his 
men to sea within minutes of receiving word from the secretary that the two nations were at 
war.  Hamilton was unable to communicate with him for the next four months, and 
essentially lost operational control of the U.S. Navy.23  As for Rodgers, his cruise failed to 
bring him the glory he craved.  He managed to bring the British frigate Belvedera to action, 
but when the winds died down, he was unable to draw close enough for his guns to do any 
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serious damage, and the enemy escaped.  Throughout the remainder of his cruise, he captured 
a mere seven small merchant vessels.  Although he found it “a truly unpleasant task to be 
obliged to make a communication thus barren of benefit to our country,” he did console 
himself that his very presence in the Atlantic occupied the Royal Navy’s attention, and 
allowed American merchants to reach home unscathed.24  Of course, such strategic insight 
only occurred to him after he failed to win any other laurels for himself – he said nothing 
about merely distracting the Royal Navy in his brash letter to Hamilton recommending a 
strategy – but it did hint at the strategic vision Jones would soon bring to the navy.  
Meanwhile, other officers were enjoying much better luck against their adversaries. 
Isaac Hull’s first cruise proved far more eventful.  Encountering a British squadron, 
he recognized that he was hopelessly outnumbered and determined that it was better to 
survive to fight another day.  He almost failed to do that.   With no wind, Hull could not 
move his ships.  Only by kedging, a tactic that involved rowing the anchors in front of a ship 
and using capstans to pull it forward, was Hull able to evade his pursuers.  Although not a 
victory in any sense of the word, Hull’s daring escape did him no dishonor.  His display of 
seamanship impressed even his pursuers, and the odds were enough in the British squadron’s 
favor that no one looked askance at his running away.  Upon hearing of the affair, Oliver 
Hazard Perry stressed the fine state of Hull’s crew throughout the crisis, and took pride in the 
fact that no British vessel dared to risk attacking the Constitution by itself.25   
Hull, however, dreamed of better things than hair-breadth escapes.  He found his 
chance soon enough.  The Constitution shortly encountered Captain Dacres and the 
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Guerriere.  Now Hull had his chance to display American prowess and prove that he was the 
equal of any British officer.  Hull’s account of the encounter leaves no doubt that this, and 
not mere commerce protection, was what he and his crew dreamed of.  “Actions like these 
speak for themselves,” he gushed to Hamilton, “which makes it unnecessary for me to say 
anything to establish the bravery and gallant conduct of those who were engaged in it.”  
Nevertheless, Hull took the time to give a detailed description of his crew’s rousing cheers 
when they learned they were to fall in with a British frigate, and he heaped praise on all the 
officers and men for so thoroughly destroying their enemy.  The battle must have surpassed 
his wildest hopes.  In less than thirty minutes, the Constitution inflicted such savage damage 
to the enemy that Hull called off a planned boarding attempt, rightly concluding that Dacres 
already had no choice but to surrender.26    
Decatur also found success soon after setting sail.  Two months after Hull, he became 
the second American to take a British ship in battle.  According to legend, he had enjoyed a 
congenial relationship with British Captain John Carden before the war, and the two had 
jokingly wagered a hat on the outcome of a battle between their two ships, the United States 
and the Macedonian.  The conversation soon turned serious though, as Carden predicted that 
any American ship would surely be doomed against an equal vessel in the Royal Navy.  
“Your ships may be good enough, and you are a clever set of fellows,” Carden 
condescendingly remarked to Decatur, “but what practice have you had in war?”  Decatur 
solemnly responded that if the two ever met “as enemies with equal forces, the conflict will 
undoubtedly be a severe one.”  But Carden was mistaken, Decatur assured him, if he thought 
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Americans would surrender easily.  “The flag of my country will never be struck whilst there 
is a hull for it to wave from,” he boasted.27  
The two men’s boasts were tested on October 25, 1812.  Samuel Leech, a British 
sailor on the Macedonian who subsequently defected to the Americans, recounts the horrors 
he witnessed in the battle. Amid the “torrents of blood which dyed our decks,” and the 
“deafening roar…like some awfully tremendous thunder storm” of the gunfire, Leech 
witnessed limbs blown off, bowels split open, and wounded men who were judged beyond 
hope thrown overboard alive.28  His masts and rigging in shambles, his crew decimated, and 
his ship “an unmanageable log,” Carden saw no choice but to surrender.29  The United States, 
meanwhile, showed only the faintest signs of having been engaged in battle.  Decatur had 
only twelve men killed or wounded, compared to thirty-six dead and another sixty-eight 
wounded on the British side.30  
Carden was devastated after the battle, believing that he was the first British 
commander to strike his flag to an American.  Decatur tried to console him by letting him 
know of the Guerriere’s earlier surrender, though how comforting this news really was is 
debatable.31  The American public felt no ambivalence whatsoever about the battle though.  
Decatur brought the shattered frigate back to shore with him, and his victory, like Hull’s 
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sparked wild celebrations across the nation.  Decatur dispatched Lieutenant Archibald 
Hamilton, the secretary’s son, to carry the Macedonian’s flag to Washington.  He arrived in 
the midst of a ball attended by James and Dolly Madison and most of Washington high 
society.  A euphoric celebration erupted, and at least one guest compared Decatur’s victory to 
the Athenian victory over Persia at the historic Battle of Marathon.32  A victory tour 
followed, with Decatur taking both ships to New York.  Samuel Leech, by now counting 
himself among the Americans and shamelessly partaking in the celebratory atmosphere, 
recalled the “continual cheering,” of the jubilant crowds.33  Decatur and his crew were 
especially happy not only because of the celebration of their exploits, but also because they 
were entitled to prize money from the captured vessel.  Under maritime law, the officers and 
crew received half the proceeds of a captured ship’s sale if it was of inferior size, and the 
entirety if it was of equal or greater size.  Although the two ships now floated side by side, 
making it patently obvious to any observer that the British vessel was smaller, in the heady 
atmosphere of victory no one wanted to quibble over prize money, and the Macedonian was 
quickly declared to be of equal force to the United States, ensuring that Decatur and his crew 
received the whole of the prize money.34 
Perhaps no American captain was more elated to capture an enemy vessel than 
William Bainbridge.  In July of 1812, he received orders to relieve Hull as captain of the 
Constitution.  Having been on the losing end of his share of battles, the chance to finally 
redeem himself was a desperately needed balm for his reputation.  Frustrated by the 
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ambiguous and often nonexistent direction from Hamilton, Bainbridge sought counsel 
elsewhere on where to cruise.  He contacted his old friend and prominent merchant captain, 
William Jones, the future secretary of the navy, for advice.35  Jones responded with detailed 
counsel based on his extensive knowledge of maritime life.  He urged him to avoid sailing all 
the way to the Indian Ocean, even though the volume of British trade there almost guaranteed 
a fat prize.  Bainbridge would find it difficult to put into any ports for supplies and the known 
prevalence of diseases in the region might frighten his crew and limit their effectiveness, 
Jones warned.  Better to stick to the Caribbean or the South American coast, where ample 
merchant shipping would still give Bainbridge the best chance to disrupt British trade.  
Interestingly, Jones made no mention of the recent frigate captures, which he surely would 
have heard of, and failed to wish Bainbridge similar luck.  This is the first hint of the new 
strategy the navy would employ when its civilian leadership changed; Jones understood that 
a far worse disaster for the British than the loss of two or three ships would be extensive 
raiding of their commerce, which would threaten to further sink the economy and drive up 
insurance rates. 
But Bainbridge had more on his mind than insurance rates when he sailed in October.  
Almost pathologically desperate to vindicate his honor, nothing would have satisfied him but 
taking a British frigate of equal size.  Fortunately for him, on December 30 he encountered 
the British thirty-eight-gun ship Java, and a fierce battle ensued which lasted for over three 
hours.  When the smoke cleared, the British captain Lambert lay seriously wounded upon the 
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deck, with another fifty-seven of his men killed.  Lieutenant Henry Chads had the immensely 
unpleasant duty of becoming yet another British officer to strike to an American.36 
The British were as frustrated by the losses as Americans were thrilled.  From 
faraway Portugal, the Duke of Wellington groused that the war would end quickly “if we 
could take one or two of these damned frigates.”  Although the American ships were 
technically all larger than the British vessels they captured, that gave little consolation to a 
naval force that was not used to losing any ships, regardless of circumstances.  The 
Admiralty ordered John Borlase Warren, theater commander in North America, to impress on 
his officers the need to “[vindicate] the honor of His Majesty’s Arms.”  Sir Philip Broke, 
among the most tenacious officers in the Royal Navy, lamented to his wife that “honor is a 
jewel of more value than whole fleets and armies and public prejudice waits not to enquire 
into the particulars of a defeat where the result is so mortifying.”37  British newspapers were 
equally distraught.  The Naval Chronicle announced the Java’s loss but refused to print any 
further details, as “the subject is too painful for us to dwell on.”  The London Pilot managed 
to comment at greater length.  “Anyone who had predicted such a result of an American war 
this time last year would have been treated as a madman or a traitor,” it opened, further 
reminding its readers that British public opinion (and Madison and his cabinet, it might have 
added) had assumed it would only take a few months to annihilate the American navy.  
Instead “not a single American frigate has struck her flag.”  American captains “insult and 
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laugh at our want of enterprise and vigor,” while sailing where they please from the West 
Indies to South America to even Europe itself.38  
Ecstasy from the American public, dismay from the British Admiralty, and elation 
from officers whose honor and reputation were exalted in victory could not hide the fact that 
these frigate victories had limited strategic value.  Britain had an abundance of ships; losing 
three hardly made a dent in the Royal Navy’s force, even when fighting a two-front war.39  In 
the emotional aftermath of victory, Americans reading accounts of the battles might be 
forgiven for forgetting this fact, but Paul Hamilton cannot be excused so easily.  His duty 
was to see the war with a dispassionate eye for victory, focusing on what would give his 
country the best chance to force concessions from Great Britain and achieve the nation’s 
stated war aims.  The single-ship actions had little chance of accomplishing that, so long as 
Britain had an ample supply to draw from.  Yet Hamilton was as caught up in the euphoria of 
the moment as anyone.  “In this action, we know not which most to applaud, your gallantry 
or your skill,” he gushed to Hull.40  Nor did Hamilton forget Stewart and Bainbridge’s 
intervention that made these victories possible.  According to Stewart’s admittedly self-
promoting autobiography, when word of Decatur’s victory reached Washington, Hamilton 
proclaimed to the celebrating crowd that “it is to Commodores Stewart and Bainbridge that 
you owe your naval victories!”41 
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Hamilton was profuse with his praise in the aftermath of such stirring victories.  
Presiding over an officer corps that fought for their own reputations and honor, such applause 
was wholly appropriate and a key part of his job.  The victories were indeed surprising and a 
significant boost to the nation’s morale at a time when little else about the war was going 
well.  That Hamilton joined in the celebration was expected.  The problem was his failure to 
put these early successes in the context of an overall strategy, something he as of yet had not 
formulated.  He must have known the captures would only infuriate a still significantly larger 
British Navy, and that they had no chance of forcing any kind of war-ending concessions.  
Hamilton was understandably caught up in the moment, because he had been making up 
strategy as he went.  It would await another secretary of the navy for the United States to put 
in place any kind of comprehensive naval strategy.  
Throughout the early victories of 1812, Hamilton continued to look primarily to his 
officers for how to manage the United States’ limited naval forces.42  He did finally make a 
decision on how to organize his ships, dividing his forces into three squadrons under the 
command of Rodgers, Decatur, and Bainbridge.  But beyond that, commodores were on their 
own.  He ordered each squadron to “pursue the course, which to the commanding officer 
may, under all circumstances, appear the most expedient to afford protection to our trade and 
annoy the enemy.”  The only caveat was that they were to write the department “at all proper 
opportunities.”43  Hamilton’s deference to his captains only increased with victories.  
William Fowler concludes that, by the end of his tenure, his relationship with Rodgers, 
Decatur, and company was “solicitous and at times almost fawning,” and that he was 
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completely beholden to their advice to know how to oversee the navy.44  The problem may 
not have been so much Hamilton’s attitude towards his officers as that, lacking a coherent 
strategy himself, he was easily swayed by others.  Daniel Dobbins, a merchant captain on the 
Great lakes prior to the war, convinced Hamilton that Presque Isle Bay, which just happened 
to be his home, would be an ideal spot to construct additional vessels for the battle to control 
the Lakes.  Oblivious to the situation, or geography, on the Lakes, Hamilton accepted 
Dobbins’ pitch at face value and immediately commissioned him as a sailing master and 
signed the orders to move ship construction facilities to Presque Isle without consulting his 
two officers already at work on the Lakes.  Although the wisdom of using Presque Isle was 
later vindicated, Hamilton strained his relations with Jesse Elliott and Isaac Chauncey by his 
handling of the episode.45   
Upon dispatching Dobbins, Hamilton returned to his habit of ignoring the Lakes.  
Officers in the Atlantic received more attention, but scarcely more supervision and direction.  
What efforts Hamilton did exert to control his officers were limited and confined to a few of 
the more problematic captains.  He sternly rebuked David Porter for standing by and 
allowing his crew to tar and feather a seaman who claimed to be British.  John Irving, a sailor 
who apparently was born in Britain but had signed on to an American ship before the 
declaration of war, informed Porter that he would be unable to take an oath of allegiance to 
the United States now that the two countries were at war.  Momentarily abdicating 
leadership, Porter willingly granted the rest of his crew permission to cover Irving in tar and 
feathers, and cast him off in a strange port where he had no friends or acquaintances to turn 
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to.  The police took him into protective custody.46  Hamilton was infuriated at Porter’s report, 
and sharply informed him that “mobs should never be suffered to exist on board a man of 
war.”  Instead, “order and discipline and perfect observance of the law should be enforced.”47  
Still, Hamilton’s relationship with Porter was always tense, dating back to the captain’s days 
at the New Orleans Station.  Only in egregious cases did he intervene in a captain’s treatment 
of those under his command.  When a group of employees at the Washington Naval Yard 
sent him a petition complaining of Thomas Tingey’s authoritative ways, he sent the petition 
back to Tingey and promptly forgot about it.48  This was certainly in keeping with precedent; 
like Stoddert and Smith before him, Hamilton preferred to leave officers’ relations with their 
subordinates alone, be they seamen or civilian employees.      
Hamilton also found himself in trouble with his officers over promotion practices.  
While he initially tried to make the Department more efficient and systematized, he had a 
tendency to get carried away in the aftermath of victory.  He allowed Lieutenant Charles 
Morris to jump two ranks to post captain, ahead of several other lieutenants senior to him, 
after his heroic conduct in battle.  Fellow officers were disgusted at what they regarded as 
excessive reward.  While all had only the highest praise for Morris, they felt that a single 
promotion would have sufficed, and Arthur Sinclair pointedly informed the secretary that he 
had been serving for fifteen years, without having been lucky enough to be involved in a war.  
If every lieutenant with the good fortune to fight a battle with a British frigate jumped over 
all his peers, Sinclair argued, Hamilton might face a mass exodus from the officer corps.  
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James Lawrence was even more forceful, threatening to resign rather than serve under an 
officer he regarded as his inferior.  Although Hamilton put up a tough front to Lawrence’s 
threat, informing him that if “(without cause) you leave the service of our country, there will 
still remain heroes and patriots to support the honor of its flag.”  Calling Lawrence’s bluff 
apparently worked; he immediately wrote back a less than contrite letter accusing Hamilton 
of questioning his patriotism, but he at least assured him that he had no thoughts of resigning.  
Hamilton nevertheless took their objections to heart.49  When Stephen Decatur tried to secure 
a similar reward for his first lieutenant, William Allen, after defeating the Macedonian, 
Hamilton declined.50 
In short, Hamilton failed to provide leadership amid the chaos of war.  His problem 
was not only that he was overly deferential to his officer corps.  That was certainly true in 
cases, but he also occasionally overruled them or gave emphatic orders.  His problem was 
inconsistency in his directives and relations with those under his authority.  Moreover, he 
proved too easily convinced to follow anyone else’s advice on virtually any issue.  At his 
core, Hamilton had no coherent strategy, no concrete idea of how to put his means toward a 
definite end, and thus he was willing to defer to anyone who appeared to know what they 
were doing.  He surely felt the weight of his authority very intensely, and in the meantime he 
continually received reports that his South Carolina plantation was deteriorating and his 
personal finances going to ruin in his absence.  Although he protested, it probably came as a 
relief to him when Madison brought his tenure at the head of the Navy Department to an end.   
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Despite the successes at sea in 1812, it was clear by the year’s end that the 
department was in trouble, and Hamilton came under increasing fire from Congress.  Among 
the most popular charges was that he was perpetually drunk.  One congressman groused that 
he “never spends a day without being in a state approaching intoxication,” and besides that 
his “talents have never been estimated above mediocrity.”51  David Porter echoed the charge, 
complaining to Samuel Hambleton that, so long as Hamilton lived there, it would be 
impossible to find “so much as a pint of whiskey in the District of Columbia.”52  Porter, 
however, is not the most reliable source on this issue.  As noted earlier, he quarreled 
constantly with Hamilton and openly hated him.53  No other officer ever leveled a similar 
accusation, even as Hamilton’s popularity declined.  Accusations that Hamilton was a drunk 
or that his alcoholism kept him from performing his duties effectively are greatly 
exaggerated.  Christopher McKee notes that his handwriting remained “beautifully small, 
clear, and precise,” until his ouster, hardly an indication the man was in a drunken haze on 
the job most days.54  Yet it is clear that Hamilton was ill-suited to be a wartime cabinet 
officer.  The administration of the Department fell into disrepair shortly after the outbreak of 
war and became increasingly chaotic in the final months of 1812.55  Goldsburough later 
admitted to Madison that “owing to the very loose manner in which the books of money and 
warrants and drafts have been kept, for some time past” he was unable to give the president 
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any idea of how much money the department had spent.56  In fact, the Navy Department 
ended the year almost a million dollars over budget, with little to show for these expenses in 
terms of ship construction, defenses against British invasion, and preparations on the Great 
Lakes.57  A handful of isolated victories masked the fact that the navy remained woefully ill-
suited to wage war with Britain. Once Madison secured reelection, he took the opportunity to 
clean house, accepting resignations from both Hamilton and Secretary of War James Eustis.58  
To replace Hamilton, Madison turned to William Jones. 
William Jones’ connection to the navy dated almost from its creation.  In 1798, an 
aspirant to the officer corps begged Jones to “use your interest with the Secretary of the Navy 
in my behalf.”59  His familiarity with the sea stretched back before that, having served on 
board of Thomas Truxtun’s privateer during the American Revolution, after service in the 
Continental Army under Washington.  Since then, he had enjoyed a thriving career as a ship 
captain and merchant.  He was recognized as a strong candidate for secretary of the navy 
early on, with Jefferson offering him the post on two separate occasions before turning to 
Robert Smith.  With the country at war, Jones found it more difficult to refuse Madison.  
While Jones weighed the possibility of taking the post, Jonathon Roberts of Congress 
appealed to him that the country was “in a state of public suffering to be relieved only under 
your saving hand.”60  Moreover, the public outpouring of support for the navy meant that, 
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instead of overseeing downsizing as he would have for Jefferson, Jones could now head a 
growing maritime force.61  On the other hand, Jones’ business was suffering from the 
embargo and the war, and accepting the post would only cause his personal finances to 
deteriorate further.  He came very close to declining the position once again on those 
grounds, but he concluded that “we are engaged in a war more just and inevitable than our 
glorious revolution,” and “the same indignant feelings which impelled me, not to the ‘tented 
field,’ but to the frozen untented heights of Princeton, Pluckamin, and Morristown” now 
compelled him to set aside his private affairs for the sake of his country.62  Laying aside 
personal considerations, Jones accepted the post.   
Jones vigorously threw himself into the task of managing a wartime navy.  The only 
exercise he could make time for was that of “the head and hands,” he wrote to his wife, 
Eleanor.  He was up every morning at seven and at his desk writing until midnight.  He 
fortified himself each day with four glasses of wine at dinner but, no doubt mindful of his 
predecessor’s scandals, he did not allow himself “a drop of any kind of spirit since I have 
been here.”63  Although he considered it “a Herculean task,” and appreciated his friends who 
“commiserated with” him, he was still upbeat about the labors he faced.  “Having accepted 
the trust with reluctance, but with the purest motives and most ardent zeal for the cause of 
our country, why should I despair?”64   
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His most frustrating task, even more than grappling with the Royal Navy, was 
removing those he considered corrupt or inept from the department.  He complained of the 
“excessively disordered and confused state of which I have found every branch of the 
department,” and the “corruption of self-interested men who have taken root in the 
establishment and, like the voracious poplar, nothing can survive in their shade.”65  He 
promptly fired all department employees but one.  Even Chief Clerk Charles Goldsburough 
was not immune from his purging.  Although he had contributed a great deal to the 
department in its early days, even briefly serving as acting secretary prior to Hamilton’s 
arrival, Goldsburough had apparently followed his boss’s example a bit too much early in the 
war, doing little to salvage the department from Hamilton’s mismanagement.  Jones might 
have been inclined to remove a long-serving and powerful subordinate from a prior 
administration anyway, but Goldsburough did himself no favors when he began trading 
increasingly vicious public broadsides with Dr. Thomas Ewell, a former naval surgeon.  
Ewell referred to Goldsburough as “one of the most cunning scoundrels with whom I have 
ever come in contact,” and compared him to a rabid dog.  Goldsburough, in turn, gave as 
good as he got, and the entire affair embarrassed the Navy Department at a time when its 
reputation was already suffering.66  Jones insisted on Goldsburough’s resignation, though he 
did feel some compassion for the man, and allowed him to remain in the department a few 
days and purchase some of its furniture to at least give the appearance of a mutual and 
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amicable parting.67  Benjamin Homans, a staunch Republican and former merchant captain 
who had the endorsement of Vice president Elbridge Gerry and Secretary of State James 
Monroe, had the unenviable task of replacing Goldsborough as clerk and trying to restore 
some semblance of order to the department.68 
His relationship with his officers got off to a good start.  Decatur no doubt spoke for 
many of his brethren when he wrote Jones to express his happiness with the change in 
leadership.  “I in common with all my brother officers feel now that the establishment in 
which our feelings and interest are involved will have nothing to struggle against, but such 
things as ought fairly to be charged against it,” he wrote, apparently believing that the navy 
would be free to achieve new heights of success against the Royal Navy, now that its 
incompetent civilian head was out of the way.  Decatur added that “whatever may have been 
the talents of the gentleman filling that office, his deficiency in practical nautical knowledge 
was such as to increase the expense of our establishment infinitely beyond what it ought to 
have been,” and that he hoped “the enormous unnecessary expenses our establishment has 
been taxed with” would cease under Jones’ direction.69  Bainbridge likewise rejoiced at 
Jones’s appointment, and commiserated with his friend – and now superior – about “the 
unorganized state of your department.”  “I can say that there never was any system in it, and 
for the want of which great abuses have crept in.”70 
Though no doubt gratified to receive Bainbridge and Decatur’s endorsement, Jones 
came into office determined to make sure every officer knew who was in charge in the Navy 
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Department.  “The latitude and discretion you have been in the habit of exercising is 
altogether inadmissible, and must not be repeated,” he wrote to one officer early in his 
tenure.71  As with Smith and Hamilton, spending habits proved the biggest source of conflict 
between Jones and his officers.  He fired one officer for making an unauthorized purchase 
(the man had already been tried once before for unofficerlike conduct).  More common was 
his sharp reprimand to another officer who consistently exceeded what Jones thought were 
acceptable expenditures.  “I have great concern that the expenses on the New Orleans 
[Station] are extravagant beyond all reasonable bounds,” he charged one officer, before 
threatening not to reimburse him.  Throughout his tenure, he waged an ongoing battle to 
“check the great and astonishing extravagance” of his officers’ spending.72  “The expenditure 
at your station has been very extravagant and must be corrected,” he ordered another captain, 
otherwise “for every expense not authorized by law or the sanction of this department…you 
will be held accountable.”73  
Despite such seemingly imperious letters, Jones still proved willing to allow his 
officers to use their own discretion in certain instances.  While he found it necessary to order 
his captains, at times, to coordinate with land forces, he sympathized with their frustrations at 
joint command and granted them considerable leeway to clash with their army counterparts.  
“In all cases where your cooperation with the military shall be required, you are to be the 
exclusive judge of the nature, extent, time, and circumstances of the required cooperation,” 
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he wrote to Arthur Sinclair, adding only that he should put forth a genuine effort to give any 
aid that he could “with propriety.”74  
As with all of his predecessors, Jones came into office understanding that naval 
officers represented the nation by their conduct, and if one of them behaved in a shameful 
manner he shamed the entire country.  “The moment an officer becomes a commander,” he 
wrote to one lieutenant thirsting for promotion, “the honor and reputation of the nation is 
committed to his single judgment, discretion, and valor.”75  Jones took a more limited view 
of officers’ duty to national honor than any man who had overseen the Navy Department to 
that point.  Unlike Hamilton, Jones came into office with a clear idea of how he planned to 
match America’s naval means with its stated goals of forcing British concessions.  His new 
strategy, however, marked a radical departure from earlier attitudes in the Navy Department.  
No longer would officers be pressed to hazard everything in the pursuit of national honor.  
Instead, Jones instituted a cautious policy that praised officers who shrank from needless 
combat.  The purpose of sending out the U.S. Navy against Britain was not primarily 
achieving glory, earning prize money for naval officers, boosting public morale (though that 
was nice), and certainly not crippling the Royal Navy.  Jones sought to damage British 
commerce enough to affect its economy and force concessions regarding impressment and 
neutral rights.76  While Stoddert had opened his tenure as secretary of the navy in 1798 by 
informing his senior officer that “a spirit of enterprise and adventure cannot be too much 
encouraged in the officers under your command, nor can too many opportunities be afforded 
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the enterprising for distinguishing themselves.  We have nothing to dread but inactivity,” 
Jones informed his officers that “our great inferiority [to the British] in naval strength does 
not permit us to meet them…without hazarding the precious germ of our national glory.”77  
Where Hamilton had told his officers it was their duty to “be prepared and determined at 
every hazard to vindicate the injured honor of our navy” and “maintain and support at any 
risk and cost the dignity of your flag,” Jones informed them that they were “strictly 
prohibited from giving or receiving a challenge to or from an enemy vessel…the character of 
the American navy does not require those feats of chivalry.”78   
Jones based his change of tactics on simple math.  Britain could replace the ships it 
lost, while America could not.  Rather, naval vessels should cruise individually and target 
“rich and exposed commercial fleets,” which would force Britain to pull valuable ships away 
from the blockade, thus achieving “the two-fold object of increasing the pressure upon the 
enemy and relieving ourselves.”79  He also forbade his officers from bringing prizes into port 
for adjudication.  Not only was it virtually impossible to get a prize all the way back to the 
United States without it being retaken by the British, but by diminishing his own crew to man 
the prize a captain made his ship vulnerable.  Burning prizes was frustrating enough, but 
Jones’ instructions to avoid engaging Royal Navy ships were even more repugnant to his 
officer corps.  By and large, naval officers complied, though by the summer of 1813 their 
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main problem was simply getting to sea through the British blockade, not what to do once 
they got there.80 
Rodgers managed to slip through the blockade in the President, and his cruise 
perfectly illustrates the disconnect between Jones’ strategy and the mentality of naval 
officers.  Rodgers sailed out in the spring of 1813, and began seizing and burning British 
merchant vessels, forcing the Royal Navy to divert valuable ships to track him down.  The 
American captain led the British on a merry chase across the Atlantic for five months.  Still, 
at the end of it, he had only a dozen captured merchant ships to show for his efforts.  While 
not a bad record for a cruise of that length, Rodgers still felt less than elated with his 
performance.  A hundred merchantmen probably would not have satisfied him, however.  
Rodgers wanted his name added alongside Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge; he wanted to 
capture a prize from the Royal Navy.  After all the hardships at sea suffered by himself and 
his crew, he still returned feeling that he had failed to “add any additional luster to the 
character of our little navy.”81     
Jones had no such reservations.  He did not want Rodgers to capture a single British 
vessel.  Given the disparity of numbers, the loss of one would not restrict the enemy’s ability 
to blockade the coast.  Far better to keep an entire squadron in pursuit, while also showing 
British insurers that the Royal Navy was helpless to protect its merchant vessels, he 
explained.82  If Rodgers struggled to accept the concept, it was not lost on the British public.  
“How gratifying it must be to him,” wondered the Morning Chronicle, “to learn that not 
                                                 
80 Lambert, The Challenge, 228-230. 
81 Rodgers to Jones, September 27, 1813, NW, II: 251-253. 
82 Jones to Rodgers, October 4, 1813, NW, II: 253-254. 
222 
 
single ships but squadrons were dispatched after him, one under the command of an 
admiral.83  Of course, part of Rodgers’ ability to draw such a significant force away from 
blockade duty to give chase stemmed from the earlier frigate victories.  Britain dared not 
send “single ships” after the President specifically because they feared a repeat of their 
earlier embarrassments.  But this only serves as further evidence that the American navy did 
not need any more engagements with the British.  Their earlier victories were sufficient to 
prompt an overreaction whenever a U.S. ship slipped through the blockade.84   
If their ability to fight the British was diminished, naval officers continued to clash 
with each other too.  As usual, the issues of relative rank and prize money drove a wedge 
between many fellow captains.  Stephen Decatur took one of his subordinates to court over 
the prize money for a capture made thousands of miles from his location.  On January 13, 
1813, the Chesapeake – nominally part of Decatur’s squadron, although Decatur was in New 
York at the time, while the Chesapeake sailed off the African coast – encountered the British 
ship Volunteer, a merchant vessel which had foolishly strayed from its naval convoy.  
Captain Samuel Evans of the Chesapeake easily seized it, and the ship and cargo were 
condemned in New Hampshire for almost $200,000.  Initially, the prize money was awarded 
only to Evans and his crew, but Decatur immediately pounced.  Suffering from failing 
eyesight and ill health, Evans retired from the Navy as soon as he returned to port, passing 
power of attorney and prize money disbursal duties to his purser, Thomas Chew.  Although 
he was considerably inferior to Decatur in rank, Chew was unwilling to disburse prize money 
to him or anyone else until the legality of Decatur’s claim was settled.  In theory, Decatur 
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could have made trouble for Chew, given his rank and immense popularity, but he apparently 
agreed without complaint to hand the matter over to the courts.  He no doubt realized that his 
would set precedent, but also that he had the overwhelming weight of English common law 
practice behind him.  His calculations proved correct; the court awarded him the squadron 
commander’s share of one-third of the captain’s earnings.85  The incident was settled 
amicably, by all accounts.  Jones, for his part, kept out of it.  He apparently regarded it as a 
matter for the courts, and made no effort to intervene in an officer corps squabble.   
Meanwhile, the British finally achieved a measure of redemption for what they 
perceived as their debacle at sea during the first year of the war.  Philip Broke of the H.M.S 
Shannon managed to fall in with Lawrence and the Chesapeake.  Still heady from having 
captured another British vessel, Lawrence disregarded Jones’s new instructions and engaged 
the Shannon.  His dreams of adding his name to that of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge came 
to an end, as did his life.  A British sniper caught him in the hip, and Lawrence knew even as 
he was being carried below the wound was mortal.  In one of the bloodiest engagements of 
the war at sea, the British finally won only by slaying the majority of the American ship’s 
officers during a fierce boarding action.  Even then, or perhaps because there was no one 
with the authority to do so, the Americans refused to strike their flag; the British boarding 
party hauled down the Chesapeake’s colors.86 
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When it became obvious that the ship was lost, the dying Lawrence urged his men to 
blow it up rather than allow it to fall into British hands.  Fortunately for all aboard, the 
remaining officers ignored him, loath though they were to strike the flag.87  Lawrence’s 
seemingly outrageous order was not entirely an American phenomenon.  A British lieutenant 
urged Carden to sink the Macedonian with all hands rather than surrender to Decatur, though 
he too was overruled.88  For many in this generation of naval officers, death seemed 
preferable to disgrace.  Of course, some of this was more empty talk than actual attitudes.  
No one ever actually blew up their ship rather than surrender in the War of 1812, nor did any 
captain fight to the last man, despite multiple captures by both navies.  Preble indicated that 
he wished Bainbridge would have sacrificed himself and the Philadelphia during the war 
with Tripoli, and touted the crew of the Intrepid for seemingly doing so.  But when 
Bainbridge took offense after the war, Preble backed off from these comments, and 
Bainbridge never suffered ostracism for still being alive.  It is certainly difficult to imagine 
any secretary of the navy, even Stoddert, pushing for such radical actions by his officers.  
Such conduct would have violated international norms of warfare, and besides, even if the 
ship would be lost either way, the United States could still exchange for valued officers and 
experienced crews.  But the fact that such outlandish suggestions were mentioned speaks to 
how much officers of the period hated the thought of admitting defeat.  Falling honorably 
was better than craven surrender or submission, but it was still a loss.      
As further evidence of this attitude, one need look no further than the American 
reaction to the loss of the Chesapeake.  The U.S. Navy had nothing to be ashamed of in the 
                                                 
87 Lambert, The Challenge, 177.  McCranie, Utmost Gallantry, 152, further contends that Lawrence urged his 
men to continue fighting until the ship sank.  
88 Leech, Voice from the Main Deck, 77. 
225 
 
aftermath of defeat, all things considered.  Broke was among the best officers in the Royal 
Navy, and he sailed to North America carrying an almost pathological obsession to capture 
an American frigate.  The two ships were roughly equal in size, weight of metal, and crews, 
and Broke had enjoyed his share of luck as well.  But the officer corps of the American navy 
was not the least bit interested in admitting defeat in a fair fight.  They immediately began a 
quest to seek “excuses for a defeat that needed none, a defeat that brought nothing but glory 
to the men who gave their lives defending their ship.”89  If anything, Lawrence was guilty of 
recklessly going into battle with his crew unprepared.90  Had this battle opened the war, the 
American reaction would surely have been very different.  Lawrence had fulfilled the 
expectations laid down for naval officers by Stoddert, Smith, and Hamilton, and 
enthusiastically accepted by the leaders of the officer corps.  He had not avoided battle, he 
had stood courageously on deck throughout the engagement at the cost of his own life (in the 
mold of Nelson), and he had earned the approbation of his enemies.  That glorious defeats 
were no longer good enough speaks to the growing confidence of the officer corps, as well as 
the heightened expectations created by the war’s initial victories.  Perhaps too, with Jones’ 
orders to avoid single-ship engagements now widely known, officers knew the navy would 
not have many more chances to humble the British.  Regardless of the reason, victory and 
victory alone was an acceptable outcome now, and the quest for excuses for the 
Chesapeake’s loss began as soon as word of the defeat spread throughout the country. 
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The court of inquiry heaped blame on the Chesapeake’s bugler, William Brown, 
claiming in his terror he had failed to sound the men to quarters fast enough, and had 
subsequently sounded the bugle without adequate zeal.  He was sentenced to 300 lashes, with 
Madison reducing that to 100.  Still not satisfied, the navy also charged Acting Third 
Lieutenant William Cox with negligence.  Cox had helped carry the dying Lawrence below, 
then struggled to get back on deck through a crowd of fleeing seamen.  For this, the court had 
him cashiered, and Madison readily signed off on the verdict.  Cox served as a private in the 
Army for the remainder of the war, then spent the rest of his life fighting to clear his name.  It 
was not until 1952 that the verdict was finally repudiated, a century after his death.91 
In addition to heaping blame on two men, a host of other excuses for the 
Chesapeake’s performance began to circulate.  A large contingent of Portuguese seamen 
supposedly diminished the fighting-ability of the crew, according to one rumor.  Many also 
claimed, not unreasonably, that the crew was exceptionally green, with many having never 
experienced combat and most of them unfamiliar with the ship.  Improbably – and in a mirror 
image of claims made about American victories earlier in the war – naval officers claimed 
that the Shannon was significantly larger than the Chesapeake.  
Jones, however, responded not with dubious excuses but with fury that his orders had 
been ignored and one of his most valuable ships lost in a needless battle.  He reiterated his 
orders, even more forcefully, that officers not engage with Royal Navy vessels.  “Should any 
attempt be made to allure you by a challenge to single combat, I am directed by the president 
to prohibit strictly your acceptance,” he wrote to Charles Stewart.  Reiterating his earlier 
exhortation that America’s honor was not worth the loss of irreplaceable frigates, he bluntly 
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told Stewart that “[Madison’s] confidence in your skill and gallantry is entire, and no 
apprehensions are maintained for the honor of the flag.”  The first priority for captains was 
no longer proving American mettle, but “the safety of the precious ship entrusted to your 
care.”92       
However disappointed the American public was with the loss of the Chesapeake, 
there were finally victories to celebrate in the battle for Canada.93  Since the outbreak of war, 
American and British forces had been scrambling to build fleets to secure the Great Lakes 
that sat at the U.S.-Canadian border.  Without control of the Great Lakes, Britain’s designs 
on the northern portions of the United States would be impossible, while maintaining control 
gave them hope of sweeping their armies throughout the northwestern portions of the United 
States.  A naval arms race ensued, though both sides were guilty of slighting this crucial 
theater in favor of the Atlantic.94   
In command of this theater for the United States was Isaac Chauncey.  Chauncey 
focused on Lake Ontario, while Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry, Chauncey’s 
subordinate, supervised construction on Lake Erie.  Contrary to Jones’ intentions to focus on 
Lake Erie, Chauncey saw his own position as the more crucial, and he continually deprived 
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Perry of desperately needed men and supplies.95  As spring turned to summer in 1813, Perry 
grew increasingly embittered against Chauncy, and took to writing directly to Jones, 
violating the chain of command, to try and compel his superior to supply him with what he 
considered essential to success on Lake Erie.96  Breaking the common practice of his 
predecessors, Jones allowed himself to be drawn into an inter-officer feud, at least somewhat.  
In this case, however, he was partly motivated by the fact that Chauncey was not only 
creating tensions with Perry, but was also ignoring directives from Washington.  Even so, 
Jones restrained himself from checking an officers’ authority in a theater of combat.  After 
making his displeasure with Chauncey abundantly clear, Jones reaffirmed that Chauncey was 
the commander at the station and that his authority would almost always be recognized and 
his view of the situation deferred to.  Jones imposed his will on Chauncey only with “a very 
great degree of reluctance,” but the situation on Lake Erie seemed dire enough that he felt he 
had no choice.  Nevertheless, he concluded his letter by reaffirming Chauncey’s authority 
from that point forward.  Although he did so reluctantly, Jones’s decision to overrule a senior 
officer in favor of a subordinate shows that he was less concerned with the touchy sense of 
honor and perceived prerogatives of his officers than earlier secretaries.  The location may 
have played a role as well.  In contrast to his orders to officers at sea, in the essential Great 
Lakes Theater, Jones – who gave the Lakes far more attention than his predecessor – seems 
to have preferred fighting captains, and he may have recognized that Perry was willing to 
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engage the enemy while Chauncey was not.97  In any case, Jones reprimanded Chauncey for 
not supplying Perry the men he had previously been ordered to. 
Chauncey complied, but also fired off a letter to Perry condemning him for going 
over his superior’s head and accusing him of giving Jones misleading or outright dishonest 
information.  Perry promptly resigned.  Jones kept his cool throughout all of this, and 
managed to send a placating letter to Perry rather than simply ordering him to do his duty.  
But the secretary refused to budge on the resignation.  In the midst of a war that was going 
badly, he could hardly try and replace the commander in a crucial theater.  Fortunately for 
himself and the country, Perry allowed his temper to cool, and continued his preparations on 
the lake.98 
   Finally, on September 10, 1813, Perry had his chance to strike.  The Lawrence, 
Perry’s flagship, led the way, engaging its British counterpart, the Detroit.  The fighting was 
brutal, with the British vessel Queen Charlotte, unengaged by any other American vessel, 
joining the attack on Perry’s flagship and subjecting his crew to a vicious barrage of fire.  
The Lawrence lost every mast and spar, as well as much of its crew, but still managed to 
keep its guns firing, inflicting surprising damage on both British attackers.  Nonetheless, it 
soon became all too obvious to Perry that his ship had been reduced to an utter wreck, and 
could not hold out much longer against vastly superior firepower.99  
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 Incredibly, throughout the beating that the Lawrence endured, another ship, the 
Niagara, the second largest American vessel on the water, stood by, hardly scratched in the 
fray.  The actions of Jesse Duncan Elliott, the captain who allowed Perry to come perilously 
close to losing his ship, will forever confound historians.  The most generous authors argue 
that he too scrupulously followed the letter of his orders, remaining fixed in his place in the 
line of battle even when it became abundantly clear that he was needed alongside the 
Lawrence.100  A more harsh analysis is that he hoped to see Perry killed, so that he could then 
claim the title of hero of Lake Erie for himself.101  Whatever the reason, the Niagara 
remained at the back of the battle, unengaged, until Perry heroically rowed into American 
lore by taking a small rowboat through the thick of the fighting, assuming command of the 
Niagara, and ultimately winning the battle. 
 In the heady moments following victory, Perry made a decision he regretted the rest 
of his life.  In his official report of the battle Perry avoided calling attention to Elliott’s 
conduct, saying that it was Elliott who “was enabled to bring his vessel, the Niagara 
gallantly into close action.”  He went on to say that, in the battle, Elliott “evinced his 
characteristic bravery and judgment,” and proved immensely valuable following the British 
surrender.102  This could be a case of an officer damning a subordinate with faint praise, for 
Perry also strongly implied that Elliott missed the better part of the battle.  While temporarily 
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satisfied, Elliott later blamed Perry when the truth of his conduct inevitably came out.  His 
repeated demands for another, unambiguous statement on his bravery and essential use 
during the battle exhausted Perry’s goodwill, and the hero of Lake Erie finally turned against 
his former second-in-command.  Elliott solicited statements from British officers captured 
after the battle attesting to his bravery, but they instead informed him that he would have 
been shot for his conduct if he had served in the Royal Navy. The Niagara’s captain resorted 
to personal attacks against Perry, even going so far as to campaign for all the prize money 
from the captured British vessels, arguing that the crew of the Lawrence deserved none.  His 
patience finally at its end, Perry assembled all documents relating to the battle, and made 
plans to have his former ally court-martialed.  Only his untimely death on a mission to South 
America saved Elliott.103  
 Why did Perry initially plan to spare Elliott?  The explanation he gave for the rest of 
his life was that he did not want to taint a major American victory.  There is no reason to 
doubt this explanation, but his biographer also notes that Perry had a history of overlooking 
glaring deficiencies in his subordinates, and his treatment of Elliott is one of the worst 
examples.104  Whatever the reason, Perry’s decision, and the Navy Department’s refusal to 
investigate the matter further when reports of Eliot’s conduct began circulating, would have 
far-reaching consequences for the navy. 
In addition to their occasional clashes with each other, officers had to deal with tense 
relations with the American people whom they were sworn to defend.  Prior to the War of 
1812, civilians’ interaction with naval officers had been fairly limited and, not unrelated, 
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generally harmonious.  The exception, of course, was when naval officers were called on to 
enforce Jefferson’s embargo, seriously damaging their popularity with civilians.  But the 
thrilling victories over the Royal Navy made captains popular with Americans again, as they 
were seen as the country’s most gallant heroes.  Unfortunately, these heroes had a less 
generous perception of Americans.  They complained constantly to Hamilton and Jones 
about civilian trade with the enemy, legal and otherwise, and rampant smuggling.105  In the 
Northwest, Thomas Macdonough even had to send one of his men away to avoid prosecution 
after he was attacked by a tavern keeper and his men killed the assailant in the scuffle.106   
Direct clashes between civilians and naval officers finally came when the Navy 
Department appointed captains to oversee defensive preparations for British invasions.  The 
war seemed to confirm the worst fears of standing militaries raised by Americans since 
before the Revolution.   But naval officers’ authority in shore stations, even when the threat 
of British invasion was immanent, never approached absolute.  Rather, they and their Army 
counterparts quarreled with one another and civilian officials in a murky civil-military 
division of authority that usually produced little in the way of effectiveness.107 
Few faced as much hostility from the civilian population as Joshua Barney.  Barney 
had been one of the initial six captains commissioned when the navy was created, but had 
resigned his commission after being ranked below Silas Talbot, and had gone on to serve in 
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the French Navy.  Although he left before the outbreak of the Quasi War, accusations of 
deficient patriotism or even treason had dogged him ever since.  Even when the United States 
declared war on Great Britain and was desperate for officers, Hamilton refused to grant 
Barney a commission, and instead he sailed out as a privateer.  A reasonably successful run 
against British shipping, and no small measure of desperation on the part of the Navy 
Department, finally enabled him to return to service, and Jones assigned him to lead the 
defense of the Chesapeake.108  Although he threw himself into the task, he was less 
enthusiastic about protecting the inhabitants of the region, many of whom seemed to favor 
the British.  Barney grew increasingly disgusted with the Federalists who dominated local 
politics, and they seemed to confirm his dim view at every turn.  When one man openly 
encouraged his fellow citizens not to resist a British invasion and tried to obtain information 
from Barney that he planned to transfer to the enemy, Barney tried to arrest him as a spy, but 
was apparently prevented from doing so.  A militia unit not only abandoned him, but 
absconded with vital provisions, while other members of the city openly wished both Barney 
and the president were condemned to hell.109 
Barney did finally lash out against at least one Baltimorean.  Lemuel Taylor wrote to 
the department and accused the captain of being a “most abandoned rascal as to politics and 
morals,” and that “he is despised by nine-tenths of those who have taken part in the defense 
of Baltimore.”  Jones rallied to Barney’s defense, publishing a lengthy letter in the same 
paper strongly endorsing his character and career.  The secretary called Taylor’s accusations 
“flatigious (sic) libel,” and taunted him that “it has at length been read by the scavengers…of 
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the common sewer.”  His spirited defense of his officer is a bit surprising, since his 
predecessors tended to stay out of such public feuds, and it certainly did nothing to enhance 
the dignity of his office.  But his officers were no doubt gratified to see their superior 
defending one of their own.  For his part, Taylor responded by calling Jones “an unprincipled 
villain and a base coward.”110  Given the exchange, it is probably not surprising that Jones 
followed precedent and looked the other way while Barney fought a duel with Taylor, 
slightly wounding him.111  
Jones’s support for Barney in his clashes with civilians only went so far, however.  
Opposed to the war and even more opposed to anything that impaired their ability to make 
money, local merchants adamantly refused to supply Barney with the supplies he desperately 
needed to fend off a British invasion.  Jones and Madison alike apparently never even 
considered the idea of allowing Barney or his counterparts in other Federalist cities to 
requisition supplies.  The prospect of even limited martial law was likewise not up for 
discussion.  The resistance of the merchant community to helping Barney extended to his 
efforts to acquire men as well as materiel.  Barney tried to recruit seamen from the city, but 
with limited success.  Even at the height of the British blockade, many preferred to take their 
chances trying to get to sea on merchant ships to defending against an invasion.  “The 
cupidity of our merchants is such that they care not how much the city is threatened [as long 
as] they can get a vessel to sea,” he groused to Jones.112 
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Meanwhile, William Bainbridge also struggled to maintain a healthy relationship with 
the people he was supposed to protect.   After capturing the Java, Bainbridge was stationed 
in Boston to supervise the construction of America’s first 74-gun battleship, the 
Independence.  He surely knew he would face a less than enthusiastic response from the local 
population; the governor of Massachusetts, Caleb Strong, had declared a day of fasting and 
prayer in June of 1812 to seek God’s forgiveness for declaring war on “the nation from 
whom we descended, and which for many generations has been the bulwark of the religion 
we profess.”  British blockading ships actually entertained prominent Federalist citizens at 
the height of the war.  Citizens of the city even requested that he hand the almost-complete 
ship over to the British in hopes they would relent on attacking the city.113  A fair number of 
Bostonians eventually came around and contributed to the war effort, but only when the 
threat of invasion became dire.  In the meantime, there was little Bainbridge could do other 
than try and prepare defenses as best he could with the men under his command.  As with 
Barney, the idea of allowing Bainbridge to declare even limited martial law was never 
expressed, nor did Jones give even the slightest latitude to Bainbridge to requisition men or 
supplies. 
Isaac Hull likewise found himself fighting a two-front war on the island of 
Portsmouth, just off the coast of New Hampshire, as he prepared to fend off British raiding 
parties and also keep a watchful eye on the Federalist population of the city.  Republican 
William Plumer had recently served as governor of New Hampshire, and he had taken a few 
steps towards defending the coasts and islands from the British, but the elections of 1812 
ousted Plumer in favor of Federalist John Taylor Gilman, who made his own views of the 
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war clear by promptly revoking orders to supply rations to militiamen assigned to defend the 
state.  “I see no disposition on the part of the people to secure their harbor,” Hull lamented to 
Jones, “we must therefore endeavor to defend ourselves.”114  He became convinced that he 
was without support among the population, later writing to Jones that even in the event of an 
actual British invasion of the island, the locals would do nothing to help.  Hull pleaded with 
Gilmer for munitions for the forts on the island, and asked the War Department to further 
impress on the recalcitrant governor the urgency of his requests, but to no avail.115 Gilmer 
budged a little when British vessels appeared within eyesight of the coast, but even then 
Hull’s difficulties continued.  While Hull lived in, and was responsible for defending, New 
Hampshire, the island that housed the Portsmouth Yard was technically part of 
Massachusetts, then under the control of staunch Federalist Caleb Strong.  Strong 
consistently refused to grant Hull, an officer of the national navy, any materials that he could 
keep under state control.116  Meanwhile, the enthusiasm of the populations of both New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts fluctuated based on their perceived likelihood of a British 
attack, and Hull lived under constant strain until he received word of the end of the war.117   
Jones and Madison were certainly aware of his officers’ troubles.  In addition to their 
frequent complaints, they also received regular updates from pro-war citizens on trade with 
                                                 
114 Maloney, Captain from Connecticut, 229. 
115 Maloney, Captain from Connecticut, 244. 
116 See: Stuart, Civil-Military Relations in the War of 1812, 109 for discussion of state vs. federal control of 
militia and resources.  The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the president on such issues, but not until 
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federal government limited in its ability to enforce its will on the states. 
117 Maloney, Captain from Connecticut, 247-258. 
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the enemy and near treason from Federalists.118 In every instance, naval officers assigned to 
protect citizens from British coastal raids depended on their own ability to inspire – or beg 
for – support to rally civilians to their own defense.  Despite the dire nature of the war effort 
by 1814, the government only allowed for very limited martial law.  Full martial law, 
Reginald Stuart argues, was “politically impossible to propose, let alone apply and 
enforce.”119  The results were predictable.  In Baltimore, where the people of the city 
voluntarily rallied around John Rodgers, the British failed in their attack on the city.  
Elsewhere, British raiding parties were able to land on the American coast at will, inflicting 
dreadful damage, culminating in the burning of the capital.120    
 
Jones’s career in the Navy Department was influential but brief.  Like Hamilton, his 
personal finances suffered greatly during his tenure in government, and he too became worn 
down by the staggering administrative responsibilities.  He tendered his resignation in the 
spring of 1814, although he remained on another eight months until Madison found a 
replacement.121   By the time he left Washington in December of 1814, the war was 
essentially over.  American and British negotiators formally agreed on the Treaty of Ghent 
less than a month later.  His successes had been limited.  His commerce-raiding strategy had 
frustrated the British, but the strength of the blockade by the end of the war meant that few 
                                                 
118 “The Republican Citizens to Newburyport” to Vice President Elbridge Gerry, September 8, 1813 reported 
rampant trade with the enemy.  Gerry to “Republican Citizens,” September 19, 1813: the Vice President 
promised to forward their concerns to Madison and the rest of the cabinet.  The report certainly ended up in 
Jones’ss hands, since it is filed among his personal papers.  Box 1, Uselma Clarke Smith Collection D, HSP. 
119 Stuart, Civil-Military Relations in the War of 1812, 106.  For a broader discussion of martial law during the 
war, see pages 101-120. 
120 Lambert, The Challenge, 309. 
121 Jones to Madison, April 25, 1814, JMP: Presidential Series, VII: 437-439. 
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warships were getting to sea, and those that did inflicted little damage thanks to the Royal 
Navy’s convoys.  Although the burning of Washington was primarily the army’s 
responsibility, he was still in government when it happened.  Moreover, throughout his 
tenure, the navy proved totally unable to prevent British coastal raids.  He took over a badly 
undersupplied department overseeing an undermanned navy, and the situation only 
deteriorated under his watch.  All of this, it should be added, was largely beyond his control.  
Given the tools at his disposal, it is remarkable what the navy did accomplish as secretary, 
including two major victories in the theater he showed the least interest in: the Great Lakes. 
Moreover, his career included an attmepted transformation of naval culture.  For the 
first two decades of its existence, the navy had been a tiny force, starkly limited in its ability 
to project power or intimidate rivals.  Given its small size, successive secretaries of the navy 
sought officers with ambition, zeal, and even recklessness to compensate for a deficiency of 
force.  Cautious or even lazy officers, who likely would have proven perfectly functional and 
enjoyed long if unimpressive careers in the Royal Navy, were publicly shamed and ejected 
from the service.  The aggressive mindset showed in the beginning of the War of 1812. 
Successive captains sailed with one goal: find and defeat a Royal Navy vessel of equal size 
(or what they could claim was equal size with a reasonably straight face).  Jones’s demand 
for a less aggressive strategy therefore called for a dramatic shift in military culture.      
But the war also revealed that the zealous, fight at all costs mentality could not be 
eradicated easily.  Lawrence defied Jones’ wishes and challenged the Shannon, then called 
for his officers and crew to immolate themselves rather than admit defeat.  After the loss, the 
navy’s officers were desperate to absolve the corps of the slightest hint of blame, instead 
reaching rather far-fetched conclusions to excuse defeat.  Whether Lawrence would have 
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been held responsible if he had survived is impossible to know, but he became, in many 
ways, a heroic ideal for the navy by dying in battle, conveniently sparing himself the shame 
of surrender.  For the surviving officers, the end of hostilities with Great Britain did not mean 
an end to their quest for fame, nor to their internal squabbling.    
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“A Radical Change of System:” The Navy Board and Professionalization, 1815-1820 
 
It has ever been my opinion that a Naval Board was absolutely 
necessary, and that Board composed of Officers that are 
capable of fixing on what is necessary to fit out every class of 
ships, and after having given what they absolutely require, they 
should have nothing further, nor should any alteration be made 
in the equipment or stores furnished. 
Isaac Hull1 
 
The law authorizing the establishment of a board of 
commissioners of the Navy, making executive interference 
necessary to a construction which has unavoidably left the 
subject still involved in difficulties, the commissioners from 
that reserve which unavoidably attends an exercise of powers 
which are doubted, have not since their appointment, been 
enabled…to extend as far as is desirable, their knowledge of 
matters connected with the navel establishment of the United 
States. 
Report of the Board of Navy Commissioners2 
 
 
 America’s performance in the War of 1812 provided the Madison Administration’s 
critics with an abundance of ammunition, but in the celebratory atmosphere of 1815 they 
found themselves unable to use it.  Across the nation, Americans exulted in Andrew 
Jackson’s crushing victory over the redcoats at New Orleans, the fact that the nation fought 
Britain to a standstill in Canada (conveniently forgetting that they began the war hoping to 
conquer the entire country), and especially the frigate victories of 1812.  So exultant was the 
                                                 
1 Theodore Weld, Commodore Hull: The Papers of Isaac Hull, Commodore of the United States Navy (Boston: 
Boston Athenaeum, 1929), 37.   
2 “Report of the Board of Navy Commissioners,” November 25, 1815, Rodgers Family Papers, Box 4, Library 
of Congress, Washington DC. 
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country, that the war’s less heroic moments were quickly forgotten.1  This was especially 
true of the navy’s brightest star, Stephen Decatur.  The War of 1812, having begun for him 
with such spectacular success, ended with an equal measure of disappointment.  In an effort 
to break free of the British blockade, he instead suffered the ignominy of surrendering one of 
his country’s finest vessels, the President, to a Royal Navy squadron.    
The loss of the President barely touched his reputation, however, and he remained 
among the navy’s most celebrated officers.2  A court-of-inquiry composed of his peers 
unreservedly absolved him of blame, ruling that the odds against him were such as to make 
doubts about his honor in defeat absurd.  Personally, however, the loss burned within him.  
Possibly he understood what future historians would note, that he could have tried harder to 
escape.3  Or perhaps the precipitous fall from national exultation after capturing the 
Macedonian to mere exoneration of blame in defeat was too much to bear.  Whatever the 
reason, the hero thirsted for another chance at glory.  He got his chance almost immediately 
following the cessation of hostilities with Britain.  With the American navy occupied, the 
Dey of Algiers saw a golden opportunity to press for better terms with the United States, and 
began seizing American merchant vessels and enslaving their crews.  He no doubt based his 
                                                 
1 Donald Hickey, War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 314-315; 
Troy Bickham, Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812 (Cambridge: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 278. 
2 Robert Allison, Stephen Decatur: American Naval Hero, 1779-1820 (Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2004), 160-162 and Spencer Tucker, Stephen Decatur: A Life Most Bold and Daring, 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 150-152. 
3 See, especially, Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 (New York: The Modern Library, 1999, 
originally published 1881): 221-227.  While critical of some British accounts that exaggerate the success of the 
battle, Roosevelt concludes “I do not think that the facts bear out the assertions, on the part of most American 
authors” that Decatur acted commendably.  In fact, he argues that Decatur “acted rather tamely, certainly not 
heroically,” in his defeat.  Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain, the United States, and the War of 1812 
(London: Faber and Faber, 2012), 350-379, is somewhat less harsh, but still thoroughly unimpressed with 
Decatur’s performance.  
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actions partly on British promises that the American navy would be utterly destroyed in the 
war.4  If so, it proved a fatal miscalculation.  The American navy not only survived the war, 
but its successes banished the last vestiges of congressional opposition, setting the stage for a 
final expedition to the Mediterranean, intended to end piracy against American shipping once 
and for all.5  Decatur determined to be at the head of this mission. 
 William Bainbridge also longed for a chance at glory in the Mediterranean, with even 
more reason than Decatur.  His victory over the Java no doubt came as a tremendous relief, 
and proved that he was no coward nor was he incompetent in managing a ship.  Nonetheless, 
he still had only one capture to balance three surrenders, and he was especially anxious to 
add to his reputation in the place where he endured two humiliating failures.  Initially, 
Bainbridge was given command of the Mediterranean expedition and orders to negotiate, 
forcibly, treaties with Algiers and also Tunis – the latter regency appeared set to follow the 
Dey’s lead in resuming attacks on American shipping.  Given his seniority, Secretary of the 
Navy Benjamin Crowninshield, who had just replaced Jones, tapped him for the mission, and 
awarded him command of the United States’ first 74-gun ship of the line, the Independence.  
An elated Bainbridge immediately set about procuring supplies and outfitting his ships for 
the cruise.    
                                                 
4 Andrew Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2005), has a brief account of Decatur’s mission.  While most books on the Barbary Wars emphasize the 
1801-1805 Tripolitan War, Frederic C. Leiner, The End of the Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War Against the 
Pirates of North Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) focuses entirely on the 1815 mission, and 
provides significant detail left out of other surveys.  See also Ray Irwin The Diplomatic Relations of the United 
States with the Barbary States, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1931): 161-
186 for the diplomatic background and course of the 1815 mission as well as its aftermath. 
5 See Craig Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1794-1827 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980), 194-200. 
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 Decatur then launched one of the least flattering chapters of his life.6  While the 
obligatory court-of-inquiry into his loss of the President remained unresolved, admittedly 
with the outcome a foregone conclusion, Crowninshield offered Decatur three choices, all 
befitting a hero of his country.  He could assume command of the Charleston Navy Yard, a 
prestigious post that would have allowed him to remain in the States.  If he preferred to go to 
sea again, he could take command of the 44-gun Guerriere and sail as part of Bainbridge’s 
squadron – Bainbridge had been in the service longer than Decatur and his commission as a 
captain predated Decatur’s by a few weeks, so it was not (in Crowninshield’s mind) insulting 
that Decatur would serve under him.  Should he absolutely refuse to serve under Bainbridge, 
he could take another 74-gun ship, the Washington, to the Mediterranean upon Bainbridge’s 
return.  While all of the secretary’s offers were fully befitting an officer of Decatur’s stature, 
he boldly demanded more than any of them.  He wanted to take the Guerriere ahead of 
Bainbridge to commence negotiations with Algiers, with it explicitly understood that he 
would return home the moment Bainbridge arrived.  The secretary yielded to Decatur’s every 
demand.7    The only chance for the man to whom command was originally intended was to 
get underway ahead of Decatur.  Bainbridge’s luck continued its normal course, however, 
and he had trouble getting his squadron outfitted in time.  Decatur seized the opportunity to 
sail out ahead of him, and appeared at the port of Algiers in the summer of 1815 with two 
captured Algerine vessels and the overwhelming force necessary to dictate peace terms.  
When Bainbridge arrived shortly thereafter, he found that the United States had already 
                                                 
6 Portions of the discussion of Decatur’s voyage to the Mediterranean are taken from Sheppard, “Petty Despots 
and Executive Officials,” 2010. 
7 Leonard Guttridge, Our Country, Right or Wrong: The Life of Stephen Decatur, The US Navy’s Most 
Illustrious Commander (New York: Forge Press, 2006): 172-178. 
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signed treaties with both nations, and there was nothing left for him to do.  After a cursory 
tour of the Mediterranean, displaying his force to nations already at peace with his country, 
an embittered Bainbridge returned home.8 
 This episode is significant in its own right and also illustrative of larger issues within 
the postwar U.S. Navy.  Despite Jones’s efforts, the secretary of the navy’s authority over the 
officer corps still extended only as far as the force of his personality.  Crowninshield, an 
amiable and often indecisive man, was easily manipulated by Decatur. 9   While Decatur’s 
undermining of the secretary’s wishes and stealing a march on Bainbridge were 
inappropriate, even by the standards of the time, it was still not entirely clear to naval officers 
exactly what was appropriate.  The boundaries of civilian control remained vague in the 
aftermath of the War of 1812, and while the navy became markedly more professional over 
the next few years, no one, civilian or military, made any great effort to clarify this 
relationship.  
 It took a civil-military crisis to bring the dispute to a head.  The Board of Navy 
Commissioners, created immediately after the war to ease the secretary’s workload, instead 
looked to seize power for the officer corps at the expense of the civilian head of the 
department.  Although that failed, the board’s power over the navy remained immense, so 
                                                 
8 David Long, Ready to Hazard: A Life of Commodore William Bainbridge, 1774-1833 (Hanover, NH: 
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much so that the office of secretary of the navy did indeed become less influential, usually 
with the passive acceptance of Crowninshield and his successor, Smith Thompson. 
 
 The War of 1812 effectively ended the Federalist Party.10  Although many of their 
criticisms of the conflict were valid, in the euphoric aftermath of Andrew Jacksons’s victory 
over the British at the Battle of New Orleans, it proved all too easy to label any opponents of 
the war as traitors, little better than the Tories of the American Revolution.  Yet even as the 
party of Jefferson and Madison exulted in their opponents’ demise, they quietly conceded 
that the Federalists had been right about a great many things.  After the many humiliations of 
the war, Republican leaders quickly absorbed many of the Federalists’ policies regarding a 
standing army and navy, national defense, and the bureaucracy and national bank required to 
fund them.11 
 There were a few policies, however, that remained too much for the Republican 
Congress to stomach.  For one thing, it was unresponsive to concerns about the navy’s 
educational apparatus for its officers.   The idea of a school for training junior officers had 
been floated as early as 1777 by John Paul Jones, and his plea was echoed by such prominent 
Americans as James McHenry, Henry Knox, and John Adams.  The Board of Navy 
Commissioners strongly proposed the creation of such an academy.12  None of this, however, 
swayed enough members of Congress to make the academy a reality.  Americans cringed at 
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the thought of a naval West Point for many of the same reasons they initially opposed West 
Point itself.  It would breed aristocratic pretentions among officers, create a society of 
military professionals whose loyalty to the military would trump their loyalty to liberty, and 
provide would-be despots with a ready tool for subverting the will of the people.  Moreover, 
it was seen as expensive and wholly unnecessary.  Even in the aftermath of the War of 1812, 
many Americans remained committed to the idea of a militia at sea made up of privateers.  
The successes of the War of 1812, while improving most Americans’ opinion of the navy, 
actually worked against the idea of an academy, since the British had been humbled 
(according to public opinion) by self-trained officers.  The idea of a naval academy never 
went away, however, with successive secretaries of the navy pushing for a school for 
midshipmen throughout the Monroe, Adams, and Jackson Administrations, but it was not 
until 1845 that the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis was finally created.  In the meantime, 
senior officers had to continue training their successors at sea as best they could.13     
 The Naval Academy was not the only idea whose time had not yet come.  Ever since 
Stoddert, the Navy Department had pushed for the creation of the rank of admiral.  The lack 
of higher ranks than captain was especially frustrating to officers who reached the pinnacle of 
their profession in their early twenties, and had no hope of future promotions.  “If we are to 
have a Navy (which I almost despair of), we ought and must have admirals,” Isaac Hull 
wrote to Senator David Daggett of Connecticut.  Hull was especially frustrated because of 
the navy’s half-hearted effort at according higher rank by giving the courtesy title of 
commodore.  Any captain in command of a squadron – even one of only two ships – enjoyed 
                                                 
13 Frederick Leeman, Long Road to Annapolis, 69-100 discusses the process of founding an academy.  For 
Americans’ fears of a formally-educated officer corps, 4-5; for the successes of the War of 1812 working 
against the establishment of an academy, 72, 99.   
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this title, and usually kept it for life.  Although no additional powers came with it, it galled 
Hull that men lower than himself in seniority could demand that he refer to them by a title 
that at least implied greater distinction.14    
 Not all ideas for the improvement of the navy fell by the wayside, however.  For one 
thing, Congress proved far more willing to accept the expenses of a permanent navy, 
authorizing a substantial expansion, including the 74-gun ship of the line Independence that 
Bainbridge sailed into the Mediterranean. In April of 1816, Congress followed this 
construction project with “An Act for the Gradual Increase of the Navy of the United States.”  
The act, which sailed through both Houses of Congress virtually unopposed, approved nine 
more ships-of-the-line as well as an additional fifteen smaller vessels.  “The significance of 
this legislation cannot be overstated,” argues Craig Symonds.  “It represented the complete 
reversal of the policy of two decades,” in that “the construction was not designed for any 
specific purpose, but for general service.”15  In other words, Congress, under the near-
complete control of the party of Jefferson, was now enthusiastically supporting the idea of a 
standing navy in peacetime.    
 For leading this newly expanded maritime force, Madison was initially inclined to 
trust administration of the navy to one of its own, and when Jones resigned as secretary of the 
navy in 1814, he offered the post to John Rodgers.  The commodore politely declined, telling 
Madison that “my abilities are not of a kind to justify my acceptance” of the post, as “neither 
(sic) my habits, temper, nor education are such (as in my own estimation) to sanction” him 
becoming the civilian head of the navy.   While his self-doubts may have been sincere – 
                                                 
14 Weld, Papers of Isaac Hull, 37.  See also, Maloney, Captain from Connecticut, 292-304 for a detailed 
discussion of Hull’s frustrations on this point.  
15 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 199. 
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though in light of his actions as president of the navy board this is certainly questionable – 
we get a hint as to Rodgers’s true motives for rejecting the post later in his letter to Madison.  
Rodgers said he would be willing to assume the office of the secretary on an interim basis, 
but only if he could maintain his commission and standing in the officer corps.  Rodgers also 
used his letter declining the post as another chance to push for a navy board, which he must 
have known he would be appointed to.16  Madison saw no way that an active naval officer 
could simultaneously hold a civilian post, even temporarily, and he left Rodgers as he was.17   
 After Rodgers declined, Madison turned to New Englander Benjamin Crowninshield.  
In terms of experience, Crowninshield seemed among the most qualified men ever to hold 
the post.  He, like most of his predecessors, came into the office with extensive knowledge of 
maritime affairs.  His father, also named George, was among the most respected and 
successful merchants of New England.  The elder Crowninshield served as a midshipman in 
the Royal Navy, but left to join the American militia at the outbreak of the Revolution, and 
was wounded at Bunker Hill.18  Following the Revolution, he spent several years as a 
merchant captain, before founding an East Indies trading company, which proved 
tremendously successful and soon accumulated substantial wealth for the family.19  The 
younger Crowninshield had grown up in the heart of America’s maritime commercial 
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industry.  He also had political experience, having served a term in the Massachusetts House 
of Representatives and later in the state senate, and after his career in the Navy Department 
he went on to serve in the United States House of Representatives.20   
His qualifications on paper did not, however, make him a strong or effective 
secretary.  Although warm and friendly, Crowninshield was temperamentally ill-suited for 
the post.  In contrast to his war hero father, known as “Sailor Ben” in the maritime 
community, the younger Crowninshield was dubbed “Philosopher Ben.”  A bookish young 
man, it is unclear if Crowninshield Jr. ever captained a vessel.21  He preferred intellectual and 
philosophical pursuits, commenting that “no American [should] dare to think lightly of 
philosophy and science, and if my countrymen wish to acquire power, influence, and respect 
among nations, and convenience and perfection in society, let learned men be honored and a 
spirit of enquiry be encouraged.”22  He was in his element conducting scientific experiments 
and debating points of philosophy, but he apparently lacked his father’s hard-headed business 
sense or love of the sea.23 
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Moreover, he could be indecisive and directionless.  He dithered for months on 
whether to accept the post of secretary of the navy or not, leaving Chief Clerk Benjamin 
Homans the de facto secretary for a time.24  Even in his intellectual pursuits he occasionally 
showed a lack of commitment and drive.  He filled numerous notebooks with chapters for his 
ambitious project “A General History of Mankind from the beginning of the world to the 
present time,” though he never came close to finishing it.25  Samuel Flagg Bemis, the great 
historian of American diplomacy, regards Crowninshield as “irresolute and vacillating.”  All 
in all, he was “barely competent to handle the navy.”  Edwin Hall largely agrees.  Although 
he credits Crowninshield with some measure of effective leadership early in his tenure, he 
criticizes him for a “lack of initiative,” and concludes that he was “in general content to let 
[others] do his work for him.”26       
 Even if Crowninshield had been more forceful and energetic, he would have 
struggled.   War had made it abundantly clear that the duties of overseeing the navy were too 
great for one man.  The successes of individual ships and commanders could not conceal the 
navy’s lingering administrative problems.  “It has been affirmed, and cannot be denied, that 
imperfections exist in the civil administration of the naval establishment” William Jones 
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reported to Congress in the midst of the war, asserting that “a radical change of system alone 
can remedy the evils.”27  Despite the efficiency and general success of the navy, room for 
improvement remained, and the job of overseeing the growing service exceeded the 
capabilities of even the most enthusiastic secretary.  Jones called for expanding the size of 
the Navy Department, allowing the secretary to delegate substantial responsibilities thereby 
reducing the workload on himself and his successors.28 
Jones proposed granting experienced naval officers greater authority in the 
administration of the service through the creation of a Board of Navy Commissioners.  The 
board was duly established by Congress in the aftermath of the War of 1812, but Jones’s idea 
rested on earlier precedents.  During the Revolutionary War, the Marine Committee of the 
Continental Congress created two navy boards to oversee administrative matters.  The Navy 
Board of the Eastern Department was primarily responsible for the New England states, 
while the Navy Board of the Middle Department oversaw the rest of the Continental Navy.  
The boards, in s sign of things to come, suffered from a vague mandate, and it shows how 
little planning went into them that even their names vary in the documentary record; no 
standard name was ever given.29  Most congressmen serving on the Marine Committee 
lacked interest in the navy, and in any case labored under a substantial workload, so in short 
                                                 
27 Secretary of the Navy William Jones, “Reorganization and Extension of the Navy, the Establishment of a 
Board of Inspectors, and a Naval Academy,” communicated to the Senate, November 15, 1814, American State 
Papers, Naval Affairs, Volume I, 4 volumes (Washington DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832): 320.  Some of the 
discussion of the Board of Navy Commissioners is taken from Sheppard, “Petty Despots and Executive 
Officials,” 2010. 
28 Jones, “Reorganization and Extension.” 
29 Charles Oscar Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution:  Its Administration, Its Policy and Its Achievements 
(New York: Haskell House Ltd, 1971, originally published 1906), 97. 
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order the boards were essentially running the Continental Navy.30 Stoddert had also 
recommended such a body before his retirement.31  In 1805, James Barron and Thomas 
Tingey campaigned strongly in favor of the creation of such a board to establish uniformity 
in ship design, examine candidates for promotion, and advise the secretary of the navy.32     
Shades of the board can also be seen in the occasions when the civilian government 
sought out the counsel of selected officers before making a decision; Robert Smith’s 1805 
circular regarding Truxtun’s readmission, Thomas Tingey and Samuel Barron’s official 
reports in 1807 on the best use of gunboats, and even Hamilton’s plea to Rodgers and 
Decatur for advice at the beginning of the War of 1812 all foreshadowed the board to some 
extent.  Now, rather than having to rely on whichever officers were close by at a given time, 
future presidents and secretaries of the navy would have a panel of trusted officers readily 
available to weigh in on whatever matters were most pressing.  That this panel might come to 
view itself as more than a mere advisory body on policy issues does not seem to have 
occurred to anyone. 
Like so much that the American navy did, the creation of a Navy Board was based on 
the British Navy, which possessed a set of similar boards.  For Britain, however, the 
subordinate boards’ responsibilities were unambiguously limited to specific matters, and they 
were duly designated as the Victualing Board, the Sick and Hurt Board, the Ordinance 
                                                 
30 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 volumes. (Washington, DC: US government Printing 
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Board, and later the Transport Board; the British Navy Board, whose status, influence, and 
role in government fluctuated over time, generally tended to focus on dockyards, ships, and 
supplies.  Strategy, operations and questions relating to the officer corps were the clear 
prerogative of the separate Board of Admiralty, also known as Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty.  All other boards were technically subordinate to this body.   Even with a 
reasonably clear designation of roles, tensions between the British Navy Board and Board of 
Admiralty were frequent.33  Jones’s proposed Board of Navy Commissioners – and the 
subsequent congressional legislation – failed to provide such specificity of duties, leaving 
open the possibility that the board, once created, would define its own conception of its 
duties and powers.   
Even before the formal creation of the board, it was clear that the government 
intended a greater role for the officer corps in managing the navy.  When the idea of creating 
a Navy Board was first proposed, Congress solicited opinions from several prominent naval 
officers, whose suggestions were duly taken into consideration and, in some matters, 
implemented.34  The secretary had, for example, proposed a five-man board, consisting of 
three officers and two civilians.  Naval officers, unsurprisingly, felt that a three-man board 
consisting solely of active duty captains would be far better.  Their views were not 
unreasonable; long-serving captains who had spent years at sea aboard naval vessels certainly 
possessed the competency to oversee the details of such ships without civilian aid.  Congress 
                                                 
33 For the British Navy Boards, see Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Lincoln, NE: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1992, originally published 1964), 15-16.  For detailed discussion of British naval 
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Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York: W.W. Norton and 
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34 Opinions of: Commodores Bainbridge, Stewart, Hull, Decatur, Perry, Porter, Warrington, Evans, Morris, 
Shaw and Tingey on the establishment of a Board of Naval Inspectors, American State Papers, Naval Affairs, I: 
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implemented this suggestion quite readily.  While the proposed change had much to 
recommend it, however, removing any civilian influence from the board greatly enhanced the 
power of the officer corps, allowing the board to become a unified voice for a strictly 
military viewpoint.   
 That said, this body was not intended to increase the role of the officer corps in 
decision-making.  William Reed of the House, in his follow-up to Jones’ proposal, gave three 
key reasons for the need for such a board, two of which related directly to curtailing the 
officer corps.  “The want of sufficient checks upon, and the consequent irresponsibility of, 
subordinate agents,” along with “the great latitude allowed commanders” in the maintenance 
of their ships had created a pressing need for greater authority and enforcement within the 
Navy Department.35  The board, it was hoped, would provide a greater uniformity of practice 
among officers, and crack down on the use of government resources by individual captains.  
There was a disconnect between Jones’ proposal and what Congress finally created.  While 
Jones wanted officers reined in on their use of government money, he at least implied in his 
draft of a bill creating the board that the most senior officers would assume for themselves 
the better part of the secretary’s responsibilities.  In his original recommendation, Secretary 
Jones vaguely specified that the board would “have the general superintendence and direction 
of the affairs of the Navy.”36   
Congress refused to go this far.  The legislation creating the board made it abundantly 
clear that the legislators had no intention of abandoning the nation’s traditional views of 
                                                 
35 William Reed, “Reorganization of the Navy Department,” January 15, 1815, American State Papers: Naval 
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civil-military relations.  In their remarks on the proposal, Stephen Decatur and John Shaw 
both suggested that the secretary of the navy be the presiding officer of the board, not 
independent of it.37  This would have placed the secretary on much more equal footing with 
officers, and opened the door for the naval officers assigned to the board to completely 
dominate the affairs of the navy.  Congress would have none of it.  The board was 
specifically designated as “attached to the office of the Secretary of the Navy and under his 
superintendence,” and assigned “all the ministerial duties of said office.”  Exactly what the 
“ministerial duties” of the navy were was somewhat open to question.  But Congress left no 
doubt as to its intended chain-of-command.  The law ended by specifying that “nothing in 
this act shall be construed to take from the Secretary of the Navy his control of the naval 
forces of the United States.”  In the coming months, it would appear the commissioners 
neglected to read that final clause.38      
 Despite Congress’ clear intent, upon taking office, Crowninshield demonstrated that 
he was willing to defer to officers’ views.  Among his first acts was to solicit John Rodgers’s 
opinion as to who should serve on the new Navy Board (that Rodgers would be one of them 
was a foregone conclusion). Rather than install the three highest-ranking officers to the 
board, Congress gave the secretary of the navy discretion as to who would serve, and 
Crowninshield immediately sought out Rodgers’s help.  Rodgers returned a thoroughly 
candid assessment of his fellow officers.  He informed the secretary that he regarded Isaac 
Chauncey as “better qualified for command at sea,” and readily admitted that Perry and 
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Macdonough, two heroes of the recent war had still never “paid so much attention to the 
naval service as to qualify. . .for such a situation.”  In the end, Rodgers recommended that 
Bainbridge, Hull, and Morris be appointed to the board, and failing one of those he also 
strongly endorsed Porter.  Bainbridge was, at the time, preparing for his Mediterranean 
cruise, but Crowninshield obviously took Rodgers’s advice to heart otherwise.  The first 
three commissioners were Rodgers, Hull, and Porter.39  While administrative ability, proven 
character, and careful attention to duty were certainly factors in this selection, martial success 
seems to have held influence as well.  Outside of Decatur and Bainbridge, who were both 
busily preparing for a lengthy voyage to the Mediterranean, these were arguably the foremost 
heroes of the recent conflict with Britain.      
 Initially, the board members showed no interest in challenging the status quo of 
civilian control.  On their first day, they assumed no responsibility for themselves other than 
writing Crowninshield that they were “ready to receive communications from the secretary of 
the navy” and promptly adjourned until such messages were received.  Two days later, the 
board again convened, but, since they had not heard from the secretary, they again adjourned 
without conducting any business.  In the interim, they established their own internal rules and 
regulations, which specified their hours, who could open their mail, and when members 
could leave the District of Columbia.  They agreed that “while the Board is in session, no 
business of a nature not closely connected with the duties of them is to be introduced by any 
member.”  There is no indication in their minutes as to what exactly they believed those 
duties consisted of, however.40  
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40 BNC, “Journal of Meetings,” April 25-27, 1815. 
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 If it is unclear precisely what conception of their authority Rodgers, Hull, and Porter 
brought to their new office, Crowninshield did little to clarify the situation.  His initial 
correspondence to the board has apparently been lost, but it would appear he allowed them to 
meet for a few days without contacting them in any way, adding to the murky arrangement 
already in place.41  In any case, hints of the commissioners’ broader interpretation of their 
authority begin to appear very quickly in their outgoing correspondence.  By the end of their 
first week, the board wrote a circular to the officer corps asking for lists of all officers under 
the command of each commander, as well as a record of “remarkable conduct, whether good 
or bad” by any junior officer.  “[That] the character and qualifications of each member of our 
navy should be intimately known to the commissioners is obvious,” they urged their fellow 
captains, and assured them that it should be equally obvious “that we are highly interested in 
cherishing merit, and in removing from the service those who do it no honor.”  They go on to 
reiterate their request for “a candid and impartial report of the character, qualifications, and 
remarkable good or bad conduct of each of the officers under your command”42  The 
commissioners obviously believed, not unreasonably given the language of the legislation, 
that they would oversee commissioning and promotion of officers. 
There is no record of Crowninshield objecting to the circular mentioned above.  In 
fact, a few days later he consulted them on whether a purser should be discharged from the 
service based on “the suspicions attached to his character as respects to his intentions of 
going over to the enemy during the late war – and facts of his having disobeyed orders and 
overrun his furlough, as well as his being in arrears to the government for a large amount.”  
                                                 
41 The first volume of “Letters Received from the Secretary of the Navy” begins in 1820.  It is unclear what 
became of the earlier letters. 
42 BNC, “Circular to Navy Commanding Officers,” April 29, 1815, “Letters Sent to Officers.” 
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Not surprisingly, the commissioners agreed that he should be dismissed.43  But it did not take 
long after this for a turf war to break out between Crowninshield and the commissioners.  
The board members believed that they possessed oversight into the movements of squadrons, 
and could dictate not only which officers received assignments, but what those assignments 
were, leaving little need for a secretary of the navy at all.  Crowninshield countered that the 
board was only to handle duties assigned it by himself, and act under his authority.  When the 
board demanded that Crowninshield communicate to them the movements of a particular 
squadron, the secretary flatly refused, creating a deadlock in the Navy Department.44 
 It fell to the president to settle the matter.  For the next three weeks, the board daily 
met and, after noting in its minutes that it had received no reply from the president, promptly 
adjourned.45  While James Madison considered the problem, Bainbridge wrote Porter that, 
should the president rule in Crowninshield’s favor, the board members would find 
themselves “in the honorable status of Clerks to the Secretary’s Clerks.”46  Madison felt 
otherwise, however, ruling that the Secretary of the Navy is an extension of the president, 
and as such “he is understood to speak and act with Executive sanction, or, in other words, 
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44 The actual correspondence between Crowninshield and the Board leading to this standoff has apparently been 
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the Executive is presumed to speak and act through him.”  The Board of Naval 
Commissioners would oversee internal matters, but policy formulation rested firmly in the 
hands of civilian authorities.  “According to the terms of the law,” Madison concluded, “the 
Board is attached to the office of the Secretary of the Navy, and shall discharge all its 
ministerial duties under his superintendence.”47  Madison seemingly settled the matter once 
and for all, not only regarding the board, but the entire officer corps.  His unambiguous 
assertion in favor of civilian control seemingly clarified the civil-military relationship within 
the Navy Department.   
 Madison’s ruling was not as final as it appeared.  The president in many ways merely 
ratified what had already become standard practice in the Navy Department: authority rested 
with the secretary of the navy, who had the power to delegate to naval officers as he saw fit.  
What Madison did not settle was what was appropriate for a secretary to pass along to his 
officer corps.  Even when an agreement on this was explicit between civil and military 
authorities, there was still room for ambiguity.  In the coming years, the board would assume 
for itself – with Crowninshield and his successor’s tacit consent – tremendous authority and 
influence over all matters relating to the officer corps. 
 Upon receiving Madison’s reply, the commissioners seemingly accepted defeat 
gracefully.  Or at least two of them did; Isaac Hull resigned from the board shortly thereafter.  
In the meantime, they wrote the Secretary of the Navy “asking a conference to settle certain 
points of etiquette,” which was most likely meant primarily to clear the air and return to a 
harmonious working relationship.  They agreed that the board should oversee matters of ship 
construction, procuring supplies, and other administrative matters, while the secretary would 
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have control over ship movements and officer assignments.  The commissioners seem to 
have used this meeting as a bargaining session as well.  Somewhat incongruously with the 
division of labor they agreed to, the minutes of the meeting note that it was “generally 
understood that the Secretary should consult this Board in the appointment of officers.”  
Even with Madison’s backing, Crowninshield agreed to defer, at least somewhat, to his 
officers on appointments and promotions.48  
Although no doubt disappointed with their reduced role, and despite having wrung 
some minor concessions from Crowninshield, there is no evidence the commissioners 
surreptitiously sought to seize power for themselves either.  When Joseph Bainbridge wrote 
the board about matters they believed more properly Crowninshield’s responsibility, they 
immediately wrote that Bainbridge’s problems “being a subject however on which alone the 
secretary of the navy has the power of deciding they do not feel themselves at liberty to 
express any opinion relative to your claims without an official notice from him that such 
expression is desired.”49  They also yielded on questions of “pay and subsistence of officers,” 
and immediately referred inquiries on this subject to the secretary.50     
There are, however, hints that the members of the board were frustrated by Madison’s 
ruling, and maintained their resentment for several months.  The first hints of this frustration 
come through in somewhat testy letters sent to officers who communicated directly with the 
secretary on issues that were specifically delegated to the board.  “The Secretary of the Navy 
                                                 
48 BNC, “Journal of Meetings,” June 15, NA. 
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has communicated an extract of your letter of the 12th, which ought, as you will perceive by 
this reference of the Department, to have been addressed to this Board,” they wrote to one 
officer when he failed to go through them to determine how much beef, bread, and pork he 
could take for a cruise.  They made sure to protect their (now smaller) sphere of authority, 
sharply reminding another captain that any letters relating to supplies for the use of the navy 
“must be addressed to the Commissioners of the Navy.”51  Although Madison issued his 
ruling in June, by November the members of the board were still rankled enough to begin 
their report with a reference to the difficulties they struggled to work under stemming from 
“the reserve that unavoidably attends an exercise of powers which are doubted,” and 
contended that their murky legal status made it impossible to “extend as far as is desirable, 
their knowledge of matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States.”52  
 There were, however, a host of matters which Crowninshield was only too happy to 
let the board handle, and Rodgers, Porter, and Decatur, who had replaced Hull, threw 
themselves into their official duties.  The November report which began with a pointed 
reference to the recent spat between the board and Crowninshield went on to cover a wide 
variety of subjects, and make sweeping recommendations to Congress.  Their report 
recommended shutting down several navy yards, dramatically expanding others, removing 
unsatisfactory officers promoted during the war, and setting up a more efficient educational 
apparatus for incoming officers.53   
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The commissioners’ primary focus was on maintaining and overseeing the various 
navy yards, which successive secretaries delegated entirely to them.54  The board also 
assumed near-complete control of ship maintenance and outfitting squadrons for cruises, 
again with the consent of the Navy Department.55  Naval hospitals and the overall health of 
seamen also came under their purview, with generally positive results.56   
 The members of the board took the public trust they held seriously.  One of Decatur’s 
earliest biographers recounts an episode in which a man proposed his invention of a new type 
of gun to the board.  When Decatur appeared uninterested, the man offered him a bribe.  An 
infuriated Decatur assaulted the would-be inventor, and had to be forcibly restrained by 
Rodgers as he threatened to kill the man.57  On a more mundane level, the commissioners’ 
substantial outgoing correspondence shows careful attention to detail and zealous oversight 
of subordinates and navy agents.  
 As already noted, no secretary felt the need to watch his back after Madison ruled 
against the Board; the commissioners did not actively seek to undermine their civilian heads 
or claim undue influence over the officer corps.  Madison’s ruling, however, also left open 
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the possibility that the secretary of the navy could delegate any duties he desired to the 
commissioners, not just those administrative matters specified in the act of congress creating 
the Board.  Although Madison’s ruling asserted that the commissioners’ sphere of 
responsibility did not include personnel, it was the Board, and not the secretary, who wrote 
the new rules and regulations for the navy in 1818.  The proper conduct of officers, the 
consequences of deviation from that conduct, discipline of seamen, and matters of dress and 
ceremony were all spelled out for officers by officers themselves.58 
Another hint of the growing influence of the Board is Rodgers’s ongoing refusal to 
become secretary of the navy.  When Crowninshield resigned in 1818, James Monroe again 
offered the post to Rodgers.  When he declined the first time, the nation had been at war and 
at least the possibility of additional laurels in combat with the British still existed.  Moreover, 
Rodgers had foreseen the creation of some sort of navy board at this point, and he might 
reasonably have assumed that he would enjoy substantial influence within the navy without 
resigning his commission.  By the end of Crowninshield’s tenure, the board’s subordination, 
on paper, to the secretary of the navy was firmly established, and the officer corps might 
have hoped to place one of their own in the secretary’s office.  Yet Rodgers again refused.  
“Whatever attractions the secretaryship might have held for him, they paled in comparison to 
the prestige, prerogatives, and financial security” that came with his commission as a naval 
officer, asserts biographer John Schroeder.59  That is certainly true, but if Rodgers’ position 
on the Board had truly reduced him to the status of “a clerk to the secretary’s clerk,” it is 
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difficult to believe any degree of permanent financial security could have kept him from 
immediately seizing the promotion. Rodgers’ decision to decline the secretaryship a second 
time indicates the growing influence of the Board, and the fact that the officer corps had 
come to believe the Navy Department was no threat to them.   
Indeed, the existence of the Board, and its competent performance, freed presidents 
from having to worry about a potential secretary’s knowledge of the sea and sailing.  
Crowninshield was the last in a series of Navy Department heads to come into the job with 
experience in maritime affairs.  He was succeeded by a series of “legal and juridical” 
secretaries, whose ignorance of maritime affairs naturally served to increase the influence of 
senior officers.60  Smith Thompson, who succeeded Crowninshield as secretary of the navy 
in 1819, had no experience whatsoever in maritime matters.  That is not to say he was 
unsuited for a government post.  He had helped write the New York state constitution, and 
served as chief justice of the New York Supreme Court for four years prior to becoming 
secretary of the navy.  Following his tenure in the Navy Department, he served on the United 
States Supreme Court for almost two decades.61   
Thompson was fifty when he took over the Navy Department.  Having no prior 
maritime experience, he might have felt overwhelmed by the new responsibility, but it does 
not appear he expended much energy learning the new role. Referring to Thompson, John 
Quincy Adams noted that “the office sits easy upon his shoulders.”  Thompson and 
Crowninshield both made a practice of spending a limited amount of time in the nation’s 
                                                 
60 Paullin, Naval Administration, 161. 
61 Edwin Hall, “Smith Thompson,” Coletta, American Secretaries of the Navy, 123-130. 
265 
 
capital, and Adams was not entirely disapproving of their behavior, conceding that the “navy 
commissioners make the duties of that department comparatively light.”62 
Among the reasons Thompson’s duties were “comparatively light” was that the Board 
continued to assume responsibility, with the secretary’s tacit consent, for issues relating to 
officer disputes and duty assignments.  In all cases, the secretary held final authority to 
approve the Board’s decisions, but Crowninshield and Thomson never overruled the Board 
on any matter of consequence.   When Oliver Hazard Perry clashed with the commandant of 
a navy yard over authority, the matter was referred to the board, which ruled in Perry’s 
favor.63    Likewise, when Thomas Macdonough, the hero of the Battle of Plattsburg, and 
Isaac Chauncey clashed, the secretary consulted the board on the matter, and they 
recommended in favor of Macdonough.64  Later, Macdonough again came to the Board’s 
attention, when he was serving under Commodore Charles Stewart in the Mediterranean.  
Their feud became so intense that Stewart relieved Macdonough of command and sent him 
home.  Thompson and president Monroe made the final decision to restore Macdonough to 
duty, but the Board advised the secretary in settling the matter, and John Rodgers especially 
seems to have stayed abreast of the situation and played an influential role in its outcome.65  
The commissioners later corresponded with Crowninshield on “not worthy officers to retire 
to private life.”  Within a year of their clash with Crowninshield, the Board wrote him 
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unapologetically that Joseph Bainbridge had approached them, and not the secretary, about a 
duty assignment, and on their own authority they had informed him that there was no work 
for him to do at that time.66  Crowninshield did not object, and the following year, he 
requested a detailed report and recommendations from the board on the “merit and 
qualifications…of candidates for promotion.”67 
Officially, the secretary of the navy made the final decision in all these cases.  In 
practice, however, it is clear that the Board of Navy Commissioners had assumed a place of 
tremendous influence in all aspects of managing the navy.  No case illustrated the influence 
of the board over the officer corps so well as James Barron’s desperate efforts to return to 
service following his suspension after the Chesapeake-Leopard affair of 1807.  Although on 
paper, Barron’s status in the navy should have been a matter for the secretary to decide, even 
after Crowninshield showed his support for the disgraced captain, Barron found himself 
stymied by the Board of Navy Commissioners, and especially by Stephen Decatur, despite 
the secretary’s views.  Barron’s subsequent duel with Decatur, while certainly in part a 
personal squabble, was also an outgrowth of the ongoing ambiguity of civil-military relations 
and the prevailing culture of honor within the officer corps.      
The suspension had proven devastating for Barron.  Unable to find work in the United 
States, thanks largely to the Jefferson Embargo’s crippling effect on merchant shipping, he 
travelled to Europe to try and support his family.  His stay abroad proved of little value 
financially and he appears to have been miserable the entire time.  London was “a detestable 
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place,” and its people insufferable.68  The separation from his family added greatly to 
Barron’s misery.  Barron, by all evidence an extremely devoted husband and father, regularly 
sent affectionate letters back to his wife and daughters.  His pain intensified when he was 
forced to miss his eldest daughter’s wedding.69  Commerce was stunted there as much or 
more than across the Atlantic thanks to Britain’s epic struggle with Napoleon, and Barron 
had to subsist off the limited income he received from various inventions, with most of this 
going back to his family.70  Repeated efforts to return home during the course of the war 
proved futile.  The most poignant account of his time in Europe comes from John Quincy 
Adams, who testified that Barron had settled all his affairs in Copenhagen and traveled from 
there to Gothenburg for the sole purpose of obtaining passage back to the United States on 
board the John Adams which carried the negotiators sent by the United States to treat with 
Britain.  While immensely sympathetic to his plight, the captain felt he could not allow a 
former naval officer, whose suspension had technically expired, even if he had not been 
officially reinstated, on board and retain his status as a diplomatic vessel.  Barron found 
himself stranded once again.71   
Barron finally reached his native shore in 1818, and Crowninshield, concluding that 
the disgraced captain had served his suspension, readmitted him to the service.   Barron was 
                                                 
68 James Barron to Jane Barron, March 15, 1815, James Barron Papers, Box II, Earl Greg Swemm Library, 
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indefinitely placed on half-pay, however, since he was not on active duty.  Technically, it 
was for the secretary of the navy to determine whether to assign him a command.  But by the 
agreement reached in the aftermath of Madison’s ruling and subsequent practice, the board 
also held substantial power over assignments.  It could only hurt Barron’s chances that 
Crowninshield and Thompson were in the capital infrequently, placing him even more at the 
mercy of the board for a duty assignment.   Stephen Decatur had never abandoned his dim 
view of Barron as an officer that he formed following the Chesapeake-Leopard episode, and 
he may also have carried a personal grudge against Barron.  Whatever the reasons, he 
vigorously opposed allowing Barron any responsibility.72  
A feud soon developed between the two.  While it appears Decatur kept his 
simmering quarrel with Barron a secret, the disgraced former officer clearly did not act alone.  
Jesse Duncan Elliott had been a lieutenant on board the Chesapeake, and had been one of the 
lone officers to side with Barron.  The two were reunited soon after Barron’s return, and 
appear to have consulted together throughout the controversy between Barron and Decatur.  
Elliott did not, however, act from purely disinterested friendship towards his former 
commander.  In his ongoing spat with Perry, he had finally driven the hero of Lake Erie to 
initiate court-martial proceedings against him.  Before he could do so, Perry died on a 
mission to South America, having entrusted Decatur with all the evidence against Elliott 
before leaving.73    Rather than immediately hand all of Perry’s materials over to the Navy 
Department, Decatur held on to them for a time, apparently contemplating whether to take 
any action against Elliott or not.  His decision was questionable, at best, from a civil-military 
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standpoint, and it played a significant part in his death.  Rather than have to formally defend 
his conduct before a court-martial, Elliott merely had to get rid of Decatur, and most 
historians agree that he used Barron as a pawn to do so.  “You have but one enemy in 
Washington,” Elliott wrote to Barron, though it seems more likely that Elliott had but one 
enemy in Washington that he needed Barron to fight for him.74 
 Yet there are indications that Barron also intended to engage in a duel from the outset.  
When Decatur responded that “I . . . never could have been guilty of such egotism as to say 
that ‘I could insult you (or any other man) with impunity,’” the matter could easily have 
ended, with the demands of Barron’s honor satisfied.75  Neither man was willing to let go, 
however.  In the coming weeks, Decatur repeatedly insisted that his opposition to Barron’s 
return came from no disregard for Barron personally, only that he did not consider him 
entitled to a position in the navy, having been guilty of losing a vessel and remaining away 
from the country during a time of war.  Barron, however, was after more than personal 
satisfaction.  Believing Decatur to be his chief obstacle to returning to the navy, he chose to 
interpret every remark as being an insult, and clearly entered the quarrel intending it to lead 
to the dueling field.  Upon receiving a belligerent missive from Decatur, Barron lashed back 
“I consider you as having given an invitation, which I accept,” and then boldly claimed to 
have the choice of weapons for the forthcoming duel.76  Such a claim was patently absurd; 
Decatur in no way issued a challenge in his previous letter.  In the ensuing correspondence, 
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this would become a frequent theme, with Barron interpreting challenges where there were 
none, yet unwilling to take the step of issuing a challenge himself.  “I have not challenged, 
nor do I intend to challenge you,” Decatur forcefully asserted in exasperation, “it will not be 
lost sight of, that your jeopardizing your life depends upon yourself, not upon me.”  Decatur 
then spoke directly to the real issue, Barron’s desire for a duel was done “with a view of 
fighting your own character up.”  Finally forced to make the call to the field himself, Barron 
responded that “whenever you will consent to meet me on fair and equal grounds . . . you are 
at liberty to view this as that call.77  
 The initial duel was delayed, however, as Decatur had no one to act as his second.  
Rodgers and Porter both flatly refused, and wisely counseled Decatur to avoid an affair of 
honor.  It was at this point that Bainbridge, who had not spoken to Decatur since the episode 
in the Mediterranean four years prior, conveniently reappeared in his former rival’s life, 
hailing him on the streets of Washington one day as an old friend and working his way into 
Decatur’s home as a guest.  Bainbridge, upon hearing of the feud with Barron, immediately 
consented to act as Decatur’s second, and the duel was accordingly arranged.  The 
coincidence of Bainbridge’s opportunely timed return to Decatur’s life has prompted 
speculation that he may have been prompted by Elliott and Barron to insure that the duel took 
place.  Historian David Long concludes that, while there is insufficient evidence to convict 
Bainbridge, there is also ample reason for suspicion.78  Whatever the case, the duel was set 
for March 22, 1820 in Bladensburg Maryland.  
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78 David F. Long, “William Bainbridge and the Decatur-Barron Duel: Mere Participant or Active Plotter?” The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 103 no. 1 (January 1979): 34-52; and Long, Ready to 
Hazard, 227-246. 
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As they faced each other on the dueling field, Barron called out that he hoped, should 
the two meet “in a better world” that they would no longer meet as foes.  Decatur poignantly 
responded, “I was never your enemy sir.”  The seconds ignored the opportunity for 
reconciliation and historians will forever speculate if they did so deliberately.  Bainbridge 
snapped that there was to be no communication between the participants until after the duel, 
and matters proceeded accordingly.  Out of consideration for Barron’s poor eyesight, the two 
men fired from an almost suicidal range of eight yards.  Both shots struck in the hip, but only 
one proved fatal.  Barron sank to the ground with a bullet painfully lodged in his hip, while 
Decatur crumpled to the dirt, mortally wounded. 
The Barron-Decatur duel created a sensation at the time, and it has been well-trodden 
ground by historians ever since.  Most of the many historians who have studied the affair 
treat it as a personality clash between two proud men or as an example of the honor culture of 
the time.  It was indisputably both of these.  But it is impossible to overlook the fact that, 
despite having killed a national hero and prominent member of the naval establishment, 
Barron’s career turned around so dramatically with Decatur’s death.  Following Decatur’s 
death, the administrative apparatus of the navy did not immediately turn in Barron’s favor, 
but he got most of what he hoped for within a short time.  Decatur had been unwilling even 
to grant him a hearing, but within months of the duel he appeared before a court-of-inquiry.  
The officers did not recommend him for an assignment, but none of them carried the prestige 
and influence that Decatur had, and Thompson agreed to grant Barron command of the 
Philadelphia Navy Yard.79  He retired in 1838 as the second-highest ranking officer in his 
country’s navy.  Even Barron’s highly sympathetic biographer concedes that “the death of 
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Decatur removed the chief stumbling block that Barron had always encountered in his efforts 
to be employed again.”80 
The secretary of the navy is notable for his absence in Barron’s story.  Thompson 
ultimately gave Barron an assignment only after the Navy Board and a court-of-inquiry 
reinstated him.  Despite his supposed absolute authority in the Navy Department, Thompson 
was, in practice, a minor figure in Barron’s quest for reinstatement.  That he rubber-stamped 
the officer corps decisions regarding Barron, and ignored Decatur’s death altogether, speaks 
to the diminished influence of the office of secretary of the navy just four years after 
Madison emphatically ruled that the secretary served as an extension of the president himself. 
 
The Board of Navy Commissioners survived until 1843, when it was replaced by a set 
of independent bureaus.  In its nearly three decade lifespan, the board repeatedly clashed with 
civilian officials, even contributing to one secretary’s precipitous resignation during the 
Jackson Administration.81  Thanks in part to the passive acceptance of Crowinshield and 
many of his successors, the board became a major force in settling officer disputes, 
disciplining problematic officers, and even duty assignments for senior captains.  But if its 
influence exceeded the original intent of Madison and the Congress, it never quite grew to 
the extent the first three commissioners hoped for.  Historian Craig Symonds exaggerates 
when he contends that although “the act [creating the Board] expressly stated that it was not 
to be construed so as ‘to take from the Secretary of the Navy his control and direction of 
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naval forces’ that was precisely its effect.”82  The board certainly diminished the secretary’s 
power, but it did not, as the first three commissioners apparently hoped, supplant the 
secretary and leave the navy entirely in the hands of its officers.  In its limited ability to 
diminish civilian control, the board was an extension of the naval politics that preceded it.  
For two decades prior to the board’s creation, naval officers and successive secretaries of the 
navy had forged an ad-hoc working relationship, in which the authority of the secretary and 
the expertise of officers were both recognized, and the exact responsibilities of the two 
remained ill-defined.  Like the officers who came before them, members of the Board of 
Navy Commissioners carved out a sphere of influence for themselves, always acknowledging 
the secretary as their superior, but never forgetting that his interests were not necessarily the 
same as theirs.      
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Epilogue 
Two courts-martial rocked the navy in the Jacksonian Era.  One featured a successful 
officer who showed the kind of zeal and aggression the Navy Department had long prized, 
while in the other a relatively unknown peacetime captain ruthlessly slew three of his 
subordinates at sea without any kind of trial.  Yet the first was convicted, reprimanded, and 
soon out of the navy while the second enjoyed a full exoneration.   A variety of factors came 
into play in both cases, and both officers did much in the days leading up to their courts-
martial to secure their fates, but the markedly different outcomes illustrate the rough 
agreement that had been forged regarding spheres of responsibility between civil and military 
authority. 
 David Porter was already frustrated with the Navy Department in 1824 when he 
sailed for his third cruise to the West Indies in two years, and the feeling was mutual.1  He 
had come down with the dreaded yellow fever on his previous voyage, and was lucky to still 
be alive.  Almost as frustrating as the disease-ridden environment were the ostensibly 
friendly Spanish officials Porter had to contend with.  Overwhelmed with their own wars 
against colonial rebellions – or the Latin American Wars of Independence, as they would 
later be called – the Spanish had limited ability or interest in checking the rampant piracy 
Porter was sent to quash, and both Porter and his predecessor often seethed in frustration 
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when they pursued pirates all the way to a Spanish shore, only to be denied permission to 
continue the chase on land.1 
 Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard realized the delicacy of the situation, where 
American commercial interests demanded an end to piracy in the area, but already tense 
relations with Spain required any commodore sent to the region to be skilled in the art of 
diplomacy – something no one would ever think of attributing to Porter.2  Southard’s 
instructions to the commodore were therefore extremely vague.  Porter was to use every 
exertion against the pirates, while making equally great efforts to avoid offending the 
Spanish.  What exactly would constitute inadequate measures against the former or 
unacceptably belligerent behavior towards the latter went unspecified.3 
 After two frustrating and largely ineffective cruises in the West Indies, one of which 
had almost killed him, Porter reacted badly upon being ordered on a third.  He sent a 
belligerent and nearly insubordinate letter of protest to Southard.  The secretary ignored it, 
but relations between the two men were further soured.  When Porter arrived in the West 
Indies again in 1825, he was in no mood to exercise the careful diplomacy the geopolitical 
situation called for.  The Spanish, for their part, soon added deliberate insult to their 
carelessness and lack of cooperation.  When a U.S. Navy lieutenant, Charles Platt, went to 
the city of Fajardo seeking stolen property, he was detained by Spanish officials who refused 
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to believe his identity and forced him to send his clerk back to the ship, twice, to bring 
evidence of his affiliation with the United States.  Platt languished in a Fajardo jail for hours 
throughout the ordeal, and even when he was finally released he was treated to hissing and 
insults by “the ruff scruff of the place” on his way to the beach where a boat waited to return 
him to the Adams.4 
 Porter exploded when he heard Platt’s report on the ordeal.  Gathering a force of 200 
of his men, the commodore rowed back to Fajardo, scattered the Spanish soldiers guarding a 
small battery and spiked the guns.  He then sent word ahead that if he did not receive an 
apology for the shameful treatment of his subordinate, he would march into town, seize those 
responsible, and burn the city to the ground at the slightest resistance.  Spanish officials 
unhesitatingly offered profuse apologies, which Lieutenant Platt summarily accepted, and the 
matter seemed closed.  Porter and his men returned to the John Adams.  Porter’s biographer 
speculates that he “then settled down to await the commendation he expected the government 
to extend.”5  Such an expectation would have been in keeping with Navy Department 
practice in many ways.  Porter had refused to brook insult and had defended his nation’s 
honor.  Even the Spanish seemed to have felt he was within his rights, as they never formally 
protested.6 
By this time, however, Porter had made a thorough enemy of Secretary of the Navy 
Samuel Southard, who considered him insubordinate and quarrelsome.  Moreover, president 
James Monroe had only recently issued his famous doctrine against European meddling in 
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New World affairs.  For all its rhetoric, the United States was ill-equipped to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine, and the president looked askance at one of his officers giving Britain or 
France a pretext to insert themselves into US-Spanish relations.  The Spanish already had 
ample reason for hostility towards the United States, as Andrew Jackson had only recently 
invaded their territory in Florida.7 
Porter did himself no favors either, responding to questions about his handling of the 
situation with his usual complete disregard for tact.  His letters to the department were 
combative; one even got him a separate charge of insubordination.  Moreover, Porter 
published a defense before the court-of-inquiry even met, in which he excoriated the 
president (while also dedicating the pamphlet to him).  It was likely the tone of this pamphlet 
that insured the Adams and Southard would have Porter charged with insubordination and 
disobedience to orders as soon as he returned to the United States.8 
The court-martial ruled that Porter had indeed acted improperly and suspended him 
from the service, with pay, for six months.  He responded by resigning, believing he could 
never again serve in the navy with any dignity.  He went on to serve in the Mexican Navy for 
a time, and later represented the United States to the Ottoman Empire as a civilian 
ambassador.  It was while in Turkey that Porter famously commented that, “a man of war is a 
petty kingdom, governed by a petty despot.”9  He may have been thinking back to his own 
ouster from the navy, and bitter that his authority was undermined.  Regardless, events in the 
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U.S. Navy were about to confirm his assessment.  Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, an officer 
known more for his biographies of Oliver Hazard Perry than anything accomplished at sea, 
set sail in 1842 on a training cruise with a green crew and a junior officer who may have 
been insane. 
That officer, one Phillip Spencer, the son of Secretary of State John Canfield Spencer, 
had already had a problematic naval career when he sailed on the Somers in 1842.  Obsessed 
with secret societies – he founded Chi Psi Fraternity at Union College – Spencer was always 
a troubled student, abandoning more than one school that his fathered shipped him off to.  
The navy seemed a more promising road to building character in the boy and making 
something of him, and his father secured a midshipman’s warrant for him in November of 
1841.  But the elder Spencer’s hopes on this score proved in vain.  Phillip struck a superior 
officer one his first cruise, an offense that could have easily resulted in his execution much 
earlier, but the navy declined to pursue it.  Instead, apparently in deference to Spencer’s 
connections, they overlooked the matter and sent him on a second cruise a few months later, 
only to have to send him home early for getting himself extraordinarily (even by naval 
standards) drunk while on duty.  The captain accepted Spencer’s resignation in lieu of court-
martialing him, but once again the highest ranks of the navy chose to grant the boy another 
chance.  In the fall of 1842, just a year after entering the navy, he was ordered to report to 
Captain Alexander Slidell Mackenzie for a training cruise on board the brig Somers.10 
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Already overstocked with junior officers, and disgusted by Spencer’s reputation, 
Mackenzie sought to have him removed from the ship prior to sailing.  His efforts proved 
fruitless, and he sailed still stuck with the arrogant and troublesome young midshipman.11  
Once at sea, Spencer’s old habits reasserted themselves.  Mackenzie describes Spencer as an 
odd man, who showed deference to his face but often “was loudly and blasphemously 
vituperative against me, and … often abused me in the most outrageous and violent terms, 
and declared that it would give him real pleasure to roll me overboard from the round top.”12  
Spencer’s actions especially troubled Mackenzie since he was already overseeing an 
unusually unruly and insubordinate crew.13  Yet he never expected the chilling report he 
received from James Wales, a purser’s steward, on the night of November 25.  Wales 
claimed that Spencer had approached him and asked him to join in a mutiny; Spencer 
supposedly hoped to take control of the ship, kill the officers and any sailors who refused to 
join him, and begin cruising as a pirate vessel.14 
Mackenzie immediately ordered Spencer’s arrest and, lacking space belowdecks to 
confine the prisoner, had him kept in chains on deck.  But this did not end his troubles.  The 
crew continued to act insubordinately, and the loss of one of the sails the next day, what 
would have normally been seen as a careless but not uncommon incident, took on ominous 
implications.  Shortly thereafter, Mackenzie had two other men arrested, Chief Bosuns Mate 
Samuel Cromwell and Seaman Elisha Small.  Both had been implicated by a piece of paper 
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found among Spencer’s possessions that listed those whom he considered reliable in the 
upcoming mutiny.    
Tensions continued to mount, and Mackenzie barely quelled what he feared was the 
beginning of an uprising two nights later.  By this point, the captain was genuinely afraid.  
He had no way of knowing how many of the crew were in on the plot, and felt he could only 
trust his junior officers.  He could have made for a foreign port, and disembarked Spencer 
there to await transport back to the United States for trial, but he feared embarrassing his 
country in the process.  Finally, he concluded the only option left to him was the immediate 
hanging of Spencer and his two alleged co-conspirators.15  He informed the three men, much 
to their dismay, and gave them only an hour to prepare themselves to meet death.  All were 
hanged from the yardarm, and their bodies buried at sea.   
Mackenzie’s revelation of what he had done upon returning to port sent shockwaves 
through the nation.  Public sentiment was initially strongly against Mackenzie.  The court, 
however, concluded that he had acted in the only way possible under the circumstances.  
Despite vehement protests from Spencer’s father, the president endorsed the court’s findings; 
Mackenzie suffered no official sanction or reprimand for the deaths of three men.  John 
Tyler, in explaining his decision to sign off on the verdict, indicated his belief that he lacked 
the right to do otherwise.  “If [the court] had ordered Mackenzie shot, I would not have 
interposed to save him,” Tyler commented.16   
Avoiding official sanction, of course, did not remove the cloud over Mackenzie’s 
career, and he never again received orders that offered him a chance to distinguish himself.  
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Still, the markedly differing treatment of the two officers reveals much about attitudes within 
and about the navy in Jacksonian America.  A captain’s authority over his own ship remained 
sacred.  Even if the government frowned on Mackenzie’s actions, the fact that he emerged 
from killing three men on his own authority without official penalty would have sent a clear 
message to any officer thinking of doing anything less to his crew.  Likewise, any crew 
thinking of protesting what they perceived as excessively authoritarian treatment from their 
captain would have certainly given thought to Mackenzie’s exoneration.  Porter, on the other 
hand, had acted as a representative of the United States government in an international 
incident, one that might have embroiled the country in war.  Crucially, Porter also evinced 
disrespect for the office of the secretary of the navy in the immediate aftermath of the 
incident, while Mackenzie, although defending his tremendous exercise of raw power on 
ship, remained respectful of the department upon his return.  Still, even if the two had 
exchanged attitudes, they would not have exchanged verdicts.  Porter’s actions fell squarely 
in the realm of international relations, and defied the administration’s explicitly-stated 
foreign policy.  Mackenzie’s actions related to a senior officer’s handing of his subordinates 
and his ship at sea.  While his actions were extreme, they nonetheless fit with long-
established precedent that the civilian government, be it in the form of Congress, the courts, 
the secretary of the navy, or even the president, deferred to officers when it came to dealings 
with the men under their command. 
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Conclusion 
 
The implicitly agreed upon spheres of authority illustrated in Porter and Mackenzie’s 
courts-martial had been well established since the years immediately following the War of 
1812.  For internal matters and especially management of a ship at sea, the Navy Department 
was willing to defer to naval officers.  In questions of American foreign policy and relations 
with other powers, however, officers had to act within the framework set by the president, 
and conveyed to them by the secretary of the navy.  In Mackenzie’s case, the cabinet, with 
the exception of the father of one of the hanged men, was willing to defer to the naval 
officers presiding over the court-martial, who granted the broadest possible discretion to the 
captain of a ship at sea.  Porter, because his action ranged into international relations and 
arguably defied his instructions from the secretary, received no sympathy, including from his 
fellow officers who tried him.  Although not formally established by Congress and subject to 
fluctuation with each new secretary of the navy, a rough division of responsibilities had 
evolved in the civil-military arrangement of the United States Navy.  This arrangement was 
fixed in place during the first months of the Board of Navy Commissioners. 
The power-sharing arrangement in the United States Navy after the War of 1812 
contains hints of Huntington’s objective civilian control, or the “normal theory of civil-
military relations,” in that the navy was largely given the freedom to manage its internal 
affairs as it saw fit, while the civilian government handled political and policy questions.1 
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The secretary’s authority, confirmed as an extension of the president’s by Madison’s ruling 
regarding the navy board, was theoretically pervasive, but in practice certain areas remained 
under the purview of the officer corps.  The Navy Department expected its officers to oversee 
ship construction and maintenance, procurement and supply issues, and the training of junior 
officers.  Congress established the size and financial resources of the navy, the president 
determined where and how it would be used, and the secretary issued directives to officers 
and served as a go-between of the officer corps and the government.  The ultimate settlement 
between the secretary of the navy and the Board of Navy Commissioners only enhanced this 
situation, as the board increasingly became the sole authority over the use of navy materials.   
 Where the civilian government did assert its authority, the question of how officers 
could respond to disagreeable orders or oversight was more complicated.  Throughout the 
first three decades of the navy’s existence, naval officers attempted to guard their freedom of 
action in a variety of ways.  Whenever an officer felt slighted or received orders that 
challenged his honor, for example, his first solution was usually a threat to resign.  To their 
credit, secretaries of the navy proved increasingly less likely to tolerate such threats.  
Stoddert allowed Thomas Truxtun to remain in the navy after he resigned during the Quasi 
War, which almost certainly contributed to Truxtun’s belief a few years later that he would 
not be punished for threatening to resign again under Robert Smith; he was mistaken.  
Likewise, Paul Hamilton tried to sooth James Lawrence’s feelings when he threatened to 
resign during the War of 1812, but also indicated his willingness to call the aggrieved 
captain’s bluff if it came to it.   
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Officers could also resort to simply defying orders, but this was exceedingly rare.  
Although Barron and Rodgers threatened to ignore Smith’s directives and fight a duel in 
1806, they ultimately chose not to go through with it.  Lawrence paid with his life for 
ignoring Jones’s directives in the war with Britain, but his was an exceptional case.  Officers 
could also make appeals to the secretary, but with mixed results.  David Porter’s efforts to 
gain greater control over his expenditures failed, but secretaries often acceded to what they 
considered reasonable requests. 
 Threats of resignation and outright defiance usually proved ineffective in checking 
the Navy Department’s influence, but that does not mean civil-military relations in the early 
navy were always hostile.  Naval officers maintained their autonomy best by cultivating 
cordial relationships with the secretary and proving themselves trustworthy.  Secretaries 
proved willing to defer to their officers on a host of matters, and men like Thomas Truxtun 
and John Rodgers routinely acted with minimal oversight.  Officers who lived up to the 
department’s expectations earned a measure of autonomy while those like David Porter who 
clashed with the department no matter who was secretary suffered much closer scrutiny. 
In part, there was considerable trust between secretaries of the navy and their officers.  
Most secretaries in this period came from military backgrounds, and had extensive maritime 
experience.  The exception to this, Paul Hamilton, a South Carolina plantation owner with no 
ties to the sea, endured the most difficulty with his officers.   Ironically, Hamilton was also, 
in ways, the most in line with objective control in his wartime leadership.  He sent ships out 
with extremely vague orders during the War of 1812, granting tremendous latitude to officers 
in how they should take the fight to the enemy.  This was, however, more a product of his 
administrative and strategic ineptitude than ideology.  Hamilton was not particularly unique 
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though.  All secretaries of the navy prior to the War of 1812 were perfectly happy to yield 
considerable autonomy to officers they trusted.   
    Naval officers’ commitment to the office of the president transcended party.   
Although officers usually held sympathies to one party or another, they seldom engaged in 
overtly partisan behavior.  They willingly complied with Jefferson’s gunboat program, 
although some expressed private reservations about it.  They likewise refrained from publicly 
commenting on the debate over whether or not to go to war with Britain, although all 
certainly felt the nation’s honor was greatly aggrieved by its former mother country.  The 
first generation of American naval officers stayed well clear of partisan politics. 
 But successive secretaries’ reliance on the normal theory of civil-military relations 
lapsed considerably in wartime; Stoddert, Smith, and especially Jones plunged into every 
detail of managing the fight against America’s enemies.  The experiences of the U.S. Navy in 
the Quasi-War, Barbary Wars, and War of 1812 bear out Eliot Cohen’s arguments in favor of 
active civilian oversight.2  In all three conflicts, presidents and secretaries of the navy used 
their power to oversee (or meddle, depending on perspective) in all aspects of how the war 
was fought.  Officers in both the Quasi War and the Tripolitan War were recalled or 
cashiered for failing to act with enough aggression.  Strategy came from the president or 
secretary; the two usually spoke with one voice, so that it is difficult to determine where 
ideas originated).  Stoddert, Smith, and Jones all felt no qualms about giving detailed orders 
and specific instructions on how to wage war, and the exceptions to this practice, such as 
Richard Valentine Morris in the Mediterranean, usually failed to achieve any real gains for 
the United States.  The secretary who came closest to true objective control in this period was 
                                                 
2 Cohen, Supreme Command.  
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Paul Hamilton in the first months of the War of 1812, and his oversight of the Navy 
Department courted disaster.  Far from appreciating his loose oversight – which, as noted 
earlier, stemmed more from administrative incompetence than ideology – naval officers 
welcomed his departure and the installation of William Jones as his replacement.  The 
welcome proved short-lived for many officers, who quickly began to push back against 
Jones’s strict oversight and attempts at changing the naval culture.   
Naval culture, however, was never purely a product of the officers.  Every secretary 
of the navy worked to shape the culture of the officer corps, none more explicitly than 
Benjamin Stoddert.  Stoddert laid the foundation of naval culture that was to follow, 
emphasizing the importance of action, courage, and honor.  His successors, while less 
forthright about their expectations, all built on Stoddert’s foundation.  The Navy Department 
wanted officers who refused to accept insult, who pursued their nation’s reputation at all 
costs, and who showed real courage in battle.  Officers who failed to fit this mold found 
themselves unemployed or, if they were lucky, assigned to a post on shore that offered no 
hope of distinction.     
This honor culture produced its share of negative consequences.  Officers fought 
reckless, often foolish duels that deprived the navy of valuable subordinates.  Secretaries of 
the navy had to devote considerable time to settling personal squabbles over perceived insults 
and relative rank among their senior officers.  And in the case of Thomas Truxtun, one of the 
foremost heroes of the service left the navy over a question of honor.  That the oversight 
from the civilian government was never particularly close only added to such problems.  Yet 
issues over honor never prompted any secretary of the navy to greatly expand his oversight 
of the corps.  Likewise, while officers openly proclaimed that honor mattered more than 
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subordination, very rarely did an officer defy orders for the sake of his reputation.  
Secretaries of the navy understood, and encouraged, the officers’ high valuation of honor and 
acted cautiously to avoid offending sensibilities; for their part, officers understood that they 
could only go so far in defense of their reputation.  
Though their devotion in practice occasionally lapsed, naval officers never denied 
their commitment to civilian control, nor did the navy ever face any kind of large-scale 
rebellion from the officer corps.  Officers and their civilian superiors reached arrangements, 
some explicit, some understood, on the division of responsibilities.  Tensions arose on a 
regular basis, and compliance could be grudging, but the president’s ability to issue orders 
was never challenged, and aside from the clash at the creation of the navy board, the 
secretary’s ability to act as the voice of the president was likewise consistently respected.  
Despite the powerful personalities and often oversized egos of the earliest American naval 
officers, they bequeathed to future generations a staunch commitment to obedience to orders 
and service to the government.  This, alongside the stirring victories over French, Tripolitan, 
and British vessels, ranks among their contributions to their country. 
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